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4  RABIAN SEA
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the decade of the 1870s Britain was faced 
with the problem of what policy to pursue towards her 
neighbor, Afghanistan, on British India's Northwest 
frontier. The problem arose as a result of Russian 
expansion in Central Asia, and was further aggravated 
by Russia's war with Turkey which for a time threatened 
to precipitate war between England and Russia.
The question of what type of policy to have 
towards a neutral country in danger of going under the 
domination of an opposing power faced Britain in her 
relations with Afghanistan at this period. However, this 
question is still a very pertinent one today. In fact 
it is such situations that pose a threat to world peace, 
rather than the possibility of a direct confrontation 
between the major powers. There are enough similarities 
between the position in which Britain found herself in 
relation to Afghanistan, and the situation in which the 
United States now finds herself in relation to small 
neutral countries threatened by political and/or military
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aggression, that it is hoped some of the points brought 
out by this study may be of some use in analyzing the 
current situation.
The decision of the British Government to enter 
upon a war with Afghanistan had far-reaching effects, for 
it not only contributed to financial difficulties in 
India, but it led to such a protestation on moral grounds 
that the support of the Conservative Government was 
greatly undermined. Gladstone made much of what was 
termed, by supposedly impartial reporters in the Annual 
Register, "a very wanton and a very wicked war."^ The 
defeat of the Conservative Government in the general 
election of 1880 was due in no small degree to the 
disastrous results of the Afghan policy.
Objectives
The purpose of this study is to discover just 
how the decision to declare war upon Afghanistan in 
November of 1878 was arrived at by the British Government. 
In doing this, the study hopes to answer such questions 
as: who was responsible for the formulation of British
policy towards Afghanistan? What motivated that policy? 
Was sufficient information available for making a sound
^Annual Register, 1878 (London: Longmans and Co., 
1879), CXX, 194.
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decision? Where was the decision made, and who was 
responsible for it?
In addition, it is hoped that certain hypotheses 
may be drawn concerning the decision-making process in 
general which may be of some value when applied to the 
study of other foreign policy decisions. Establishing 
the validity of such hypotheses will depend on many more 
research projects of this type being undertaken which 
utilize the decision-making approach, but perhaps the 
present study may make some contribution in the direction 
of helping establish certain data regarding the nature of 
decisions and decision-making.
Approach
The approach being used in this study is basically 
the decision-making approach as set forth by Richard C. 
Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, in their book,
pForeign Policy Decision-Making. Glenn D. Paige's The
OKorean Decision, has also been used as a further guideline, 
This approach has been modified somewhat, and combined with 
certain aspects of the historical approach, such as
^Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, 
Foreign Policy Decision-Making (New York: The Free Press 
of Glencoe, 1952).
^Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision (New York:
The Free Press, 1968).
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providing historical background of the decision in order 
to better suit the case at hand. The mere fact that the 
decision was made almost ninety-three years ago necessi­
tates providing some information pertaining to the back­
ground and environment in which the decision took place, 
in order to make it comprehensible.
The Snyder-Bruck-Sapin approach is essentially an 
ordering device. In developing their approach these three 
gentlemen believe that an understanding of all States is 
to be founded on an understanding of any one State through 
the use of a scheme which will permit the analytical con­
struction of properties of action which are shared in common 
by all specific States. They reject the assumption that 
two different analytical schemes are required simply because 
two States behave differently. They approach State action 
from an Actor-Situation point of view, the Actors being 
those whose action is the action of the State, otherwise 
called decision-makers.
The scheme is intended to provide certain advantages.. 
The frame of reference is designed to be more inclusive. The 
system provides for a limited number of categories for the 
phenomena of international relations, as well as for the 
identification of key variables which may explain State 
behavior. The focal point is shifted to the decision-maker, 
thus avoiding some of the problems of the objective- 
subjective dilemma. This focus also provides a way of
5
organizing the determinants of action around those officials 
who act for the political society. This aids in relating 
domestic factors to international politics.
This approach attempts to find out why one particu­
lar decision is made instead of another. This involves a 
look at alternatives and an attempt to discover what factors 
contributed to the particular selection. In doing this, 
emphasis is placed on three main variables: spheres of
competence, information and communication, and motivation. 
These categories are further subdivided, with the idea 
being to take each bit of information and place it in the 
proper category. The format of this study, though based 
largely on the concepts of the Snyder-Bruck-Sapin approach, 
and encompassing their main topics, has been organized in 
a slightly different pattern.
Historical Setting
A background is given of the history of Anglo- 
Afghan relations, in order to establish a better under­
standing of the development of British policy towards 
Afghanistan. This serves to orient both the researcher 
and the reader, and inasmuch as the decision under con­
sideration involves a change in policy, that change can 
only be understood on the basis of comparison with the 
preceding policy. Also, the past experiences of the 
British Government in dealing with Afghanistan provides
6
some sort of yardstick for measuring capability and compe­
tence in understanding and evaluating the past relationship,
and its effect on the present.
Organizational Setting
Since decision-making behavior takes place within 
a complex organizational setting, it is necessary to be 
familiar with this setting in order to judge authority 
(competence) to act, as well as the decision-maker's role, 
actual and constitutional. The organizational structure, 
the chain of command, the various duties and functions of 
the offices concerned, are carefully analyzed, also the
limitations of the various offices.
The Actors
This scheme focuses its main attention on- the 
decision-makers. Therefore, it is important to study all 
phases of the various Actors which pertain to the decision. 
Each Actor is viewed from the standpoint of his office and 
role, including his role expectations. Also viewed are 
the Actor's background, experience, qualifications, value 
system, and personality.
Some of the specific points to be noted for this 
study include the Actors' views of imperialism, their 
stand on the Eastern Question, their attitude toward war 
and peace, and their feelings regarding the conduct of
foreign affairs.
Decision
The decision itself takes place within the organiza­
tional setting, and may be described as an input-output 
function, with the aggregation of the variables serving 
as the input, ?.nd the resultant decision as the output.
This approach serves to point up the fact that decisions 
are not isolated events, but structured and determined by 
the variables. The final decision is generally the 
result of a sequence of events and factors, and also of 
intermediary decisions which set the stage for the final 
action.
Determinants of Decision
Under this category are considered the three basic 
variables pertaining to decisions, as outlined by Snyder, 
Bruck, and Sapin, with a slight change in terminology, for 
the term "capability" has been substituted for "spheres of 
competence."
Communication and Information
The communication network closely parallels the 
authority relationship of the Actors. It is important 
for circulating orders and directives, and for supplying 
information from one department to another, or from one
8
Actor to another. In this particular decision the com­
munication network was a vital link between the Home Govern­
ment in London and the Government of India in Calcutta.
The flow of information between these two points was 
essential for cohesive action, and when any inadequacies 
appeared in the transmittal of vital information, the 
results were apt to be serious.
Information must be viewed from both the standpoint 
of accuracy and interpretation. Thus the decision-maker's 
perception of information may be affected to varying degrees 
by both his motivation and his competence. Action is 
necessarily based in part on information, and thus the more 
accurate the information, and the freer the decision-maker 
from subjectivity in interpreting the information, the 
better the quality of the decision.
Motivation
Motivation has been described very simply by 
James Olds, who said, "Some quality in the system of things 
is presented, perceived; some other quality in the system 
of things is wanted, motivated; some path of behavior 
connects the presented quality to the wanted one, and the 
behavior is thereby motivated. . . . It is based on the 
present prediction of a specific outcome over this behavior
pathway, and the want for the specific outcome."^ Motives 
are not inherent but acquired, and possess the characteristic 
of durability and persistence. They have been described 
by Snyder, Bruck and Sapin as "acceptable justifications 
for present, past, and future programs of action.
The motivation of foreign policy decision-makers 
tends to make them respond in specific, often predictable, 
ways to certain stimuli— rather like a conditioned stimulus- 
response situation. Motivation is extremely important to 
foreign-policy decisions, and thus a knowledge of the 
Actors' motivations is a key to the understanding of those 
decisions. Motivation, as viewed in this study, consists 
of national objectives, influences of social values and 
the needs and values of society on the Actors, and the 
significance of personality.
Capability
The third determinant of decision used in this study 
is capability. This factor necessarily enters into any 
foreign-policy decision in several aspects. First of all, 
the capability of the Actor to implement his decision, or 
his authority to act, must be considered. Secondly, as this 
decision involved war, military capability was important.
^James Olds, The Growth and Structure of Motives 
(Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956), p. 197.
^Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p. 14 6.
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Another aspect of capability investigated is that of 
financial capability, for a decision involving full-scale 
hostilities must include a consideration of financial 
ability. Perhaps the most important aspect of capability 
in this particular instance, that of political capability, 
will also be considered.
Situation
The situation is the point at which the determinants 
of decision converge. After isolating each of the three 
variables for analytical purposes, they must then be con­
nected, and in the process of the interrelationship become 
more comprehensible. Thus the decision-maker's view of the 
situation is a combination of his information plus motiva­
tion plus capability.
Scope
The present study is concerned with the specific 
decision of the British Government to declare war on 
Afghanistan in November of 1878. This particular decision 
presents several complications, such as the problem of 
long-distance decision-making versus on-the-spot decision­
making; an overlapping of command; and a difference in 
perspectives. The change in British policy towards Afghan­
istan in March of 1876 is investigated, for it was this 
change that was eventually to lead to the decision. The
11
important intermediary decisions are also viewed due to 
their contribution to the final resolution.
CHAPTER II
THE HISTORICAL SETTING
The decisions that led to the Second Afghan War 
(1878-1880) had some of their roots in the past. Thus an 
understanding of the policy of the Disraeli Government 
toward Afghanistan necessarily entails a comprehension of 
Anglo-Afghan relations up to that time. In surveying the 
development of Anglo-Afghan relations, a certain pattern 
emerges. The "Forward Policy" as developed in the mid­
nineteenth century actually was the same policy that 
dominated the scene from the very beginning of their 
relations. In Britain's successive attempts to establish 
her influence over Afghanistan, one primary motive stands 
out— that of the defense of India from foreign aggression, 
or more precisely from Russian aggression. Each time 
Russia began stretching out towards the south, the British 
reacted with a "forward policy," while as long as the situa­
tion was calm and without ostensible threats, a "stationary 
policy" prevailed.
The first British contact with Afghanistan was in
180 8 when Mountstuart Elphinstone was sent by the British
Government on a "magnificent embassy." Elphinstone's
12
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mission was a result of the British fear of Russian and 
French designs on India, and had for its purpose an 
alliance between Britain and Afghanistan against those two 
powers.1
Elphinstone and his suite were received by the 
Afghan Amir, Shah Shuja, in Peshawar. The mission was 
successful, and a formal treaty was drawn up which guaran­
teed British assistance to the Afghan ruler only in case 
of joint attack by France and Russia.
The second formal contact of the British with the
Afghans was made by Alexander Burns, who belonged to the
Bombay Army. With the approval of Lord Bentinck, then 
Governor-General of India, Burns started early in 1832 on 
a long journey through Peshawar, the Khyber Pass to Kabul 
and Bukhara. His mission was one of exploration, both 
geographic and political. He was well received by the Amir 
Dost Mohammed, and upon his return to India he brought with 
him optimistic reports about the development of good trade 
in the markets of Central Asia. In 1833 Burns was sent by 
Bentinck to England to give to the home government the 
results of his travels.^
^Halford Lancaster Hoskins, British Routes to 
India (Philadelphia: Longmans, Green and Co., 1928), p. 67.
^L. J. Trotter, Earl of Auckland (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1893), pp. 40-41; Sir Kerr Fraser-Tytler,
Afghanistan (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 
pp. 88-89.
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When the Whig Ministry of Lord Melbourne took over 
the reigns of government. Lord Auckland was appointed 
Viceroy of India. The ministry felt that "India was 
entering on a period of internal tranquility and prosper­
ity."^ With this in mind, the Whig Ministry thought that 
Lord Auckland "could hardly make any very serious errors.
While still in England, Lord Auckland shared the 
idea of Russophobia with Lord Palmerston who was then the 
head of the Foreign Office. Palmerston stated that "Russia 
must be forestalled" in her designs and intrigues against 
"the lands bordering India," and that "Afghanistan held the 
key position on the land route to India.Auckland 
brought with him from England a feeling of uneasiness in 
regard to Russian designs. Thus, afraid of the approach 
of Russian intrigue and its influence in Afghanistan, he 
ordered Alexander Burns in September 1836 to pay a visit 
to Kabul, nominally on a commercial mission.^ Actually, 
it soon turned into a political mission. Burns was very 
successful in his early negotiations with the Amir, and the
^Fraser-Tytler, pp. 83-84.
4lbid.
SPaul Knaplund, The British Empire 1815-1939 (New 
York: Harper and Brothers”, 19 41) , p. 431
^Archibald Forbes, The Afgan Wars, 1839-1842 & 
1878-1880 (London: Seeley and Co., Ltd., 1896), p. 11.
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Amir himself "was eager for a British alliance. . . .
In the middle of November, 1837 a Russian agent 
arrived in Kabul and while Dost Mohammed was inclined 
toward the British, provided they would help him restore 
Peshawar under his authority (it had been annexed by the 
Sikh, Ranjit Singh in 1833 by force), the Amir "made no 
concealment of his approaches to Persia and Russia in 
despair of British good offices."®
On January 20, 1838 Auckland wrote to Burns telling 
him that Dost Mohammed must give up all hope of obtaining 
Peshawar, that in keeping the peace between Lahore and Kabul 
the Government of India was really doing him (Dost Mohammed) 
a service of the highest value, and that consequently. Dost 
Mohammed must conclude no treaties with foreign powers on 
pain of British displeasure.® He wrote the same things to 
Dost Mohammed in a separate letter which offended the Amir 
because it was written "in a dictatorial and supercilious 
manner.
Burns was placed in a difficult position, and as a
Ĝ. T. Garrett and EdwardThompson, Rise and 
Fulfillment of British Rule in India (London: Macmillan
and Co., Ltd., 1934), p. 335.
®Forbes, p. 8.
Ĝ. P. Moriarity, "India and the Far East 1833-1849," 
The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy 1815-1866 
(New York: Macmillan Co., 1923), p̂  206.
lOporbes, p. 9.
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consequence his mission failed. With its failure, the 
Russian mission began to rise in importance. Thus Auckland 
resolved to replace Dost Mohammed with the restoration of 
Shah Shuja, who had been dethroned in 1809 and was a 
British prisoner in Ludianah, India.
While all this was going on, the Persian army, led 
by Mohammed Shah, had laid seige to Herat, an important 
city in northwestern Afghanistan. The Russians were also 
intriguing in the Persian Court, and this development seemed 
a further threat to British India.
On October 1, 1838 Lord Auckland issued the Simla 
Manifesto which set forth his policy and included the 
following points: (1) Denunciation of Dost Mohammed on the 
grounds that he had made a sudden unprovoked attack on 
Ranjit Singh, (2) that in the siege of Herat by the Persian 
Army Dost Mohammed was giving support to Persia, and (3) 
that his brothers, the chiefs of Kandahar, had "given their 
adherence to the plan of P e r s i a . T h u s  it was decided 
to send a British expedition into Afghanistan to establish 
Shah Shuja on the throne. Perhaps the prime motive for 
the whole expedition is contained in the following sentence 
from the Simla Manifesto:
The welfare of our possessions in the East requires 
that we should have on our western frontier an ally 
who is interested in the resisting of aggression and
lljustin McCarthy, A History of Our Own Times 
(New York: International Book Co., 1894), I, 182.
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establishing tranquility, in the place of chiefs 
ranging themselves in subservience to a hostile 
power, and seeking to promote schemes of conquest 
and aggrandizement.12
The siege of Herat was raised on September 8, 1838. 
"Hardly had the Manifesto of October 1, 1838 appeared, when 
news arrived from Persia which put the Government of India 
in a d i l e m m a . B u t  Auckland still wanted to prosecute 
his policy of the invasion of Afghanistan and the dethrone­
ment of Dost Mohammed, replacing him with an English "puppet" 
supported by British bayonets.
The British were successful in placing Shah Shuja 
on the throne, but not in maintaining him there. Archibald 
Forbes points out that under Shah Shuja's administration, 
"oppression and corruption were rampant in every department 
of internal administration. Both the nobles and people 
alike were r e s e n t f u l . T h e  people were not contented, and 
"it soon became abundantly clear that the Shah had not even 
a small measure of Afghan s u p p o r t . "1^
By the Spring of 1841 the cost of continued occupa­
tion of Afghanistan was causing much anxiety both in 




l^Howard Robinson, The Development of the British 
Empire (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1922), p. 202.
18
in India decided to reduce the number of troops in Kabul 
and to cut the subsidies paid to the chiefs to keep the 
passes open.lG when the allowances of the Chiefs were 
cut, the Eastern Ghilzais revolted. Though at first they 
seemed like isolated local outbreaks, the insurrections 
continued until they reached Kabul, finally precipitating 
the First Afghan War.
The British Commander at Kabul was General 
Elphinstone, who was ill, incompetent and desirous of 
being relieved of his post. He attempted to withdraw 
British troops, after the massacre of Sir Alexander Burns 
and his household and the murder of the British envoy.
Sir William Macnaghten. "Disorganization and panic 
marked the departure of the army; deceit and treachery 
followed the army to its destruction in the passes beyond 
the c i t y . "17 out of sixteen thousand soldiers only one 
man lived to reach Jellalabad. Thus the first British 
attempt to establish control over Afghanistan ended in 
disaster. "Though our military success, and apparently 
our political success, was complete for a time, the 
result was, as everyone knows, most disastrous in every 
point of view, and no one of any authority is now found
l^E. L. Woodward, The Age of Reform (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1938), p. 204.
l^George D. Bearce, British Attitudes Towards 
India (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 269.
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to defend either the justice or the wisdom of our
*1 pmeasures."
Following the British defeat, Dost Mohammed was 
released from prison and subsequently returned to 
Afghanistan to resume his throne. He was naturally 
hostile to the British for some years following, but in 
1855 he agreed to enter into a treaty with the East India 
Company. By the terms of this treaty, the East India 
Company agreed to respect the Afghan territories held by 
the Amir, and in return the Amir agreed to respect the 
territories of the East India Company.
Anglo-Afghan relations were further strengthened 
by another treaty made between the Company and Dost Mohammed 
on January 26, 1857. At this time Britain was at war with 
Persia, and a great deal of the treaty has to do with the 
war, but some points of future importance were contained 
in it. For one thing, the Company agreed to pay the Amir 
a subsidy of a lakh (10,000 L.).of rupees a month for 
military purposes, providing at the same time for British 
officers to reside in Afghanistan to see that funds 
were properly spent. The subsidy was to be discontinued 
upon the cessation of hostilities between Britain and
IScauses of the Afghan War; Being a Selection of 
Papers Laid before Parliament (London: Chatto and Windus,
1879), p. 1. Cited hereafter as C.A.W.
l^Treaty between the East India Co. and Ameer Dost 
Mohammed, May 1, 1855, C.A.W., p. 2.
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Persia, and the British officers to be withdrawn. However, 
there was one further provision which was to become an 
important issue in years to come:
Whenever the subsidy shall cease, the British 
officers shall be withdrawn from the Ameer's country; 
but at the pleasure of the British Government a 
Vakeel, not a European officer, shall remain at Cabul
on the part of the Government, and one at Peshawar
on the part of the Government of C a b u l . 20
On June 9, 1863, during the Viceroyalty of Lord
Elgin, Dost Mohammed died. He had acknowledged his 
son, Sher Ali, as his successor. However, his other sons 
disputed Sher Ali's claim to the throne and a civil war 
ensued during which the British Government maintained a 
"hands-off" policy. Lord Elgin thought it more prudent 
to await the outcome and then recognize whoever could 
establish his rule.
The civil strife continued for several years, and 
Britain was able to maintain her avowed policy, which 
was reiterated by Lord Lawrence, then Viceroy, on June 20, 
1867 in a report to Sir Stafford Northcote, Secretary of 
State :
Whatever happens, we contemplate no divergence 
from our settled policy of neutrality; unless indeed 
Shere Ali or any other party should throw themselves 
into the hands of Persia and obtain assistance from 
the Shah. . . . Thus whether the brothers Afzul Khan 
and Azum Khan maintain their hold on the Bala Hissar, 
or whether Shere Ali, with Fyz Mahomed's aid, regain 
the throne of his inheritance, our relations with
Z^Treaty between the East India Company and Ameer 
Dost Mohammed, January 26, 1857, Article 7, C.A.W., p. 2.
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Afghanistan remain on their first footing of friend­
ship towards the actual Rulers, combined with rigid 
abstention from interference in domestic affairs.21
During the year 186 8, Sher Ali was able to establish 
his supremacy over his rivals, and to become in effect, Amir 
of Afghanistan. While Sher Ali may have been vexed by the 
lack of British support during the war with his brothers, 
he did not display any public hostility, and on the 
contrary, shortly after assuming power he told the British 
agent in Kabul that he would go to Calcutta, or send 
envoys for "the purpose of a meeting, and to show my sin­
cerity and firm attachment to the British Government, and 
make known my real wants."22
While the policy of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of Afghanistan was followed after 1842 
by six Governors-General, from Dalhousie to Northbrook, 
the seeds of the "Forward Policy" were at the same time 
being sown. After 1842 first Sind and then the territories 
of the Sikhs were occupied by the British. This conquest 
of the Punjab in 1849 was precipitated by the steady 
advance of Russia into Central Asia. The effect of this 
was to greatly extend the British Northwest frontier.
However, no further movement was officially 
considered until 1865 when Sir Stafford Northcote forwarded
2lReport from Lord Lawrence, Viceroy of India to 




to the Government of India a memorandum written by Sir 
Henry Rawlinson, a member of the Secretary of State's 
Council. Rawlinson had served at Kandahar during the 
First Afghan War, and though he had been away from the 
area for almost twenty-five years, he was still looked 
upon as somewhat of an expert. In this memorandum Sir 
Henry cited the dangers from Russia, and advised an attempt 
to extend British authority. This he proposed to do by 
subsidizing and strengthening Sher Ali at Kabul; by 
recovering the British position in Persia; and by comple­
tion and improvement of communications with the Afghan 
frontier. He also proposed consideration of the establish­
ment of fortifications at Quetta above the Bolan Pass, a 
matter already suggested by others. But here he recognized 
that there might be repercussions which would negate the 
unquestionable military advantage of such a project,
" . . .  but if, as is more probable, the tribes in general 
regarded this erection of a fortress— above the passes, 
although not on Afghan soil— as a menace, or as a pre­
liminary to a further hostile advance, then we should not 
be justified, for so small an object, in risking the rupture 
of our friendly intercourse."23
Rawlinson's argument for interfering in Kabul was 
that it would be of definite advantage to keep good order
^^Confidential memorandum from Sir Henry Rawlinson 
to Sir Stafford Northcote, 1865, C.A.W., p. 13.
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in a country adjoining the Indian frontier, and he also 
suggested the formation by British agents of a confederacy 
of Mohammedan States to counter Russia. His argument for 
interfering in Persia was that Russia might otherwise 
seize Herat.
At the time, Rawlinson's opinions were not shared 
by the major Indian officers, such as Lord Sandhurst, then 
Commander-in-Chief, R. H. Davies, Lord Lawrence, Sir 
Richard Temple, H. S. Maine, and John Strachey. These 
gentlemen delivered the joint opinion of the Government of 
India to the Duke of Argyll, Secretary of State for India, 
in a dispatch dated January 4, 1869. Herein they avowed 
their belief that it would be unwise, both politically and 
financially, to depart from the already established princi­
ples of non-interference. They particularly pointed to the 
formidable difficulties involved in any attempt to establish, 
support, and supply troops in necessarily isolated positions 
at a great distance from British territories. Such an 
undertaking would be so costly in money as to place a 
great burden on India. They felt that these factors should 
be considered equally with those of Russia's advance in 
Central Asia and her military occupation of Samar and 
Bokhara. 5̂
24ibid.
^^Dispatch from the Government of India to the Duke 
of Argyll, Sec. of State for India, January 4, 1869, C.A.W., 
pp. 19-20.
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The Indian officials felt strongly that the 
best defense against any possible Russian aggression in 
Afghanistan was still the policy of non-interference.
This would aid in developing friendship among the natives 
both in Afghanistan and India, while permitting the 
build-up of a strong defensive system on India's Northwest
frontier as a deterent to aggression.
The only new proposal they had to make was that of 
attempting to reach some sort of understanding with the 
Russian government as to its projects and designs in 
Central Asia, and of giving the Russians to understand 
that they would not be permitted to interfere in Afghan­
istan. These gentlemen were also of the opinion that the 
Russian threat was greatly over-emphasized;
. . . The truth appears to us to be, that the
advances of Russia, coupled with the constant allusions
made in the newspapers to her progress as compared 
with what is called the inaction of the British 
Government, have produced in the minds of Europeans 
and Natives, what we believe to be an exaggerated 
opinion of her resources and power. A mutual good 
understanding between the two Powers, though difficult 
of attainment would enable us to take means to counter­
act unfounded rumours and to prevent unnecessary 
alarms.26
This dispatch also contains a prediction as to a 
future change in policy when they state that "some writers 
possibly imagine that a change in the Head of the administra­




Thus the first inklings of possible policy change 
were in the air. Rawlinson and Sir Bartle Frere became 
active supporters of a "forward policy," and their ideas 
were made more acceptable in view of the supposed threat 
of Russian aggression. Even so, it was not until the new 
Conservative Government of Disraeli sent Lord Lytton as 
Viceroy to India in 1877 with instructions to press 
European Residents on the Afghan.Amir that the policy 
actually changed. Up until then, no responsible officer 
in India had advised any extension of the Indian frontier 
or any extension of British political influence, except 
by "peaceful and gentle m e a n s . "^8
The following March (1869) the Conference of 
Umballa took place between Lord Mayo and Sher Ali. By 
this time the Amir had firmly established his rule and 
stabilized the government. Thus the British felt it was 
now time to assist him, monetarily and militarily, and by so 
doing strengthen their friendship as a guard against Russian 
designs. The Home Government, while in sympathy to the 
general idea of a conference and the development of better 
understanding between Britain and Afghanistan, had some 




Lord Mayo on May 14, 1869 telling him that he ought not 
to bind the Government too tightly to any promises, and 
that any assistance should be at the discretion of the 
Indian Government under direction of the Home Government. 
"It ought to depend not only upon the conduct of the Ruler 
of Afghanistan in his relations with the Government of 
India, but to some extent also upon his conduct in his
n qrelations with his own people." Thus if Sher Ali were 
to show himself as "cruel and oppressive" to his own 
subjects, the British Government should have the option to 
withhold all assistance from him.
The Viceroy replied to Argyll by sending him on 
July 1, a complete resume of the conference, which held 
some surprises for the British Government. Sher Ali came 
to the Conference expecting a great deal more than the 
British were prepared to give. First of all, he desired 
a treaty supplementary to that of 1857 with his father; 
secondly, he wanted the British to declare themselves 
friends of any friends of the Amir's, and enemies of any 
of his enemies; third, he wanted a declaration that the 
British Government would never recognize any ruler of 
Afghanistan except the Amir and his descendants. Further, 
he desired the promise of a fixed subsidy. And finally, 
he did not want tlie British Government to be the sole judge
Z^Letter from the Duke of Argyll to Lord Mayo, 
May 14, 1869, C.A.W., p. 32.
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of when and how future assistance would be given, but 
rather it should be dependent on the needs of the Amir,
"as his welfare should require.
It is necessary to note that the wishes of the 
Home Government in this matter were not expressed to the 
Viceroy before the Conference took place. However, the 
Viceroy's actions were generally in keeping with the tardy 
expressions of the Home Government's desires. Thus the 
promises made to the Amir did not exceed former promises 
or extend British liabilities. The Viceroy refused to 
make a treaty with Sher Ali, to send any European troops 
to assist the Amir, to grant any fixed subsidy, or to give 
any pledges of dynastic recognition. On the other hand, 
he did promise the Amir his recognition and support, such 
material assistance as the Government of India felt 
necessary, friendly communications, and non-interference 
in his affairs.31 The one other important pledge was that 
the British would not force European officers upon him.
Sher Ali was adamant on this last point, as he felt that 
the residence of any European officers in his dominions 
"would do him harm in the eyes of the p e o p l e . "32
30Dispatch to Duke of Argyll by Government of India, 
July 1, 1869, C.A.W., p. 34.
31lbid., p. 37.
32Letter from Mr. Seton Karr, Foreign Secretary of 
the Indian Government to Lord Lawrence, April 5, 1869,
C.A.W., p. 39.
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Sher Ali soon had an occasion to be dissatisfied 
with the British Government. For a long time the Afghans 
and the Persians had been quarrelling over the border 
country of Seistan. Finally, both parties agreed to let 
the British Government arbitrate the quarrel, and accord­
ingly in the autumn of 1872 General Goldsmid awarded a 
portion of the disputed territory to each. Neither was 
satisfied, and Sher Ali, in particular, felt that as a 
supposed British ally he should have been treated better.
About the same time another and more ominous 
controversy was brewing, this time involving Russia. It 
involved a border dispute over the districts of Wakhan and 
Badakhshan, which Sher Ali claimed as a part of Afghanistan. 
This time the British persuaded Russia to recognize Sher 
Ali's title over the disputed territory. However, the 
dispute had the greater effect of bringing Afghanistan and 
Russia into closer political contact.
As a result of the Afghan-Russian border dispute, 
the Simla Conference was arranged, as the British wished
to advise Sher Ali as to the settlement. Sher Ali also
wished some clarification of the British position, and in 
a letter to the then Viceroy, Lord Northbrook he stated 
his anxieties :
As for the recently defined boundary of Northern 
Afghanistan, whatever views the British Government 
may have entertained about it, great anxiety weighs
on me day and night, and I am not in any moment
relieved from it, that the juxtaposition of boundaries
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with Russia will involve difficulty in making provision 
for the security of the borders in the interests of 
both Governments.̂  ̂
And he also expressed his desire to have one of his
representatives meet with the British Government to
find their views on the matter and to express his.
The Simla Conference which took place in July,
1873, revealed the Amir's alarm at Russian progress, and
his desire to know just how far the British were prepared
to go in helping him, should Afghanistan be invaded by
Russia. Northbrook cabled the Secretary of State for
instructions and was told that the Cabinet wished him to
inform Sher Ali that it did not share his alarm and
moreover that they felt there was no cause for it, "but
you may assure him we shall maintain our settled policy
in favour of Afghanistan, if he abides by our advice in
external a f f a i r s . "34
Accordingly, Northbrook advised Noor Mahomed, Sher
Ali's representative that the British Government was
prepared to assure the Amir that they would give him
assistance in arms and money, and if the necessity should
arise, aid him with troops, but that the British Government
would maintain the right to decide when and to what extent
such assistance would be given. Moreover, any assistance
33Letter from Sher Ali to Lord Northbrook, April, 
1873, C.A.W., p .  42.
34Telegram from Secretary of State to the Viceroy, 
July 26, 1873, C.A.W., p. 43.
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would be conditional upon the abstinence of the Amir himself 
from aggression, and upon his "unreserved acceptance of the 
advice of the British Government in regard to external 
relations."35
The Viceroy also suggested at this conference that 
it would be a good idea to send a British officer to examine 
the western and northern boundaries of Afghanistan. He 
felt that the presence of accredited British officers at 
Kabul, Herat and Kandahar might be desirable, but he was 
fully aware of the difficulties of accomplishing this.
He hoped that sending an officer to examine the boundaries 
might help break down some of the obstacles to having 
British agents in Afghanistan as "a judicious officer would 
have it in his power to do much towards allaying any feel­
ings of mistrust that may still linger in the minds of 
some classes of the people in Afghanistan, and towards 
preparing the way for the eventual location of permanent 
British representatives in that country, if such a measure 
should at any time be considered desirable or n e c e s s a r y . "̂ 6 
From the Simla Conference to January, 1875 the 
British policy towards Afghanistan remained essentially 
the same as before, although from time to time each side 
did something the other did not like. During this period
35c.A.W., pp. 44-45.
35Report to the Duke of Argyll from the Government 
of India, September 15, 1873, C.A.W., pp. 49-50.
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Sher Ali did receive letters from the Russian General 
Kaufman, all of which, with the Amir's replies, were 
shown to the Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, the British Vakeel 
at Kabul. This correspondence apparently gave the Viceroy 
no cause for alarm.
However, in January, 1875 Lord Salisbury, Secre­
tary of State, set forth his desire for a new policy in 
a letter to the Secret Department of the Council of India. 
Salisbury's main stated objective was the establishment of 
a British Agency at Herat, to be followed by one at 
Kandahar. His desire for this, according to his state­
ments, was prompted by a need for more accurate intelli­
gence and information than was presently being supplied;
Her Majesty's Government are of the opinion that 
more exact and constant information is necessary to 
the conduct of a circumspect policy at the present 
juncture. The disposition of the people in various 
parts of Afghanistan, the designs and intrigues of 
its chiefs, the movement of nomad tribes upon its 
frontier, the influence which foreign Powers may 
possibly be exerting within and without its borders, 
are matters of which a proper account can only be 
rendered to you by an English agent residing in the 
country.^7
Salisbury also stated that at one time Sher Ali 
had expressed his willingness to receive a European 
officer, and thus if he were truly a friend of the British 
he should now have no objection to it. This appears to 
have been a misinterpretation on Salisbury's part, as
37Letter from Lord Salisbury to the Governor- 
General of India, January 22, 1875, C.A.W., p. 55.
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Sher Ali had always been most adamant in his refusal to 
admit any British Residents.
After hearing Salisbury's request, the Council of 
India undertook to ascertain certain pertinent information 
from the Government of the Punjab, the local government 
which was primarily responsible for the proper conduct of 
Afghan affairs. They requested information as to whether 
th^ Amir of Afghanistan would consent to European British 
Residents, and whether such Residents would be advantageous 
to the British Government. The Council also requested an 
evaluation of the quality of the present information being 
received from the Vakeel.
The Punjab officials, represented by R. H. Davies, 
replied that it was their opinion that under the present 
circumstances the Amir would not willingly consent to the 
establishment of European British officers as Residents 
anywhere in Afghanistan, and that the presence of such 
Residents would be of no advantage to the British, parti­
cularly if they were there against the wishes of the Amir. 
Mr. Davies also noted the dangers of intrigues and involve­
ment in incidents which could lead to recriminations and 
from bad to worse. He was also doubtful that such Residents 
would serve any useful purpose informationwise that could 
not be obtained by some more acceptable means, and at the 
same time he praised the quality and accuracy of the 
information then being conveyed by the native agent at
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Kabul. He concluded, "I do not think that any innovations 
on the existing system would, at the present time be of 
any advantage, and I consider that the Ameer having now 
got Herat into his own hands, will probably be himself 
sensitive of any menace to it, and will not be slow to 
apprise the British Government thereof."38
Despite the views and the recommendations of the 
Council of India to the contrary. Lord Salisbury sent orders 
to the Governor-General in Council to proceed "without any 
delay that you can reasonably avoid," to send a Mission to 
Kabul and to press for the reception of this mission. He 
again stressed the inadequacy of information then being 
received from Afghanistan, and showed his real concern to be 
that of fear of a Russian advance in that direction, be it 
a military advance, an advance by sedition and insurrection, 
or an advance by obtaining a direct influence over the 
Amir.39
The Council's response was not very enthusiastic, 
and pointed out that from their vantage point they could 
see no imminent threat from Russia, nor any valid reason 
for imposing British Agents, for even if the latter were
38Minute by Lt. Governor of the Punjab, R. H.
Davies, to the Sec. of the Government of India in the Foreign 
Dept., No. 48 C. P. March 25, 1875, C.A.W., pp. 60-61.
39oispatch from Lord Salisbury to the Governor- 
General in Council, No. 33, Secret No. 34, Nov. 19, 1875, 
C.A.W., p. 69.
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accepted, they would be so closely watched as to make their 
usefulness as informers very slight indeed.
Thus it was to take a new Viceroy before the new 
policy could be initiated.
CHAPTER III
ORGANIZATIONAL SETTING
Creation of British India
In the latter half of the nineteenth century the 
making and carrying out of foreign policy regarding India 
was a rather complex, and at times dualistic, process. At 
first glance it is not apparent where the actual decision­
making authority rested. In order to clarify this point 
it is necessary to examine the structure of the bodies 
involved in this decision-making process. The administra­
tion of India differed vastly from that of the other 
British colonies due to the fact that for almost three 
hundred years it had been under the rule of the East India 
Company. However, the Crown had gradually exercised control 
over the Company, and beginning with the Regulatory Act of 
1773, the first of a long series of statutes, it had 
reduced the effective powers of the Board of Directors.^
This came about when the British people and 
Parliament awoke to the fact that the East India Company
^Ramsay Muir, The Making of British India (London: 
Longman's Green and CoT) 1915) , p"I 380 .
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had possession of an immense territory in India, where it 
was exercising sovereign rights, such as raising armies, 
declaring war, negotiating peace, and conducting other 
affairs which would normally be beyond the scope of a 
trading association.
The Company claimed to hold this territory as its 
own private property, and for a time Parliament had gone 
along with this, exacting an annual tribute of L400,000. 
However, the Company's debts and the confusion of its affairs 
in India led the nation and Parliament to initiate reforms 
which gradually extended governmental control over the 
Company and its affairs in India. While the Company's 
governmental functions theoretically continued, in practice 
they were greatly curtailed. All important dispatches were 
still addressed to the Board of Directors, but they were 
immediately passed on to the British Government, and the 
Board of Directors could take no action upon them without 
the Government's consent. Moreover, while the Directors 
nominally appointed and paid their officers in India, the 
chief officers were in reality the nominees of the Govern­
ment. From the Governor-General on down, the servants of 
the Company knew that the authorities to whom they really 
had to answer were the British Cabinet and the Indian 
Minister, and behind them, the British Parliament.^
2sir T. W. Holderness, Peoples and Problems of 
India (New York: Henry Holt and Co., n.d.), p. 159.
%uir, p. 380.
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By the time the Crown decided to officially take 
over the government of India, a dual system of government 
had developed, and this duality, in essence at least, 
was to continue. Since the Crown had been steadily increas­
ing its control over the Company's affairs, the transfer 
involved less change than might appear at first sight. The 
transfer was effected by the Government of India Act of 
1858, wherein the Queen proclaimed the change to the 
princes, chiefs and people of India. This Act transferred 
all the powers and properties of the Company to the Crown, 
and set up a Secretary of State with an Indian Council of 
fifteen members to take the place of the Board of Control 
and of the Board of Directors. "This is, in effect, the 
only change which the Act made. It is a change of form 
rather than of substance.
The Crown
Walter Bagehot, in his essay on the English 
Constitution states that "it would very much surprise 
people if they were only told how many things the Queen 
could do without consulting Parliament. . . . Among 
those possibilities he mentions her power to disband the 
army, make peace, declare war, pardon all offenders, make
4lbid., p. 381.
^Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution and 
Other Political Essays (New York: D. Appleton and Co.,
1897), pp. 31-32.
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every citizen a peer, etc. "In a word, the Queen could by 
prerogative upset all the action of civil government within 
the government, could disgrace the nation by a bad war or 
peace, and could, by disbanding our forces . . . leave us 
defenceless against foreign nations."^ This essay, written 
at the height of Victoria's reign, serves to point out the 
position of the monarch at this point in time. It might 
appear that the Queen would therefore be supreme in matters 
of foreign affairs and foreign policy. However, there 
existed two powerful checks on the monarch which served to 
diminish her power. The first was the check of impeachment 
for high treason which could be brought against any minister 
who advised the Queen to use her prerogative in a way that 
might endanger the safety of the country. The second, and 
most commonly used check, is the change of ministry, which 
in general causes ministers to look long and carefully 
before taking action. However, this check has its weak­
nesses, as the removal from office does not solve the
7problem or remedy the predicament.
By the time of Queen Victoria the British Monarchy 
had lost much of its power. The oldest form of the 
English Constitution considered the monarch as an "Estate 




with the House of Lords and the House of Commons. But 
such authority could only be exercised by a monarch with 
a legislative veto, which the Queen did not possess. Any 
legislative power was a fiction of the past, and she had 
long ceased to have any. As Bagehot points out, "She must 
sign her own death warrant if the two Houses unanimously 
send it up to her."B
Despite the limitations on royal authority, the 
real royal power lay in the use of royal influence. The 
strength and importance of such influence is a variable 
that is difficult to measure. It is a factor determined to 
a great extent by the forcefulness and personality of the 
monarch. As Laski points out, "It is clear enough that a 
monarch who takes his duties seriously is a force to be 
reckoned with in our system . . . the immense social 
prestige of the Monarchy gives to the King's views a weight 
and an authority it is impossible to ignore."^ Thus the 
wise Prime Minister must take the opinion of the Monarch 
into account in making his decisions.
The Prime Minister
Although the monarch was somewhat of a force to be 
reckoned with, the real power in foreign affairs rested
Bibid., p. 25.
9prank Hardie, The Political Influence of Queen 
Victoria (London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 196 3) , pp.”
14-15.
40
(and rests) with the Prime Minister and his cabinet. The 
nature and extent of this power has been described by 
Bagehot as follows :
Now, beforehand, no one would have ventured to 
suggest that a committee of Parliament on Foreign 
relations should be able to commit the country to 
the greatest international obligations without 
consulting either Parliament or the country. No 
other select committee has any comparable power; 
and considering how carefully we have fettered and 
limited the powers of all other subordinate author­
ities, our allowing so much discretionary power on 
matters peculiarly dangerous and peculiarly delicate 
to rest in the sole charge on one secret committee 
is exceedingly strange.10
During the nineteenth century, the majority of 
political crises were over questions of foreign policy or 
new laws. However, in the case of foreign policy the 
crises were after the fact. In other words, the policy 
was inaugurated and then it was criticized, and the Prime 
Minister and his cabinet stood or fell on the basis of a 
committed policy, not of a proposed one.
During this period the strength of the Prime 
Minister in relation to the other members of his cabinet 
depended a great deal upon his abilities, external cir­
cumstances, and the attitudes and abilities of his col­
leagues. The rise of Gladstone and Disraeli did much to 
increase the power of the Prime Minister because of their 
dynamic personalities. This increase in power was further 




The extension of suffrage stimulated the growth 
of political parties and gave them more of a basis for 
power as public opinion began to have a greater force than 
before. The parties, in turn, became more highly disci­
plined. The Prime Minister stood at the apex of the party 
organization and was recognized as the party leader. As 
such he could draw upon the organized power of the party 
in the House of Commons, where its members were pledged to 
a general acceptance of- the party program. Thus the
Prime Minister could depend on his party’s support in
12Parliament for his policies.
The Prime Minister's position was further streng- 
ened by the fact that the electorate tended to equivocate 
the party with its head figure. This made disagreement 
with a successful Prime Minister a rather hazardous 
undertaking, and tended to discourage such disagreement 
within the party.
Although the fiction that the Prime Minister was 
the King's Minister was maintained by means of formal 
selection by the monarch, the choice of Prime Minister was 
in reality that of the predominant party in Parliament.
This was assured by the fact that the monarch's appointment
^^Byrum Carter, The Office of the Prime Minister 
(London; Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1955), p. 35.
IZlbid., p. 39.
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had to be given to a member of the House of Commons who 
was able to command the support of a majority of that 
House.
During the nineteenth century the power of appoint­
ment of cabinet members, as well as subordinate ministerial 
posts, was shifted from the monarch to the Prime Minister. 
However, the prerogative of cabinet appointment had several 
limitations. All ministers had to be selected from members 
of Parliament. The position of many members of Parliament 
forbade their being appointed to the cabinet, while the 
position of others almost insured their invitation.
"Between the compulsory list whom he must take, and the 
impossible list whom he cannot take, a prime minister's 
independent choice in the selection of a cabinet is not 
very large; it extends rather to the division of the 
cabinet offices than to the choice of cabinet ministers.
In addition to appointing his fellow ministers, 
the Prime Minister also had charge of appointing ambas­
sadors, bishops, the highest judges, and all the higher 
officials in the various departments. Moreover, he 
directed the general policy of the whole government, and 
had to be consulted on every matter of importance which 
arose in any department. Thus he had to be well acquainted 
with the conditions and tasks of each department in order
l^Bagehot, p. 80.
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to carry out his responsibilities.^^ These varied duties 
of guiding legislation in Parliament, gathering together 
party forces, and conducting the administration of the 
government, called for character and ability of the highest 
order in a Prime Minister.
While the power of the Prime Minister is obvious, 
as is his supremacy over the cabinet, the need for the 
delegation of authority is also apparent. No doubt general 
policy was formulated to a considerable degree by the Prime 
Minister, with the backing of his ministers and party. 
However, he necessarily relied in a great part upon his 
appointees to carry out his policy as they saw fit.
Although the Prime Minister doubtless made every effort to 
keep informed on all matters of grave importance, day to 
day details of administration were left in charge of those 
whom he felt shared his objectives and viewpoint.
A word might be said about the Cabinet during this 
period. The meetings of the Cabinet were in both theory 
and practice held in secret. In most instances no official 
minutes were kept of the Cabinet meetings. "The House of 
Commons, even in its most inquisitive and turbulent moments, 
would scarcely permit a note of a cabinet meeting to be
l^David Duncan Wallace, The Government of England; 
National, Local, and Imperial (New York: G. P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1917), p. 135.
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r e a d . "15 Thus the innermost workings of government were 
not public property, nor even necessarily party property.
Then as now, foreign affairs were conducted under 
the prerogative of the Crown and consequently treaties, 
agreements, and other international relationships could 
be entered into by the British Government without the 
necessity of previous authorization by Parliament, or even 
the necessity of ratification.1® The chief responsibility 
for foreign policy rested with the Prime Minister who 
supervised the work of the Foreign Secretary. The Prime 
Minister had the task of harmonizing foreign policy with 
domestic and general policies of the government, as well 
as making decisions which he feels are too important to 
be left to the discretion of the Foreign Secretary. Thus 
the Prime Minister must see all the important correspondence 
of the Foreign Office and be kept informed of all important 
developments.
The same rights and duties of the Prime Minister 
in the matter of foreign affairs pertained also in the 
case of India, where his relationship with the Secretary 
of State for India was like that with the Foreign Secretary. 
Of course both were members of the Cabinet.
l^Bagehot, p. 82. 
IGcarter, p. 295.
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Secretary of State for India
In theory the Indian government was responsible 
to the English Parliament, but in practice it was primarily 
the responsibility of the Secretary of State for India.
The Secretary of State for India was in a position which 
differed constitutionally from the other Secretaries of 
State. In the first place his salary was not paid from 
British revenues, but rather from Indian revenues. Thus 
his policy could not be reviewed in Parliament, as in the 
case of other departments, when Supply was being considered. 
And secondly, he had to act with a council. Both of these 
differences were survivals of Company rule.^?
These differences served to diminish Parliamentary 
control over the actions of the Secretary of State for 
India. Although Parliament legally had the same unlimited 
sovereignty over India as over other parts of the Empire, 
or over England itself, it chose for the most part to 
leave the government of India in the hands of experienced 
men. Throughout the years of British control of India, 
Parliament rarely interfered beyond the point of controlling 
general policy, or the relations of India toward the rest 
of the Empire or the outside world. Parliament passed 
few laws for India, and when it did, it used "wide and
Ramsay MacDonald, The Government of India 
(London: The Swarthmore Press, Ltd., n.d.), p. 45.
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general terms, leaving all details and some important 
matters of principle to be determined by regulations and 
rules made by the authorities in India.
The rank and file of the members of Parliament 
were either ignorant of or indifferent to questions 
regarding India. J. Ramsay MacDonald claimed that British 
opinion on Indian affairs did not exist, "except on odd 
events at odd times" and that as a result very few subjects 
in Parliament took a continuous interest in Indian affairs, 
or had any real knowledge of them.19 This fact is pointed 
up by the notable lack of interest in the Indian budget.
For whereas months were spent considering the British 
budget, only a few hours were spent on the Indian budget, 
and at that, the sessions were poorly attended. This was 
probably due to the fact that in the case of the British 
budget, members of Parliament had a responsibility to 
their constituents, which did not exist in the case of the 
India budget. 0̂
William E. Gladstone made this observation on the 
administration of India:
[The administration of India] depends upon a 
cabinet, which dreads nothing so much as the mention 
of an Indian question at its meetings; on a minister, 
who knows that the less his colleagues hear of his 
proceedings, the better they will be pleased; on a
IBwallace, p. 311.
l^MacDonald, p. 51.
20sudhindra Bose, Some Aspects of British Rule in 
India (Iowa City, Iowa: The Chesnutt Printing Co., 1916),
p. 44.
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Council, which is not allowed to enter into his highest 
deliberations; and on a Parliament, supreme over them 
all, which cannot in its two Houses jointly muster 
one single score of persons who have either practical 
experience in the government of India or tolerable 
knowledge of its people, or its history.
The Secretary of State for India was generally 
selected for his qualifications of information and judgment. 
Since at least one of the five Secretaries of State had 
to be selected from the House of Lords, often this was the 
Indian Secretary. Of course this was a Cabinet position 
which necessitated the Secretary being a staunch party 
member, and as such to have certain party biases. This 
in turn affected his Indian policies in the areas of 
finances, reforms, and frontier wars, which were for the 
most part conducted according to the "known predilections 
of his political creed."22
The Secretary of State for India and his Council
As the Secretary of State for India replaced the 
President of the Board of Control of the East India Company, 
so the Court of Directors was replaced by the Council of 
India. The Government of India Act, 1858, set the number of 
the Council members at fifteen, and provided that the major 
part of them should be persons who had either served or 




recently than ten years previous to their appointment. 
Members were to hold office during good behavior, and no 
member was allowed to sit or vote in Parliament.23 Thus, 
whereas the Secretary of State was more or less a poli­
tical official, changing with the political majorities in 
the House of Commons, and consequently attempting to exert 
his influence to support party policies, his Council was 
more in the nature of a body of civil servants. It was 
non-representative and non-responsible to Parliament, and 
therefore able to act very much as the members saw fit. 
This constitutional anomaly was able to exist because of 
the indifference of Parliament to Indian affairs.24
Except when secrecy was required, all orders and 
communications regarding India had to be submitted to the 
Council. The Council had the final say in financial 
matters, such as the expenditures of Indian revenues, and 
the disposal of property. In all other matters the 
Secretary of State had the power of veto, as well as the 
power to cast the deciding vote in Council in case of a 
tie vote. Thus the legal framework seems to have given 
decidedly more power to the Secretary of State than to 
the Council, and it would even appear that the Council was 




Blackwood's Magazine in November 1860 criticizes the 
Government of India Act for making possible the creation 
of a virtual dictatorship by the Secretary of State:
Wavering between the two policies and timidly
shrinking from both, Parliament took refuge in a 
sham— a Council, to be advised with, or not, at the 
discretion of the Minister himself;— a body that 
might act as a blind, but could never presume to be
a check.25
The article goes on to relate how Sir Charles Wood,
Secretary of State for India between 1859 and 1866, took
the initiative upon himself and his undersecretaries, 
referring any points he thought fit to a committee, which 
he had himself appointed. The reports of such committees, 
instead of going to the Council were sent in private to the 
Secretary of State, who t^en presented them to the Council, 
if he saw fit.
The members of the Council complain that they are 
reduced to the position of simply offering an opinion, 
when the Secretary of State may think fit to ask for 
it. When he has decided the question, they are made 
acquainted with the result and may record their 
dissents if they please; but their collective vote, 
whether in committee or in council, has become 
absolutely powerless, save in the few cases where the 
Act has made the consent of the Council i n d i s p e n s a b l e . 26
In matters involving peace and war, foreign affairs, 
relations with native states, and those requiring secrecy 
and dispatch, the Secretary of State was empowered to act
25"The Administration of India," Blackwood's 
Magazine, Vol. 88 (November, 1860), 543.
26Ibid., pp. 546-547.
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without consulting the Council. This of course served to 
reduce the Council to the position of supplying advice 
and of being a "sort of prudential body of o p i n i o n ,"2? 
while maintaining the freedom of action of the Secretary 
of State.
The tremendous potential power of the Secretary 
of State can be seen from the fact that he could by-pass 
his Council on questions that concerned Imperial policy 
rather than Indian policy. As the Secretary of State is 
the one who interpreted the category of the matters, it 
was not beyond the realm of possibility, as the author of 
the article in Blackwood's suggested, that since "the 
Government of India is, in all its parts, the Government 
of the Crown; every question may be declared of imperial 
more than local i n t e r e s t . "28 The Council also had little 
recourse to Parliament, to make their opinions known, 
since they could not hold office in that body.
Despite the apparent power, based on constitutional 
authority, of the Secretary of State to work his will, 
even in the face of opposition from his Council, in 
practice this authority was limited. Most secretaries of 
state were hesitant to force their wishes upon a council 
adamant in its opposition, because of the awkward situation
2?Wallace, p. 312.
28"The Administration of India," p. 549.
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this would create.29
One other point worth noting in regard to the 
Council is that it had no initiative power. Its members 
could not bring matters before the Council, but rather 
they were limited to acting upon measures submitted to 
it by the Secretary of State.
While Parliament had the final authority in 
Indian affairs, it is obvious that this authority was 
delegated to the Secretary of State and his Council. Of 
course, the Secretary of State was responsible to his 
party, and owed his appointment to the Prime Minister. 
This meant that the actions and policies of the Secretary 
of State were generally in keeping with those of the 
ruling party. But before we assume that the Secretary of 
State was the actual ruling office for India, we must 
consider the other most powerful office— that of the 
Viceroy. In fact, the Indian Executive may be considered 
to have consisted of the Secretary of State for India and 
his Council, together with the Viceroy and his Council.
The Viceroy
The office of the Viceroy was derived from that 




During Company rule, the Governor-General had supreme 
executive authority, which he retained under Pitt's Act 
of 1784, from which date the Company began to administer 
India as a trustee for the Crown. This Act also gave 
the Governor-General the right to overrule his Council, 
and with his Council, the power to make laws, eventually 
developing the formalities of a legislature.The 
Governor-General was a Parliamentary Governor-General, 
responsible to Parliament through the medium of the 
ministry, which thus became virtually responsible for the 
policy pursued in India. But while the ministry was 
accountable to Parliament for action in India, it left the 
detailed administration to the Company, reserving a 
final voice in the selection of the Governor-General to 
ensure that the policies of the ministry would be carried 
out.
The transfer of India to the Crown did little to 
alter the position of the Governor-General, or the Viceroy 
as he was now to be called. The highest administrative 
authority in India continued to be vested in the Viceroy, 
who was in theory the representative and an appointee of 
the Crown. However, as before, his appointment rested 
with the party in power, or more particularly, with the 
Prime Minister, who made the appointment with the
^iRolderness, pp. 162-163.
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consultation and advice of the Secretary of State for 
India.
The Viceroy performed three major functions. He 
personified the Crown, represented the Home Government, 
and headed the administration of India.^2 Although he 
was selected by the ruling party, the fact that his 
appointment was for five years sometimes produced an 
interesting situation, as it was possible for a political 
upheaval to occur at Home before his term was up. Thus 
the Viceroy could find himself representing the opposition 
party, as Lord Minto did when the Liberals came into power 
in 1905. Of course he then had the option to carry out 
opposition policy, or resign.
The Government of India consisted of the Viceroy 
and his Council. Together they formed the supreme executive 
authority in India. The Government of India Act of 1858 
stated that the Viceroy's Council should consist of four 
ordinary or full-time members, with a fifth or extraordinary 
member in the person of the Commander-in-Chief. The 
members of the Viceroy's Executive Council were appointed 
in actuality by the Secretary of State.
Although generally the Viceroy acted in accordance 




them and to follow his own opinion, if he so chose.
However, this was a rash and dangerous course to pursue, 
for as a rule the Viceroy was a novice in Indian affairs, 
whereas the members of his Council were veterans, and as 
D. D. Wallace points out, "The responsibility assumed by 
a Governor-General in India for only a few years even if 
reappointed after his five-year term, who chooses to act 
on his own opinions in defiance of those who have grown 
old in the service, is so overwhelming that only a man 
of great courage or great rashness will assume it."34
The duties of the Government of India (Viceroy 
in Council) were very wide. There was no constitutional 
instrument to determine the relation of the Government of 
India and the local governments. Thus the Government of 
India had supreme and undivided authority, subject to the 
Home Government, being a unitary and not a federal system. 
The Government of India, as the supreme executive authority, 
exercised its powers in two ways. First of all, it 
kept certain departments of the state in its own hands 
and administered them directly. These included the army, 
defense, political relations with foreign states, the 
management of finances, currency and debt, the railways, 
and the postal and telegraph systems. Secondly, it handed 
over functions dealing with the general internal
34wallace, p. 313.
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administration of the country to the local governments, 
while retaining supervision and general c o n t r o l . 35
To facilitate the administration of India, the 
business of the Council was divided into ten departments: 
finance, foreign, home, legislative, revenue and agri­
culture, public works, army, commerce and industry, 
railway, and education. Each of these departments was 
placed under a secretary acting under the direction of 
a member of the Council.
The Council had no stated time to meet, but 
rather convened at the pleasure of the Viceroy who was not 
bound to consult his Council on every matter. In fact, in 
times of emergency, he could issue ordinances and regula­
tions, which had the effect of law for six months, without 
calling the council t o g e t h e r . 36
In 1861 Parliament began to lay the foundations 
in India for a deliberative assembly to which the law­
making function could be entrusted. It created a legis­
lative council by adding twelve purely legislative members 
to the Viceroy's Council. Six of these members were to be 
persons not in public service. By 1916 this council, 
which came to be known as the Imperial Council, had 
grown in number to sixty-eight, of which about half
35Holderness, p. 16 8. 
36Bose, p. 37.
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were elected and the other half appointed.^7
The enlarged council served to bring the executive 
government closer to the people and to interpret the 
actions of the government to them. However, the Imperial 
Council was not a Parliament, and it had its powers 
greatly restricted by the British Parliament. While it 
could propose new laws, it had no power to enforce the 
resolutions that it passed. Thus its resolutions mainly 
had the effect of a recommendation to the Viceroy. Neither 
did it have the power to turn out the executive govern­
m e n t . ^8 The Imperial Council also was not free to discuss 
certain subjects, such as interest on debt; ecclesiastical, 
political, and territorial matters; political pensions; 
state railways; military works; nor d e f e n s e . 89
The members of the Imperial Council were allowed 
to put questions to the executive government by giving 
notice in writing to the secretary ten days in advance, 
and submitting a copy of the question. However, the 
Viceroy could disallow any question, or part of a question, 
if, in his opinion, it could not be answered.






and an Executive Council, it was still, in the final 
analysis, the Viceroy who had the final say. How much he 
followed the advice of this Executive Council depended on 
his own inclinations and personality. For he was free 
to listen to them or not. In India the Viceroy was 
unquestionably the supreme head of the Government.
However, the Viceroyalty was still subject to the limits 
of constitutional government. He was appointed "by the 
warrant under the Royal Sign Manual" and was required 
"to pay due obedience to all such orders as he may receive 
from the Secretary of State.
Nevertheless, the Viceroy had real power as well 
as title and prestige. He could make himself responsible 
for the foreign affairs of India— chiefly frontier matters 
and relations with the Native States. His authority was 
derived from being in Council, and generally he had to 
carry a majority of his Council with him. But while that 
was a real check, it was not an absolute one. As Ramsay 
MacDonald points out, "Saving in certain directions, each 
Viceroy makes his own power."^2
The relationship between the Viceroy and the 
Secretary of State for India needs to be carefully examined 




important question is, with whom did the power of decision­
making really lie, with the Viceroy or with the Secretary 
of State? The intention of Parliament in the Government 
of India Act of 1858 was apparently to give the power of 
initiative to the Government of India, and that of 
examination and revision to the Secretary of State and 
his Council, reserving the right of veto to the Secretary 
of State. However, the Home Government soon developed 
different views, particularly when economic concerns were 
involved. In 1870 the Duke of Argyll, who was then 
Secretary of State for India, issued an order to the 
Viceroy, Lord Mayo, that the Government of India should 
take instructions from the Home Government, as it was a 
part of the Home Executive and therefore subordinate to 
the Cabinet.43
This point was raised again by Lord Salisbury in 
1874 when he, as Secretary of State for India, claimed 
the right of previous sanction before the introduction 
of important measures in the legislative council. In a 
dispatch to the Viceroy, Salisbury wrote:
I see no sufficient reason why the circumstances, 
often quite accidental, that your Excellency's orders 
take a legislative form should deprive me of all 
official information concerning them until a period 
of time at which it becomes peculiarly difficult to 
deal with them. . . . Whenever the Governor-General 
in Council has affirmed the policy and expediency of 
a particular measure, and has decided on submitting
43lbid., p. 50.
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it to the Council for making laws and regulations,
I desire that a dispatch may be addressed to me, 
stating at length the reasons which are thought to 
justify the step intended to be taken, and the mode 
in which the introduction is to be carried o u t . 44
From that time on it became customary for the 
Viceroy to telegraph the Secretary of State and inform 
him of every important measure before it was presented 
to the Council. This served to limit the initiative on 
the part of the Government of India, and furthermore, 
when a policy was laid down by the Secretary of State, 
the Viceroy had practically no alternative but to follow 
it or resign. Such was the case in 1875 when the Government 
of India passed a Tariff Bill imposing duties upon cotton. 
Angry correspondence followed between the Viceroy and 
Lord Salisbury, who finally issued an order to remove the 
duty as quickly as possible. Upon this issue the Viceroy 
r e s i g n e d . 45 This serves to show that while the administra­
tive initiative was with the Government of India, the 
Secretary of State had gradually taken upon himself the 
legislative initiative. Since presumably this was not the 
intention of the Act of 185 8, the basis for the extension 
of the Secretary of State's power was personal rather than 
constitutional. The precedent of supremacy of the Secretary 
over the Viceroy had been established by the time Lord
44Bose, p. 38.
4 5 M a c D o n a l d ,  p. 5 2 .
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Lytton received his appointment. However, the potential 
power of the Viceroy still existed, and whether the Home 
Government or the Government of India would be supreme 





Victoria became Queen of England in 1837. At the 
time of her accession the role of the monarch had dimin­
ished considerably in popular esteem due to the character 
of her predecessors, George IV and William IV. In the 
early part of her reign it was believed by many that the 
institution of monarchy was on its way out— especially as 
it seemed to be incompatible with democracy. In 1854 
the Crown was so bitterly attacked in the press that 
Victoria threatened to abdicate. Anti-monarchism again 
flourished during the period following Prince Albert's 
death in 1861, when Victoria secluded herself and seemed 
to have little interest in affairs of state. Walter 
Bagehot in his study of the English Constitution in 186 7 
suggested that the real value of the monarchy now con­
sisted of its symbolic and emotional appeal, rather than 
any political function. He remarked, "it is nice to trace 
how the actions of a retired widow and an unemployed youth
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become of such importance."^
In 1870-71 an English republican movement reached 
its height, but it was at this juncture that the monarchy 
regained its position and public sympathy. This was 
brought about partly by the serious illness and recovery 
of the Prince of Wales, and partly by an assassination 
attempt on the Queen. The Queen's new popularity was 
sustained, however, by her own actions. For now she took 
a more active part in government. Thus the monarch who 
ruled during the period of the Eastern Question and the 
Second Afghan War was a far different one from the one who 
ruled from 1861 to 1871.
The Victoria of 1871 onward was a strong-willed 
monarch and an active one. It was not that her character 
changed overnight, but she regained her spirit and will 
which she had temporarily lost with the death of her 
husband. Victoria was "a woman most womanly, who as a 
child had loved her dolls, and as a wife was able to 
worship her husband." When she became Queen she wrote in 
her diary that she was "very young, and perhaps in many 
things, not in all things, inexperienced, but . . . sure 
that very few had more goodwill and more real desire to do 
what is fit and right than she had."^
^Bagehot, p. 36.
^Algernon Cecil, Queen Victoria and Her Prime 
Ministers (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1953), p . 53.
3ibid.
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While Victoria was not an intellectual giant, she 
had great capability and a knowledge of things a Queen of 
England needed to know. Her first teacher was the Reverend 
George Davys, a young Evangelical clergyman. He taught 
her to avoid bigotry and to revere tolerance. She was 
taught letters by Hanoverian governess, Baroness Louise 
Lehzen, and other subjects by visiting tutors. Politics 
and worldly wisdom were taught her by her prime minister, 
Lord Melbourne. Her character was "singularly straight, 
dutiful, and resolute."^ Victoria had to work with ten 
different prime ministers during her sixty year reign.
The fact that she was able to work well with all but two 
or three, is a tribute to her ability. Even Gladstone 
praised her "integrity of mind."^
In 1874 when Disraeli became Prime Minister, after 
five years of Liberal rule, the Queen's political sympathies 
were definitely on his side. Gladstone's legislative 
program had seemed to her intended to reduce the prestige 
of the Crown. She disliked his impetuosity, and was also 
disturbed by his hold over the forces of militant democracy. 
Thus she regarded the election of 1874 as "a wholesome sign 
that the nation had recovered its s e n s e s . W h i l e  she
4lbid., p. 52.
Sjohn Morley, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone 
(London: Macmillan and Co., 1904), II, p. 192.
^Robert Blake, Disraeli (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1967), p. 545.
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always observed the constitutional limitations on her 
power, she nevertheless maintained a steady and persistent 
influence over the actions of her ministers. As Salisbury 
observed, "No Minister in her long reign ever disregarded 
her advice or pressed her to disregard it without after­
wards feeling that he had incurred a dangerous responsi­
bility . "7
The more one studies this period in depth, the 
more apparent it is that Queen Victoria did have considerable 
political influence, and that she did not hesitate to use 
it. Her sympathies were Tory and Conservative. She wanted 
to preserve the position of the monarch, and was therefore 
against republicanism. In foreign affairs she was imperially 
inclined, and especially felt attracted by the glamour of 
the East. She went so far as to take lessons in Hindustani, 
and as early as 1873 she conceived the idea of styling
Oherself Empress of India.
On questions of war and peace, she was neither a 
pacifist nor a militarist. Her policy was practical— to 
avoid war when possible, "but in common with the great 
mass of her contemporaries, she believed that there were 
occasions on which the only honourable course was to take
^Speech by Salisbury in the House of Lords, January 
25, 1901, quoted by Cecil, Queen Victoria, p. 52.
8prank Hardie, The Political Influence of Queen 
Victoria (London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1963), p. 174.
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up a r m s . On imperial questions she shared the prevailing 
opinions of her time, adhering to two main principles of 
imperial policy. First, she accepted the doctrine of 
imperial compensation, wherein annexation of territory by 
one Power is justification for counter-annexations by 
other Powers. Secondly, she adopted the principle of 
"the White man's burden," as indicated in her letter to 
Lord Derby (then Colonial Secretary) regarding the annexa­
tion of New Guinea in 1884: "It is no doubt a serious step,
but she rejoices at it as it will enable us to protect the 
poor natives and to advance civilization, which she 
considers the mission of Great Britain.
On the Eastern Question, which so influenced 
British attitudes towards India and its northwest frontier, 
the Queen was strongly pro-Turk, so much so that at one 
point Disraeli reminded her that he was not her "Grand 
V i z i e r . H e r  Turkish partisanship was a result of her 
strong anti-Russian feelings. The policy of upholding the 
Turkish Empire was for the most part to prevent Russia 
from having Constantinople. Thus her favoritism was not 
dictated by love of Turkey, but rather by hatred of 
Russia. During the Eastern crisis she remarked, "Oh if
9lbid., p. 169.
l^G. E. Buckle, ed., Letters of Queen Victoria, 




the Queen were a man, she would like to go and give 
those horrid Russians whose word one cannot trust such
1 pa beating." Even in the face of the Bulgarian atrocities 
she managed to rationalize to the point of placing the 
blame on Russia for its role in instigating the insur­
rection "which caused the cruelty of the Turks, it ought 
to be brought home to Russia, and the world ought to know 
that on their shoulders and not on ours rests the blood 
of the murdered Bulgarians’"^^ She firmly believed that 
there would be no permanent peace until the Russians had 
been beaten.
Her feelings against Russia were so strong that on 
four different occasions during the Eastern crisis she 
threatened abdication. On one occasion she stated that 
"she cannot, as she before said, remain the Sovereign of 
a country that is letting itself down to kiss the feet of 
the great b a r b a r i a n s , and on another occasion, " . . .  her 
first impulse would be to throw everything up, and to lay 
down the thorny crown. . . . Blake claims that the 
Queen had no real intention of abdicating,but her 
threats do serve to show how strong her feelings were.
12lbid., p. 637. 
l^Buckle, V, p. 437. 
l^Ibid., p. 1089. 
ISlbid., p. 1117. 
^^Blake, p. 549.
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On most questions of foreign policy, Queen Victoria 
had such decided views that it was difficult for her not 
to be biased, and she usually made her views crystal clear. 
She took a much greater interest in foreign affairs than in 
domestic politics. Since she was related to most of the 
ruling families of Europe, her interest was in part a 
family interest. This also gave her the advantage of 
inside information.
Queen Victoria was conservative by nature. She 
viewed the role of the monarchy as being within the proper 
constitutional framework. And while she did not endeavor 
to step beyond the limit of constitutionalism, she was 
strongly opposed to republicanism or anything else that 
threatened to diminish the role of the Crown or the 
aristocracy. She had definite opinions on foreign affairs, 
and in matters where she felt strongly, she exerted all 
her influence to the end that her policies might prevail. 
Although she was not always successful, at least she made 
herself heard and her presence felt. And of course there 
were many times when her influence did prevail. It is 
rather difficult to state exactly who influenced whom during 
the Disraeli administration. Certainly there was much 
pressure brought to bear on both sides. But the question 
of personal influence in this case is rather irrelevant 
since both Queen Victoria and Disraeli basically had the 
same goals. What differences they did have stemmed from
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ways and means rather than from objectives.
■ The Prime Minister
Benjamin Disraeli was born into a distinguished, 
well-known, and well-to-do family. His father, Isaac 
Disraeli, was Jewish, but had left the Congregation in 
1817, and from that time on Benjamin, then thirteen years 
old, was a practicing member of the Church of England.
This was an extremely important event, for his later 
political career would not have been possible if he had 
remained a member of the Jewish religion, as the law 
prohibited non-Christians from entering Parliament. Until 
1829 Jews, as well as Roman Catholics and Dissenters, were 
excluded by the Test Acts, which preserved the higher 
positions in public life for members of the Church of Eng­
land. While the barrier for Christians was removed in 
1829, Jews were still barred until 185 8.
He received his formal education at Higham Hall, a 
private school attended by middle class sons of prosperous, 
but unaristocratic fathers. At sixteen he left the school 
and continued his education on his own, studying at home 
where his father had a large l i b r a r y . H e  firmly believed 
that his origins were highly aristocratic. In his day the 
notion prevailed that the Shepardi Jews, particularly that 
branch descended from the Spanish or Portugese Jews, were
l?Ibid., p. 17.
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more aristocratic than those from Central and Eastern 
Europe. Disraeli believed that he came from the most 
aristocratic branch, and while there is no proof of this, 
his belief greatly influenced his political outlook. 
Disraeli once defined the task of the Conservative leader 
as being "to uphold the aristocratic settlement of this 
country. That is the only question at stake however mani­
fold may be the forms which it assumes. . . This
idea was Disraeli's guiding purpose. However, he did not 
equate aristocracy with oligarchy, as did the Whigs, but 
rather the whole ordered hierarchy of rural England. Blake 
puts it very well when he says :
Disraeli believed in a territorial aristocracy 
partly because he was at heart a romantic, partly 
because he had a genuine hatred of centralization, 
bureaucracy and every manifestation of the Benthamite 
state. He felt the sort of reverence that Burke had 
had for the many independent corporations and insti­
tutions which, however odd and anomalous, however 
contrary to abstract symmetry, to what Burke called 
"geometrical" theories, were the true bulwarks of 
English liberty.20
The fact that Disraeli was involved with some of 
the great reform measures, such as the extension of the 
franchise in 1867 and the labor and sanitary legislation 
of the 1870s, was not incompatible with his feelings 





could well be supporters of an aristocracy which legislated 
in their behalf. In his life of Bentinck he wrote:
England is the only important European Community 
that is still governed by traditionary influences, 
and amid the shameless wreck of nations she alone 
has maintained her honour, her liberty, her order, 
her authority, and her wealth. . . . It is not true 
that England is governed by an aristocracy in the 
common acceptation of the term. The aristocracy 
of England absorbs all aristocracies, and receives 
every man in every order and every class who defers 
to the principle of our society, which is to aspire 
and to excel.21
In his earlier years Disraeli was a novelist, and 
he used his novels for social criticism, denouncing the 
dreadful conditions of the "hungry forties." These 
conditions he blamed on the manufacturers. "'The middle 
class,' said Disraeli, were 'a miserable minority,' who 
had seized power 'in the specious name of the people' and 
used it for their own selfish ends, causing misery for the 
people as a result: 'The proper leaders of the people,'
he wrote, 'are the gentlemen of England. If they are not 
the leaders of the people, I do not see why there should 
be gentlemen.'"22 with such words and convictions Disraeli 
helped to revitalize the Tory party which was at low ebb 
in the mid-nineteenth century. So it was that the Con­
servative party, under Disraeli's leadership, was
2lBenjamin Disraeli, Lord George Bentinck, a 
Political Biography (London: Longmans, 1872), pp. 555-557
22John Thorn, Roger Lockyer, and David Smith,
A History of England (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co.,
1963), p. 499.
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responsible for the extension of the franchise to the 
working people, a measure of which the Liberals did not 
approve.
Disraeli was undoubtedly a great parliamentarian.
He was a master of the rules of procedure and debate. For 
years he stood.alone, answering the great orators of the 
day who were members of the opposition. In the early days 
of his leadership, his own party members, for the most 
part, were not good at oratory and thus could give him 
only their moral support. When he first entered Parliament 
(1837) he was looked upon as an eccentric and audacious 
adventurer. In the words of Justin McCarthy, one of 
his contemporaries ;
He dressed in the extremest style of preposterous 
foppery; he talked a blending of cynicism and sentiment; 
he had made the most reckless statements; his boasting 
was almost outrageous; his rhetoric of abuse was, 
even in that free-spoken time, astonishingly vigorous 
and unrestrained.23
His first speech in Parliament was a disaster, 
partly because of the reputation which preceded him there. 
Also, "he had failed to discover that the House of Commons 
had adopted itself to a manner of address to which it demand­
ed a degree of conformity and Disraeli in his first speech 
was hauled down in such a way that many an auditor must have 
doubted the truth of his last sentence: 'the time will come
23justin McCarthy, A History of Our Own Times 
(Chicago: Belford, Clarke and Co., 1880), I, p. 297.
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when you will hear me.'"24 However, the fiasco was not 
repeated, and he won the admiration of his colleagues, 
both friends and enemies, for his oratorical skill.
During Disraeli's second ministry the policy of 
empire took shape. The road to India became a preoccupa­
tion of the British mind and this feeling culminated in 
the proclamation of Queen Victoria as Empress of India. 
Moreover, his acquisition of the Suez Canal, a feat which 
showed the swiftness and daring action of Disraeli, added 
a great plum to the British Empire. In his earlier years 
he had been anti-imperialistic along with the rest of his 
countrymen. In fact in 1852 he had referred to the colonies 
as millstones around the neck of England, and again in 
1866 he called Canada and South Africa deadweights and 
advocated the withdrawal of British troops from those
n careas. However, in his Crystal Palace Speech of June 24, 
1872 he adopted imperialism as a plank in the Conservative 
platform when he proclaimed the three great objectives of 
the party to be the maintenance of British institutions, 
social reform, and the preservation of the Empire.
[The working classes] are proud of belonging to a 
great country and wish to maintain its greatness— that
Joseph Hendershot Park, British Prime Ministers 
of the Nineteenth Century (New York: New York University
Press, 1950), p. 194.
^^William L. Strauss, Joseph Chamberlain and the 
Theory of Imperialism (Washington, D.C.: American Council
on Public Affairs, 19̂ 42) , p. 11.
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they are proud of belonging to an Imperial country, 
and are resolved to maintain, if they can, their 
empire— that they believe on the whole that the 
greatness and the empire of England are to be 
attributed to the ancient institutions of theland.26
Disraeli's concept of empire resulted in an 
aversion to all forms of nationalism, except English 
nationalism. He perceived nationalism in Ireland, the 
Balkans, and elsewhere, as a threat to British imperialism. 
To him, English interests took precedence over the so-called 
"moral struggle" of the nations to be free.^?
His belief in imperialism greatly influenced Dis­
raeli's foreign policy. While at times his policy seemed 
erratic and changeable, it could best be described as 
opportunistic. His policy was naturally dictated by 
British interests as he saw them. For example, in the 
Eastern Question he was pro-Turk, whereas many of his 
fellow countrymen were greatly distressed by stories of 
Turkish atrocities against the Christian minority.
Disraeli's political feelings in this instance were 
dictated by his fear of Russian aggression. In October 
1876 Lord Barrington inquired of the Prime Minister why 
Britain did not forget about Constantinople and rather 
secure the route to India by annexing Egypt. Disraeli's
26crystal Palace Speech, June 24, 1872, quoted 




. . .  If the Russians had Constantinople, they could 
at any time march their army through Syria to the 
mouth of the Nile, and then what would be the use 
of our holding Egypt. Not even the command of the 
sea could help us under such circumstances. People 
who talk in this manner must be utterly ignorant 
of geography. Our strength is in the sea. Con­
stantinople is the Key of India, and not Egypt and 
the Suez Canal. . . .28
He distrusted Russia, and believed that Moscow Pan-Slavists
were pressing Russia to start a war of Balkan conquest
under the pretext of philanthropy.29 it was during the
Eastern Crisis that Disraeli developed into a Russophobe,
much apace to Gladstone's increasing Turcophobia.
Disraeli's hand in foreign affairs reached its 
height during the Eastern Crisis and the ensuing Berlin 
Congress. The Congress was the pinacle of his success in 
foreign affairs, for at that moment he "possessed a 
prestige unsurpassed by any statesman of his time."20 
Foreign policy from the purchase of the Suez Canal through 
the Berlin Congress was dominated by the Prime Minister. 
Even so, his Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury, raises 
important doubts as to his competency in foreign affairs
28w. F. Monypenny and G. E. Buckle, The Life of 
Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield (London: John
Murray, 1910-20), p. 84l
2^R. C. K. Ensor, England 1870-1914, The Oxford 
History of England, ed. by G. N. Clark (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1936), XIV, p. 45.
2®Blake, p. 655.
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when he says, "The Eastern policy of the Government suf­
fered much through having at the head of affairs a man 
who, with all his great qualities, was unable to decide 
a general principle of action, or to ensure when decided
O 1on it should be carried out by his subordinates."
This is probably a reference to Lord Derby, whose actions 
shall be discussed further on. But it is a noteworthy 
fact that on various occasions Disraeli did not know what 
his subordinates were doing. Salisbury also charged 
that his chief was "exceedingly short-sighted, though 
very clear-sighted . . .  he neither could nor would look 
far ahead.
After the Berlin Congress, Disraeli left foreign 
affairs more and more to others. This probably had two 
main causes. First, was his failing health. He was far 
from well in 1876, and in October 1878 he wrote to Lady 
Bradford, "If I could only face the scene which would 
occur at headquarters if I resigned I would do so at once; 
but I never could bear scenes and have no pluck for the 
occasion." And two days later he wrote: "I can't head a
House of Parliament, even a H. of L. without a voice without
•0 Ohealth. . . . " Dr. Joseph Kidd, Disraeli's personal
Arthur Balfour, Chapters of Autobiography
(1930), pp. 113-114.
32%bid., p. 115.
S^Monypenny and Buckle, p. 190.
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physician, diagnosed his condition as Bright's disease, 
bronchitis and a s t h m a .
The second factor that led to his diminished role 
in foreign affairs was his appointment of Salisbury as 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. His great con­
fidence in Salisbury allowed him to shift this burden on 
to younger and more energetic shoulders.
Disraeli was a strong prime minister, but was 
not dictatorial. He always held steadfast to his purpose, 
■and once he decided on a policy, he usually had his way.
He never harassed his departmental ministers, but he was 
available for consultation. He came to the Prime Ministry 
late in his career. Once before he had formed a government 
in February 1868, but it was dissolved in November of the 
same year. Prior to assuming the premiership in 1874 he 
had served as leader of the Conservative party in the 
House of Commons for over twenty-five years, the longest 
continuous leadership on record to that time. Obviously, 
Disraeli had a great deal of experience in government, but 
he received the Premiership in his seventieth year, when 
his physical powers were beginning to ebb.
Disraeli's competence in matters of legislation 
and other government functions was very good due to his
34joseph Kidd, "The Last Illness of Lord 
Beacons field," The Nineteenth Century, XXVI (July, 1889), 
65-71.
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long experience in politics. However, his knowledge of 
foreign affairs was not quite up to that of domestic 
affairs, even though he was greatly interested in them.
He toured the Middle East in 1830-31, a trip that lasted 
long enough for him to gain certain knowledge and opinions 
of the area, but far enough removed in time for the 
information to be either irrelevant or false. While the 
danger of the Russian threat was rather remote by the 
"seventies," Disraeli's policy on the Eastern Question 
was rather dominated by it, a fact which tends to show 
his ignorance of geography. In Blake's opinion, the 
"British obsession with the Eastern Question stemmed 
from ancient habit rather than clear thought."35
Some of Disraeli's contemporaries view the beginning 
of his second administration as somewhat of a failure. 
Bagehot's view tends to support the notion of deteriora­
tion when he says:
In 1867 he made a minority achieve wonderful 
things but in 1876 when he had the best majority—  
the most numerous and obedient since Mr. Pitt, he did 
nothing with it. So far from being able to pass great 
enactments, he could not even despatch ordinary 
business at decent hours. The gravest and sincerest 
of Tory members— men who hardly murmur at anything—  
have been heard to complain that it was hard that 
after voting so well and doing so little, they should 
be kept up so very late. The session just closed 
will be known in Parliamentary annals as one of the
^^Blake, p. 538.
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least effective or memorable on record, and yet one 
of the most f a t i g u i n g . 6̂
Bagehot's view must not be considered as wholly 
objective, as he was a Liberal, and also rather dis­
trusting of Disraeli's showmanship. However, a very 
similar view was expressed in the same year by Sir 
William Heathcote, a high Tory, writing to Salisbury;
The aspect of the Government in the House of 
Commons distresses me most seriously and I can 
hardly imagine how you are to keep the machine 
going if you are not somehow relieved of the 
incubus of your present Chief.
Cold and lukewarm in all that might serve the 
Church or Religious Education and thus (to place it 
on its lowest ground) real conservatism, he is 
earnest only in sensational clap trap in which he 
is continually compromising himself by contradictory 
utterances. . . .
In the ordinary conduct of business Disraeli 
shows himself at every turn quite incompetent to 
guide the house.3?
It must be remembered that Disraeli was in poor health 
at this time which accounts for his lack of leadership in 
Parliament. It was because of this that he desired and 
agreed to enter the House of Lords.
The relationship between Disraeli and the Queen 
was extremely amiable. "She lavished upon him an abundance 
of confidence, esteem, and affection such as Lord Melbourne
^^William Bagehot, Bagehot's Historical Essays, 
ed. by Norman St. John-Stevas (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor 
Books, Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1965), p. 294.
^^Salisbury Papers, April 15, 1876, quoted in 
Blake, p. 564.
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himself had hardly known."38 He treated the Queen with 
deference, consideration, and flattery which she thoroughly 
enjoyed. He was thus able for the most part to persuade 
the Queen to do what he wanted, although there were a 
few occasions on which she persuaded him. Their relation­
ship was cordial, and for the most part they presented a 
united front, being basically in agreement on the majority 
of points.
Disraeli's political beliefs can be summed up as 
devotion to the Crown, support of the territorial con­
stitution, belief in the maintenance and expansion of the 
Empire, desire for an influential position in international 
affairs, and advocation of social reform. Disraeli had a 
Cabinet of very able men to aid him in carrying out his 
programs. When the Queen heard his choices for the 
cabinet posts, she wrote to her daughter, the Crown 
Princess of Prussia, "You will see that instead of being 
a Govt, of Dukes as you imagine it will contain only 
1 & he a very sensible, honest and highly respected one.
The others are all able and distinguished men, not at all 
retrograde."39 The Cabinet was small, consisting of 
twelve members, six peers and six commoners, the smallest 
since 1832. The Cabinet was a strong one and a harmonious
38Lytton Strachey, Queen Victoria (New York; 
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1921), p. 328.
39giake, p. 540.
80
one until the Eastern Question caused some striking 
differences of opinion. Disraeli tended to consult a 
small inner circle of the Cabinet whom he treated with 
a special confidence. This group included Cairns, Hardy, 
Northcote, and Derby, who was later replaced by Salisbury, 
both in office and inner circle.
The Foreign Secretary 
Lord Derby
Edward Henry Stanley, 15th Earl of Derby, was the 
son of Edward George Stanley, 14th Earl of Derby who was 
Prime Minister three times. Disraeli's relations with 
Derby were of a long standing personal friendship, which 
seemed to lessen as time went on. When forming his 
Cabinet, Disraeli appointed Derby to the important post 
of Foreign Secretary. The relationship between the two 
men was described thus by Sir Stafford Northcote;
How he (Lord Derby) stood with Lord Beacons field 
was very difficult to say. They had long been personal 
friends and respected each other's merits, though 
each in turn would say sharp things of the other.
Lord Beaconsfield had great influence over him and 
often brought him to do what he very much disliked.
Derby has been described as "the most isolationist 
foreign secretary that Great Britain has ever k n o w n ."^1
40lbid., p. 544.
4lA. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in 
Europe 1848-1918 (1954),p. 233.
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Of course, when he took office he found Britain already 
in an isolated position, and since he had a natural 
aversion for positive action, he favored prudence, caution, 
and a minimum of intervention. The fact that his chief 
was of the opposite disposition put a strain upon the 
relationship. Disraeli had close ties with the Stanley 
family, having served in the Cabinet as Chancelor of the 
Exchequer in the three administrations of Lord Derby's 
father. He was therefore reluctant to recognize these 
differences.
Derby's opinions on the franchise, on church ques­
tions, and many other matters were more those of a middle- 
class Liberal than those of a Tory aristocrat. Even his 
demeanor was rather plebian.^^ But the real parting of the 
way came over the Eastern Question. Derby was often 
accused of sloth and procrastination in dealing with 
matters that came under his office. Salisbury wrote of 
him in October, 1876, "Making a feather-bed walk is nothing 
to the difficulty of making an irresolute man look two 
inches into the f u t u r e . "43
Derby managed to exasperate his chief and some of 
his associates by his procrastination in dealing with 
the Eastern Question. However, in this case, his inaction
42siake, p. 544.
43&ady Gwendolen Cecil, Life of Robert, Marquis 
of Salisbury (London: Hadder and Stoughton, Ltd., 1921),
II, p. 89.
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was due to a deep conviction that intervention was unneces­
sary because the Russian government meant what it said—  
that the object of the war with Turkey was only to gain 
reforms for the Christians. The motive for peace was so 
strong in Derby that he took the unprecedented action of 
disclosing cabinet secrets to the Russian ambassador in 
order to thwart Disraeli, and with the hope of securing 
the peace. This did not come to light until the publica­
tion of the Shuvalov correspondence in 1924, thus the 
leakage of information appeared to the Prime Minister and 
the Queen as an indiscretion, while his obstructionism was 
attributed to his odd c h a r a c t e r . 4 4
In January 1878 Derby resigned his post in protest 
over Disraeli's proposal to send British warships through 
the Dardanelles. When this order was revoked, Disraeli, 
under great pressure, brought Derby back into the Cabinet. 
But from this point on his role in foreign affairs dis­
integrated rapidly. The strain had been too much for him, 
and he had taken to heavy drinking, lapsing into a state of 
apathy. Foreign policy passed out of his hands and fell 
to the trio of Disraeli, Cairns, and Salisbury. The trio 
conducted the business, while Derby signed the papers, in 
a detached manner. At the end of March, Derby again 
resigned his post with much bitterness on both sides.
44filake, p. 623.
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The rupture was so deep that just before the election of 
1880 Derby withdrew from the Conservative party and 
supported Gladstone.
Lord Salisbury
Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne-Cecil, Third Marquess 
of Salisbury was appointed by Disraeli first as Secretary 
of State for India in 1874, and later as Foreign Secretary 
upon Lord Derby's resignation. He was educated at Eton 
and Christ Church, Oxford. He first entered Parliament 
in 1853 at the age of twenty-three. However, during his 
earlier years he was known more for his political writings 
than for his political activities. The latter, however, 
began to come to the forefront about 1864, and in July of 
1865 he was appointed Secretary of State for India. He 
held this position for less than a year, resigning in 
March, 1867 over differences with the Prime Minister,
Lord Derby, and Disraeli over the second Reform Bill.
Salisbury spent the first fifteen years of his 
political career in the House of Commons, moving to the 
House of Lords in 185 8 upon the death of his father.
His political views were conservative and old-fashioned.
He was deeply suspicious of democracy and regarded 
Disraeli's espousal of Parliamentary reform as a betrayal. 
He believed that man was innately selfish, and thus in an 
unlimited democracy the poor would dominate the rich.
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making class struggles inevitable, and resulting in a 
tyranny of the majority over the minority. He therefore 
viewed Parliamentary reform as the beginning of a movement 
that would eventually attack all English institutions and 
traditions. His view of the best type of government was 
paternalistic, looking to a progressive and enlightened
oligarchy.45
Politics was viewed by Salisbury as a necessary 
evil, a duty. He once remarked, "Politics brutalize and 
degrade the mind," and again, "politics stand alone among 
human pursuits in this characteristic— that no one is 
conscious of liking them— and no one is able to leave 
them."46
Salisbury should be considered a political realist 
in the field of foreign affairs. He felt that policies 
should be adopted and adjusted to fit the situation, and, 
as he once wrote to Lord Lytton:
The commonest error in politics is sticking to 
the carcasses of dead policies. When a mast falls 
overboard you do not try to save a rope here and a 
spar there in memory of their former utility; you 
cut away the hamper altogether. And it should be 
the same with a policy. But it is not so. We cling 
to the shred of an old policy after it has been torn 
to pieces; and to the shadow of the shred after the 
rag itself has been torn away.47
45j. A. S. Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign 
Policy, the Close of the Nineteenth Century (London:
The Athlone Press, 1964), p. W 7  
46ibid., p. 7.
4?Lady Cecil, p. 145.
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Salisbury strongly supported British imperial 
interests, and pursued a policy aimed at forestalling 
rival powers. He felt that defense of the British Empire 
was the most important task facing British statesmen during 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century.^8 But here 
too he tended toward practicality and expediency. He 
subscribed to no specific doctrine, rather adopting 
whatever policy seemed to him to best suit the situation.
He wrote to Lord Northbrook (January 14, 1876);
We cannot shape our national policy by an ascetic 
rule, and shun temptation on the side where we believe 
our moral nature is weak. We must do what is politic, 
trusting that our successors will have the sense not 
to draw from it a motive for doing what is impolitic.49
In regard to the peoples of the Empire, he was opposed to
all forms of racial arrogance, and was convinced that
racial animosities would lead to ruin of the Empire if
not overcome. In 1876 he wrote to the Viceroy of India
urging him to work with the Indian p rinces. 0̂
Disraeli selected Salisbury for his cabinet, not 
only for his political qualifications, but also because 
he might have posed a threat outside the cabinet. 
Salisbury’s appointment helped to bridge the gap with the 
right wing of the Conservative party. Salisbury was not
48Grenville, p. 19. 
4^Lady Cecil, p. 72. 
SOlbid., p. 20.
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too anxious to accept the appointment, for at the time 
he did not particularly care for Disraeli. However, he 
was persuaded to accept by such anti-Disraeli figures as 
Carnarvon, Sir William Heathcote, and the Duke of 
Northumberland.5i
Salisbury began to come to the forefront in foreign 
affairs when he was sent as the British representative to 
a conference of the great powers held at Constantinople to 
discuss the Eastern Question. His appointment was welcomed 
by all. Even Gladstone was pleased, remarking that 
Salisbury "has no Disraelite prejudices, keeps a conscience 
and has plenty of manhood and character. Disraeli felt 
that as Secretary of State for India, Salisbury would be 
anti-Russian. However, he soon changed his opinion, 
writing to Derby on December 28, 1876:
Sal seems most prejudiced and not to be aware 
that his principal object in being sent to Const, is 
to keep the Russians out of Turkey, not to create an 
ideal existence for Turkish Xtians. He is more 
Russian than Ignatyev: plus Arabe que l'Arabie!53
For his part, Salisbury regarded the old Crimean 
policy as out-of-date. He felt that it was futile to 
preserve Turkey's territorial integrity, and at the 
same time he was skeptical of the alleged Russian threat
Slsiake, p. 538.
52Lady Cecil, p. 95.
^^Monypenny and Buckle, p. 71.
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via Central Asia. He observed that "much of the trouble 
came from British, statesmen using maps on too small a 
s c a l e . "54 So Salisbury's actions were not dictated by 
any pro-Russian sentiment, but rather by his view of 
what was best for Britain.
Upon Derby's resignation from the Foreign Office 
in March, 1878, Disraeli appointed Salisbury to take his 
place. The very next day Salisbury issued his famous 
"circular" to all the great powers. This dispatch claimed 
that the position of Turkey in Europe was a matter of 
concern to all the powers, and could not be determined by 
Russia alone. Thus it called for a European congress to 
decide the future of the Balkans. This laid the founda­
tion for the Congress of Berlin which was held in June, 
1878. The swiftness of Lord Salisbury in issuing this 
circular, even before he had been formally installed as 
Foreign Secretary, is significant, for it shows that he 
was a man of action. Disraeli found his new Foreign 
Secretary energetic, clear-thinking, and responsible.
While Salisbury was not always in agreement with Disraeli, 
circumstances, together with loyalty, forced him for the 
most part to conform to his v i e w s . ^5 Disraeli more and 
more left the conduct of diplomacy to Salisbury, although
54Blake, p. 577.
55h . W. V. Temperly and L. M. Penson, Foundations 
of British Foreign Policy 1792-1902 (London: Frank Cass
and Co., Ltd., 1966), p. 363.
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he continued to keep in close contact with him.
In the conduct of foreign affairs, Salisbury has 
often been charged with secrecy. His daughter supports 
this view, but clarifies it somewhat by stating, "He 
believed in frankness between the parties to a negotia­
tion, but publicity, except on rare occasions, he looked 
upon as fruitful of m i s c h i e f . " 5 6
Salisbury criticized both Disraeli and Gladstone 
for their dictatorial attitude toward their cabinet 
members. He tended to the other extreme, and as Prime 
Minister, he avoided interfering in the policies of 
departmental ministers, as he felt it was "unsafe to jog 
the elbow of the man who held the reigns . . . [and] on 
certain important occasions he even allowed the cabinet to 
override his own views on foreign policy." This tendency 
may explain his lack of control over the actions of his 
subordinates during the Afghan crisis when he was serving 
as Foreign Secretary.
Lord Lytton, who served as Viceroy of India under 
Salisbury, had nothing but praise for his chief. He 
characterized Salisbury as strong, intelligent, prudent, 
and courageous. On receipt of the news of Salisbury's 
appointment as Foreign Secretary, he wrote to him:
56Lady Cecil, p. 346.
S^Grenville, p. 10.
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It is with a real pang that I read your telegram 
informing me of the change which deprives me of the 
chief to whom I am indebted for great forbearance, 
generous support, and considerate guidance. I shall 
ever recall with grateful feelings the support you 
have given me in every principle episode of the time 
during which I have had the honour to serve under you. 
The cessation of our direct official relations is a 
sad event in my life, nor are my regrets wholly 
selfish, for the withdrawal from the India Office, 
especially at this moment, of your long experience 
of Indian administration and intimate knowledge of 
the character of the men engaged in it will be a real 
loss to India. . . .58
Thus there appears to be a paradox in regard to 
Salisbury's role, for at times he appears as the brilliant 
man of action, making decisions, implementing policy, and 
conducting foreign relations pretty much as he saw fit.
As Secretary of State for India he inaugurated the policy 
of having all information submitted to him for approval 
before any decisions were made. As Prime Minister he 
kept the Foreign Office in his own hands. And yet in 
contrast to this, he allowed his cabinet to override his 
decisions on foreign policy, and while serving as Foreign 
Secretary, he allowed Cranbrook, Secretary of State for 
India, a great deal of freedom from supervision. His 
attitude is more clearly visible in his relations with 
Lord Lytton, Viceroy of India, when he still held the 
India office. In dealing with the Afghan question, he
S^Lady Betty Balfour, The History of Lord Lytton's 
Indian Administration, 1876 to 1880 (London: Longmans,
Green and Co. , 1899) , T] p"I 240 . (Letter from Lytton to 
Salisbury, April 3, 1878).
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counseled Lytton to use prudence and to avoid all menace, 
but otherwise he left the Viceroy a free hand in negotia­
tion. He wrote Lytton along these lines on July 7, 1876, 
stating, "We settled the main lines of policy in March.
As long as you do not step outside them, I should only 
embarrass you by interposing."59 Thus Salisbury's weakness 
lay in his trust of others to act as he would.
Certainly Salisbury was not wanting in scholarship, 
diplomatic or political ability. In fact he has been 
characterized as one of the cleverest men to hold the 
Foreign Office in the nineteenth century. 0̂ Salisbury 
was a strong Secretary of State for India and a strong 
Foreign Secretary for the most part.
The Secretary of State for India
Gathorne Gathorne-Hardy, Viscount Cranbrook, did 
not enter political life until the age of forty-two. He 
had graduated from Oriel College, Oxford in 1836, passed 
the bar in 1840, and from then until 1856 he practiced 
law on the northern circuit. With his election as M.P. 
for Leominster he entered politics, and soon became known 
as a staunch supporter of the Conservative party and an 
able debater. From 1858-1859 he served as undersecretary 
for the Home Office. He was again elected to Parliament
59Lady Cecil, p. 73. 
G^Blake, p. 642.
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in 1865 as representative from Oxford University, defeating 
Gladstone. The following year he became a member of Lord 
Derby's Cabinet, serving as President of the Poor Law 
Board. He became Home Secretary again in 1867.
Because of his ability to debate, he acted as 
Disraeli's deputy in the House of Commons for several 
years, and with Disraeli's appointment to the Premiership, 
he became Secretary of War. He held this post from 1874 
until March 1878, when he was transferred to the India 
Office.
When Disraeli retired from the House of Commons, 
Hardy had wanted to become the House Leader, but the 
position went to Sir Stafford Northcote instead. Although 
disappointed. Hardy continued to serve his party in the 
House. When Salisbury succeeded Derby as Foreign Minister, 
Hardy was asked to take the India Office. He was not 
very anxious to do so, for he considered it not only one 
of the largest, but one of the most difficult offices of 
state. Besides, he felt that he knew little about Indian 
affairs, and was much too old to learn.61 Disraeli finally 
persuaded him by offering to raise him to the House of 
Lords in return.
Hardy, or Cranbrook as he was now to be known.
GlMaurice Cowling, "Lytton, the Cabinet, and the 
Russians, August to November 1878," English Historical 
Review, LXXVL (1961), 60.
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was noted for a quick temper, and Salisbury once remarked 
of him, "considering his somewhat peppery disposition,
I fear he may 'flare up in the inside' as our friend 
Bismark phrases it."G2 However, he was not a strong 
Secretary of State, as his heart was no longer in politics. 
He had neither knowledge nor interest in Indian affairs, 
and as a result was rather lax in managing the office.
One of his India Office officials wrote of him that 
"'Old Granny' was 'slapdash' and 'lazy' 'not a bad fellow 
but rather d e n s e . At the time when the Afghan crisis 
was mounting, Cranbrook was vacationing in Scotland 
(from mid-August to mid-September, 1878) . The difficulties 
finally forced him back to London. Cranbrook's letters to 
the Viceroy during the month of August "were not those of 
a strong secretary of state riding and controlling an 
exuberant and extraordinary v i c e r o y . "&4 Nothing in any 
of his letters to Lytton during that time imposed any 
restraint upon the Viceroy. Salisbury had been able to 
effectively control Lytton, but Cranbrook made no attempt 
to do so. Perhaps this neglect is partially explained by 
his confidence in Lytton. On December 18, 1878 he wrote in 
his diary, "Much of the distrust of Lytton is unreasonable;
G^Lady Cecil, p. 339. 
G^cowling, p-. 66. 
64ibid.
93
he has once acted quicker than was ordered, but has since 
done all our b e h e s t s . "^5 However, even though Cranbrook 
made allowances for the difficulties of the man-on-the- 
spot, he was disturbed by the Viceroy's actions and wrote 
him, "Your telegram announcing the departure of the 
Mission has rather taken me by surprise, as, at the 
desire of the Prime Minister and Lord Salisbury, I sent 
the message of the 13th 'to await o r d e r s . T h i s  
message also serves to show that Cranbrook had not taken 
the initiative in the matter, but rather had been prodded 
into action by his superiors.
Cranbrook was a staunch supporter of Disraeli, 
who once described him to the Queen as the leader of the 
war party. Salisbury shared this view and complained to 
the Prime Minister that "Cranbrook's views on Afghanistan 
were inclined to be be l licose."^7 Cranbrook bore out that 
view during a Cabinet meeting in October, when, as Disraeli 
puts it, "Suddenly Lord Cranbrook startled us all by saying 
that . . . his opinion was for war, immediate and complete 
. . . the material guarantee project was a half measure 
which he looked upon as an act of timidity . . .  he would
Alfred E. Gathorne-Hardy, ed., Gathorne Hardy, 
First Earl of Cranbrook, A Memoir (London: Longmans,
Green and Co., 1910), II, p. 100.
GGlbid.
G^Sarvepalli Gopal, British Policy in India 1858- 
1905 (Cambridge: The University Press, 1965), p. 85.
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frankly confess that he was not altogether satisfied with 
the preparations of the viceroy. . . ."^8 Cranbrook's 
speech was surprising, not only because of its warlike 
stance, but also because heretofore, Cranbrook had seemed 
to be more or less passive. As Cowling points out, 
Cranbrook had been attacked from all sides for several 
months previously. Disraeli had "urged him to work 
harder. Lytton had bombarded him with angry letters 
advocating policies of which Cranbrook instinctively 
approved but which, because he was overshadowed by the 
sarcastic authority of Salisbury, he could not, or did not 
care to, make sufficient effort to c a rry."69 He was 
further disturbed by Lytton's refusal to take advice from 
the professional soldiers in India on military matters. 
Thus these pressures together with his "peppery" disposi­
tion led to the remarkable statement by the Secretary of 
State for India.
Cranbrook's competence in Indian affairs was 
slight, and he viewed his office as a burden, hurrying off 
to vacation whenever possible. He had been a good parlia­
mentary leader, so his inefficiency in the India Office 
was not due to lack of ability, but rather to his lack of 




definite ideas, rather stubborn and staunch in that 
when he did take a stand he held to it tenaciously.
Cowling suggests that he was easily led, "sometimes by 
Salisbury, at others by the last person with whom he came 
in contact,"70 but the facts do not bear this out com­
pletely. Undoubtedly he was "led," so to speak in matters 
which concerned him little, but on certain points he stood 
out against those who wished to influence him and went his 
own way, as in the case of advocating increased military 
forces which Lytton strongly opposed. Cranbrook was also 
prone to disregard cabinet decisions, and on one occasion 
wrote the Viceroy that the Cabinet's instructions in a 
certain matter were objectionable and suggested that they 
might be modified. "I cannot help feeling, much as I 
deplore it, that the knot can only be cut and that in spite
of European and Parliamentary obstacles we shall be
71compelled to cut it— if so the sooner the better."
In general he was in agreement with Lytton's 
policy, supporting him even after the fall of the Con­
servative government in 1880. However, he did not keep 
a close check on the Viceroy, allowing him to have his own 
way. Cranbrook was not a strong Secretary of State, 
although he could have been if he had set his mind to
7Qlbid., p. 65.
7^Cranbrook to Lytton October 28, 1878, Lytton 
Papers, vol. 51813, p. 855, quoted in Gopal, p. 87.
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it, as demonstrated on the few occasions when he did 
assert himself.
The Viceroy
Edward Robert Bulwer Lytton, first Earl of Lytton, 
was the son of Edward Bulwer, first Baron Lytton, a well- 
known novelist and politician. Lord Lytton was educated 
at Harrow and Bonn, and from 1849 to 1874 he filled minor 
diplomatic appointments, beginning his career as an 
unpaid attache to his uncle. Sir Henry Bulwer, the minister 
at Washington, D.C. By 1865 he was minister at Lisbon, 
Portugal. Besides being a diplomat, Lytton was also a 
poet, writing under the pseudonym of Owen Meredith. His 
daughter says that "in mind Lord Lytton was essentially a 
poet gifted with a romantic and creative imagination."72 
In 1876, upon Lord Northbrook's resignation, he was 
appointed Viceroy of India by Disraeli and Salisbury.
Although the moment chosen by Northbrook to 
resign was inconvenient, both Disraeli and Salisbury 
welcomed the opportunity to place their own man in that 
position, and thereby alter the government's policy in 
that area. Lytton was not the first choice for the 
office. It was offered to the third Earl of Powis and 
then to John Manners, both of whom declined on the grounds 
of poor health. Finally, Disraeli turned to Lytton, who
72Lady Balfour, p. 28.
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was the son of his old friend and colleague. Lytton 
probably had a greater reason than the others to decline 
because of poor health, but he didn't, for as Derby 
cheerfully observed, "he would die in India, but to die 
Viceroy was something."^3
At the time of his appointment Lytton was forty- 
four years old, totally lacking in administrative experi­
e n c e , and unfamiliar with Indian affairs. He embarked 
on his new career, as he said, "knowing nothing of India 
except its m y t h s . "75 upon his appointment, he returned 
to England from Portugal, and spent the time from then to 
his departure for India trying to familiarize himself with 
India and Indian affairs. He studied books and papers 
supplied by the India Office, as well as conversing with 
persons, such as Lord Lawrence, who were familiar with 
the subject. As he sailed for India on March 1, this gave 
him less than two months to study the many aspects of the 
post.
Lytton was not left in the dark as to what was 
expected of him, nor as to what policy he was to carry 
out. Salisbury carefully outlined his instructions in a
73Monypenny and Buckle, p. 717.
74vincent A. Smith, The Oxford History of India 
(London: Clarendon Press, 1941), p. 747.
75Lady Balfour, p. 4.
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long minute dated February 28, 1876. He was directed 
to "find an early occasion for sending to Cabul a temporary 
mission," the purpose of which would be to secure the 
reception of a European Resident. If no satisfactory 
results were obtained by the mission, then the Amir of 
Afghanistan "should be distinctly reminded that he is 
isolating himself, at his own peril, from the friendship 
and protection it is in his interest to seek and deserve. 
The Viceroy concurred with the ministry's policy of 
forcing the Afghan Amir to declare himself to be either 
a friend or an enemy, and to prevent Afghanistan from 
falling under the control of Russia.
It is generally agreed that Lytton was an imag­
inative and brilliant man, "perhaps the only intellectual 
ever to become Viceroy of I n d i a . B u t  there were 
flaws in his personality that were to prove disastrous. 
Blake declares that he was "seriously unbalanced in 
judgement."78 In the fall of 1877 Lytton circulated a 
pamphlet denouncing the Government for seeking an alliance 
with Russia. Since England and Russia were at that 
moment on the verge of war, his concern seemed irrelevant. 
On this occasion Derby remarked "this production is
^^Minute from Salisbury to Lytton, February 28, 
1876, C.A.W., pp. 88-90.
77copal, p. 125. 
78Blake, p. 657.
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either the result of insanity or intrigue. In the latter 
point of view I fail to see what he had to get by it; in 
the former the look out for India is unpleasant.
Salisbury was later to become skeptical, writing of 
Lytton to Disraeli, he said, "He [Cranbrook] does not 
realize sufficiently the gaudy and theatrical ambition 
which is the Viceroy's leading passion.
It was Lytton's opinion that the government of 
India should have as much autonomy as possible. "I do 
feel strongly that, in the ordinary current details of 
its administration, a great Government, such as the 
Government of India, ought not to be, and cannot safely 
be, subjected to the uncontrolled interference, and 
inevitable veto, of a distant, and practically irresponsi­
ble, body sitting in E n g l a n d . H e  distrusted democracy 
and had little use for Parliament. He felt that the 
Cabinet was in agreement with his policy but that it was 
"hampered by all the stupidities of 'democratic' England, 
and wrestling in the clutches of 'that deformed and 
abortive offspring of perennial political fornication, the 
present British constitution.'"^2 To Lytton, despotic
79Hughenden Papers, October 8, 1877, quoted in 
Blake, p. 658.
®®Blake, p. 655.
B^Lytton to Cranbrook, April 30, 1878, quoted in 
C. H. Philips, The Evolution of India and Pakistan 1858 
to 1847, Select Documents (London; Oxford University 
Press, 1962), p. 17.
B^Cowling, p. 70.
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government in India was a desirable necessity.
Having established for himself the principle of 
an autonomous Indian government, he also established 
the idea of strong personal government with the Viceroy 
as virtual sole ruler. He had little use for the India 
Office Council, complaining to Cranbrook that the "dis­
position of that Council is to reject summarily every 
proposal, however important, or however trivial, which 
emanates from the Government of India. . . ."83 in 
dealing with his own council, he usually had his way.
John Strachey, the ablest member of Lytton's council, 
and a personal friend, always gave the Viceroy his strong 
support; while some of the other members of the council 
occasionally disagreed and recorded minutes of dissent; 
Lytton could afford to ignore them.^^ The Duke of Argyll 
was of the opinion that Lytton had difficulties with his 
council, referring specifically to Sir William Muir, Sir 
Henry Norman, and Sir Arthur Hobhouse, as being definitely 
opposed to the new p o l i c y . T h i s  opinion is borne out 
by the Reverent T. P. Hughes, head missionary at Peshawar 
during that period, when he wrote to Sir Bartle Frere:
83philips, p. 16.
B^Gopal, p. 126.
B^George D. Campbell, 8th Duke of Argyll, The 
Eastern Question from the Treaty of Paris 1856 to the 
Treaty of Berlin 1878, and the Second Afghan War (London; 
Strahan and Co., 1879), p. 417.
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"It was a most unfortunate thing for your policy . . . that
it was entrusted to a viceroy who failed to secure the
confidence of a single man . . . Lord Lytton's greatest
opponents were his own officials."®^ Lytton himself
verifies this opinion, and shows that there was dissent
from the moment of his arrival in India, of which he says,
"From day to day and hour to hour I found as I approached
Calcutta that the spirit of anticipative antagonism to
the new Viceroy was so strong on the part of the Council
here that any appearance of scolding or lecturing them
at starting would have been fatal to our future r e l a t i o n s . "^7
Few Viceroys were able to act as freely as Lytton,
some critics claim even to the point of determining policy
and forcing the Home Government's hand. However, it must
be stated that from all of Lytton's correspondence it is
apparent that he felt he was carrying out the policy of
his party, and the instructions given him by Salisbury.
The discrepancy occurred in his interpretation of that
policy and the means employed for its implementation,
rather than in his intentions. For as Disraeli says of him;
. . . I have no doubt whatever, as to our course; 
we must, completely and unflinchingly, support Lytton.
We chose him for this very kind of business. Had it 
been a routine age, we might have made what might be 
called, a more prudent selection, but we foresaw what
86john Martineau, The Life of Sir Bartle Frere 
(London: John Murray, 1895), II, p. 157.
87Lady Balfour, p. 49.
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would occur, and indeed saw what was occuring, and 
we wanted a man of ambition, imagination, some vanity, 
and much will— and we have got him. . . .88
The policy of the Conservative Government towards 
Afghanistan was that of extending British influence. It 
was a "forward policy" replacing the old "stationary 
policy." It had been initiated by Salisbury while North­
brook was still Viceroy, but with no results, mainly 
because Northbrook and his council opposed it. Lytton's 
appointment was looked upon as an opportunity for ini­
tiating the new policy. Before Lytton left England, 
Salisbury strongly impressed upon him that frontier 
relations with Afghanistan were a part of a larger Imperial 
question— namely the Eastern Question and the Russian 
threat.89 Lytton was duly impressed by the Russian 
"menace" and became a staunch Russophobe, displaying a 
tendency from then on to "nervousness."^® He expressed 
his conviction of ultimate Russian aggression in a letter 
to Lord Cranbrook in which he contended that Russia's 
weak position necessitated extending her territory in 
order to increase her military strength and financial
SSoisraeli to Salisbury, April 1, 1877, quoted in 
Monypenny and Buckle, II, p. 1251.
B^Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Biluchistan 
II, No. 194, 1877, p. 356.
9®The Duke of Argyll coined the term "Nervousness" 
to characterize the Russophobes for their obsession with 
the Russian advance towards Merv, a city in Turkestan in 
Central Asia.
103
resources. Such an extension would sooner or later bring 
her into contact with British India. He rejected diplomacy 
as a weapon for "the diplomacy of Parliamentary Governments 
is always heavily handicapped." Instead, he recommended 
the sword, "so long as peace lasts, we cannot use the 
sword and our diplomacy is impotent. The declaration of 
war, therefore, would be an opportunity which may never 
recur if we neglect it, for India to make safe all those 
outworks of her empire which must otherwise fall, sooner 
or later, into the hands or under the influence of 
Russia."91 He is not referring here to war with Russia, 
but with Afghanistan, but the casus belli is the fear of 
Russian aggression.
Lytton was an able and energetic person who 
worked hard at his job, despite his reputation for heavy 
d r i n k i n g . 92 He was faced with problems of growing Indian 
nationalism, a trade recession, famine and agrarian 
rioting, and did an adequate job of solving them. He felt 
that it was important to secure the support of at least 
one segment of the Indian society, and being a strong 
conservative, he selected the Indian aristocracy. He 
believed in the strict administration of justice, and 
believed it necessary to improve the condition of the
9lLytton to Cranbrook, April 8, 1878, quoted in 
Lady Balfour, p. 246.
92copal, p. 126.
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masses. But when Lytton is recalled, it is not his 
domestic policy that is remembered so much as his foreign 
policy. Here he "took the ball and ran with it," so to 
speak. He felt that the man-on-the-spot was much better 
able to judge the situation and act upon that judgment.
He was impatient with government red-tape, disdainful of 
Parliament, and heedless of the Cabinet. He believed that 
the Government of India, and he as the Government, should 
be left alone to run things, and he saw the Secretary of 
State for India as a "buffer" between himself and the 
Home Government. It must be apparent that he had an 
over-abundance of self-confidence, always believing 
that he was acting in the right.
However, Lytton had little knowledge or under­
standing of the Afghan situation. He was unable to judge 
the circumstances from any other point of view than that 
of an Englishman. For example, he felt that the estab­
lishment of a British mission in Afghanistan would be a 
great asset because "the presence and everyday acts in 
their midst of earnest, upright English gentlemen was the 
one thing required to civilize the Afghans." These words 
by the Viceroy, "to those who know the Afghans from the 
habit of daily intercourse with them . . . denote an 
ingenuous simplicity, and tend to provoke an involuntary
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smile."93
A very important clue to Lytton's actions is to 
be found in his attitude of racial (or national) super­
iority. He was thoroughly convinced that the British were 
far superior to the Asiatics in intelligence and morality, 
and that it was their destiny to rule and to civilize the 
barbarians. On his way to India, Lytton stopped at 
Suez, where he met the Prince of Wales and his entourage 
returning from India. Among the party were a Sikh officer, 
an Afghan officer, and the British General, Probyn.
Lytton's comment sums up his feelings, when speaking of 
the Asiatic officers he said, "They are fine soldier-like 
fellows, who look as if they might have been born sword 
in hand and cradled in a military saddle. I had a pleasant 
thrill of patriotic pride however, in comparing their 
appearance with that of their General, Probyn, as he stood 
before them in full uniform. You felt that the Englishman 
was the finest man of the three fitted in all respects to 
command these stalwart men, not only par droit de conquête, 
but also par droit de naissance. He again expressed
his arrogance in his Minute on Frontier Organization,
April 22, 1877, when he assumied English civilization and
93captain W. J. Eastwick, Lord Lytton and the 
Afghan War (London: R. J. Mitchell and Sons, 1879), p. 43
94&ady Balfour, p. 43. Par droit de conquête, 
by right of conquest; par droit de naissance, by right of 
birth.
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rule to be better than that of the Sikh or Persian kingdoms, 
and English officers to be higher types of character than 
the servants of an Eastern king.^^ In his dealings with 
the Amir of Afghanistan (whom he referred to as "not only 
a savage, but . . .  a savage with a touch of i n s a n i t y " ) 96 
these feelings of superiority played an important role, 
coloring his attitude and his actions.
The Actors involved in the decision on the Afghan 
situation had some things in common. All were members of 
the Conservative Party, with the exception of the Queen, 
and her sympathies were in that direction. All of them 
believed in the maintenance of the Empire, and to a degree, 
in its expansion. They were all, with the possible 
exception of Disraeli, members of the aristocracy. And 
as Disraeli believed himself to be of aristocratic origins, 
he shared the view of aristocracy with his colleagues.
All were, or had been, happily married, the Queen and 
Disraeli having lost their spouses shared a common bond 
which brought them closer together.
Disraeli and Lytton were known to be ill. Disraeli 
was also up in years, being seventy-four in 1878. Cranbrook 
was about ten years younger, but still felt himself to be 
old. Lytton and Salisbury were relatively young. In 1878 
Salisbury was forty-eight and Lytton was forty-six.
9 5 i b i d . , p. 174.
9 6 i b i d . , p. 244.
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Queen Victoria was mid-way between the oldest and the 
youngest of the Actors. It is notable that the most 
decisive action was taken by the two younger members of 
the group.
Disraeli and Lytton also shared a literary back­
ground and an artistic temperament. Both have been criti­
cized for their "theatrics," but Disraeli appreciated and 
applauded Lytton's talent. Salisbury, the most conserva­
tive of the group, was not as appreciative of Lytton's 
personality, nor indeed had he been of Disraeli's in 
earlier years.
The Actors all shared the habit of circumventing 
bureaucratic red-tape whenever possible, even though they 
tended to complain when the others did it. At the outset 
of Lytton's Viceroyalty, the views and the motives of the 
Actors were basically the same, but as circumstances 
changed, so did views. The failure to communicate these 
changes in attitude was to have a definite bearing on the 
course of events and the decision to enter upon a Second 
Afghan War, as will be seen later.
CHAPTER V
THE DECISION
The making of a final decision, which commits a 
nation to a specific action in the field of international 
relations, is not an isolated event. Rather it is the 
culmination of a sequence of activities, including actions 
of other nations and response to these actions. This would 
tend to indicate that other decisions were involved before 
the decision was arrived at. What then sets the final 
decision apart from other decisions? Snyder, Bruck and 
Sapin have observed that while some choices are necessarily 
made at various stages of the decisions-making process 
"the point of final decision is that stage in the sequence 
at which decisions-makers having the authority to choose a 
specific course of action to be implemented assume or are 
assigned responsibility for it. At this point the decision 
becomes official and thus binding on all decision-makers 
whether they participate or not."^
A final decision is therefore characterized by a 
choice of action and by the presence of authority to carry
^Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, p. 91.
108
109
out that action. There is a certain degree of finality 
involved that does not characterize intermediary decisions, 
for anywhere along the line up to the point of the final 
decision, the direction of policy may be changed. How­
ever, intermediary decisions do lead step by step to the 
final decision. In order to better understand how the 
final decision to declare war on the Amir of Afghanistan 
was reached by the British Government, an endeavor will 
be made to trace the steps leading up to it. As the 
stimulus was provided by the Russian Mission to Kabul in 
the summer of 1878, this process will be traced from the 
beginning of the Mission on to the beginning of hostilities 
against Afghanistan.
May (First Part)
It was early in May when the Amir, Sher Ali, 
received the letter from the Governor of Afghan Turkistan, 
Shahghassi Sherdil Khan, advising him that the Russians 
intended to use the threat of supporting his nephew,
Abdur Rahman, a pensioner of Russia, in a claim to the 
Afghan throne, if Sher Ali did not cooperate with Russia's 
plans regarding British India. This threat preceded any 
news of a proposed Russian mission, but was evidently 
put forth to help prepare the way for the acceptance 
of such a mission.
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May 13
Information regarding the Russian threat made to 
Sher Ali was forwarded to the Government of India in a 
confidential news-letter from the Government agent sta- 
tioned at Peshawar. Thus the Viceroy was well aware 
of the position in which Sher Ali now found himself in 
regard to the Russians.
May 21
M. Weinburg, the Russian Diplomatic Agent attached 
to General Kaufman, accompanied by Captain Shlikter, arrived 
at Karsh for the purpose of negotiating with the Amir of 
Bokhara concerning the passage of Russian troops along the 
upper course of the Amu-Darya River. Kaufman knew of the 
intended Anglo-Indian expedition against the Asiatic 
possessions of Russia, and presumed that the British 
intended to use Afghanistan as a base of operations.^
May 22
M. Weinburg and Captain Shlikter were presented to 
the Amir of Bokhara, who agreed to allow the passage of 
Russian troops, and to aid them in any way possible. At
^Parliamentary Papers, V.LXXX (Central Asia, 
No. 1), 1878, p. 136.
3c .A.W., p. 294.
Ill
the same time he questioned the Russians as to their 
intentions regarding Afghanistan. M. Weinburg replied 
that the Governor-General (Kaufman) was contemplating 
sending a mission to Sher Ali "by which means our relations 
with the latter would in all probability become defined one 
way or the other, either in an amicable or hostile sense; 
everything would depend on the straightforwardness and 
good sense displayed by the Ameer.
While there was no direct threat in this statement, 
it was implied when Weinburg stated that relations might be 
defined in a hostile sense. The purpose of the tentative 
mission to Kabul thus appeared to be to determine relations 
between Russia and Afghanistan. This indicates that in 
the Spring of 1878 no understanding existed between Sher 
Ali and the Russians, for the avowed purpose of the mission 
was to attempt to reach some sort of understanding.
June 7
The earliest rumor of the advent of a Russian 
Mission to Kabul reached the Government of India, and the 
news was speedily telegraphed to England. However, at 
this time no details were known, and the rumors could not 
be immediately verified.
On the same day Major Cavagnari in Peshawar heard 
of Sher Ali's alarm at the news of the Russian mission,
4&ady Balfour, p. 248.
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and his attempt to halt it. The Amir had received word 
from Shahghassi Sherdil Khan that the Russians had begun 
building a road between Badkoya (near Khiva) and the banks 
of the Oxus and then to Ukeba. He also informed the Amir 
that the Khan of Khiva, with eight hundred horsemen, had 
been directed to protect the working groups, and also to 
accompany the Russian Envoy who would soon visit Kabul.
The Russian Agent at Kabul also informed the Amir that an 
Envoy, with power equal to that of the Governor-General 
at Tashkend, would shortly visit Kabul.
Upon hearing this, Sher Ali wrote a letter to 
Shahghassi Sherdil telling him to inform Kaufman that it 
was not advisable for a Russian Mission to visit Kabul, 
and suggested instead that "if the Russian Government had 
anything important to say to him, rather than receive a 
Russian (European) Envoy at Kabul, he would at once send 
one of his ministers to Tashkend, to receive the com­
munication on his behalf."5 The reply from General 
Kaufman advised him that a Russian Envoy, by orders of 
the Emperor, was being sent and could not be detained. He 
further stated that the Amir would be held responsible for 
the Envoy's safety, as well as his honorable reception.
In response to Sher Ali's proposal to send an Afghan envoy 
to Tashkend, Kaufman added that he would be glad to
5The Moscow Gazette, July 18, 1878, quoted in 
C.A.W., p. 295.
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accept the proposal to accredit such a permanent Afghan 
representative, and furthermore he advised that the Amir's 
offer could not now be withdrawn without offending Russia. 
Nevertheless, he emphasized that the stationing of a 
permanent Afghan representative at Tashkend could not 
supersede the special Russian Mission. "On this the 
Ameer got very angry, and in a petulant manner exclaimed 
that it was useless for him to depute an Afghan Agent nor 
could he do anything to prevent the Envoy's coming to 
Cabul."G The Amir decided to summon the important chiefs 
to Kabul to consult with the Kabul Durbar and to advise 
him what to do.
June 11
A letter of this date from the Taskend correspondent 
of the Moscow Gazette (published July 9th) described the 
military arrangements which had been made by General 
Kaufman against the anticipated attack by the British 
through Afghanistan from India. By this date both the 
military and diplomatic arrangements were fairly well 
completed.^
June 13
The Russian Mission, headed by General Stolietoff,
^Parliamentary Papers, V. LXXX (Central Asia, 
No. 1), 1878, p. 138.
?C.A.W., p. 299.
114
left Tashkend. The Kabul correspondent of the Russian 
newspaper Golos, described the mission in these terms:
The Russian Mission, consisting of seven officers 
[among whom was one general), twenty-two cossacks, 
four servants, and fifteen Kirghes horsemen, left 
Samarkand on the ^ t h  June.
The road selected for reaching the Oxus was through 
Hazer, Shirabad, and Chushkogosar, which, though 
presenting some difficulties, running as it does 
along a rocky ridge of hills, was traversed in five 
days. On this route the Mission passed through the 
famous defile known in ancient times under the name 
of the "Iron Gates," and now called Burghasse Khana.°
The day the Russian Mission left Tashkend was also 
the day when the Berlin Congress had its first meeting.
June 16
Major Cavagnari, in his Peshawar Diary of this 
date, portrayed the Amir's frame of mind at the impending 
approach of the Russian Mission. He noted that the Amir 
had expressed the opinion that the Russian proposals were 
adverse to British interests, and that "it would remain to 
be seen how the British authorities, when they heard of 
them, would act in their own interests with regard to the 
Indian Empire." His resolution at this time was not to 
make enemies of either power, but whichever Government 
"approached him in a friendly manner, he would make 
similar advances."^
^Golos, November 1878, quoted in C.A.W., p. 301.
^Parliamentary Papers, V. LIII (Afghanistan, No. 1), 
1878, p. 139.
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J une 2 6
The attention of the Foreign Office was called to 
the Russian Mission.
July 2
The British Ambassador to Russia, Sir Augustus 
Loftus, questioned M. de Giers about the coming of a 
Russian mission to Kabul. M. de Giers denied that any 
mission had been sent to Kabul, or that there was any 
intention of sending one. When Ambassador Loftus referred 
to intrigues which had been carried on by a Russian resident 
agent in Kabul, with a view to creating dissension between 
the Amir and the British Government, M. de Giers observed 
that when war with Britain had appeared imminent, "no doubt 
the military commanders conceived it to be their duty to 
take such measures as might be necessary and serviceable
to their country.
Since it was known that a Russian Mission was at 
Kabul at the time the denial was given Lord Loftus, it 
was assumed that either M. de Giers was uninformed of the 
actions of the Governor-General of Turkestan, or he was 
deliberately hiding the truth.
^^Parliamentary Papers, V. LXXX (Central Asia, No, 
1) , 1878, p. 132.
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July 13
The Treaty of Berlin was formally signed, removing 
the threat of war between Russia and England. The settle­
ment was a defeat for Panslavism, and showed that the 
British were still dominant in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
Britain obtained Cyprus, and this, along with the other 
terms, pointed to a bolstering up of Turkey. Russia 
suffered diplomatically, and the Tsar, Alexander II, 
described the Congress as a "European coalition against 
Russia led by Bismark.
Disraeli's diplomatic success lay in checking 
Russian ambitions. Russia was prevented from occupying 
Constantinople. Also, by impeding the creation of a 
"Big Bulgaria," which would have consisted of a polyglot 
population in which the Bulgars would have been a minority, 
the threat of Russian penetration was greatly diminished. 
Besides, the agreement left much less of the world to be 
governed by the Turks.
The avoidance of war with Russia, together with 
the positive accomplishments of the Berlin Congress, 
gave Disraeli a prestige "unsurpassed by any statesman 
of his time."12 Disraeli was now at the pinnacle of his
llAnthony Wood, Nineteenth Century Britain 1315- 
1914 (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1960), p. 304.
l^Blake, p. 655.
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success. This event marked a change in the attitude of 
the Home Government towards Central Asia due to the 
removal of the danger of war with Russia.
July 22
The Russian Mission arrived in Kabul. Its recep­
tion was described by the Russian correspondent for the 
Golos;
At a distance of seven versts from Cabul we were 
met by Prince Abdullah Khan, Share All's nephew. He 
rode on an enormous elephant of ashy-grey colour, and 
with long gilded tusks. The Prince himself was seated 
in a basket profusely ornamented with gold. He invited 
General Stoletoff to seat himself on his elephant, and 
they entered the town together. We followed also on 
elephants, the sowdas of which were ornamented with 
silver. A brilliant body of cavalry followed in rear 
of the Prince. Crowds lined both sides of the road, 
and even neighbouring rocks and trees were covered 
with people. . . .
Entering on a large plain, we found it filled with 
regular troops. On the left flank stood the cavalry, 
and twelve brass and steel guns, which glistened in 
the sun, were placed in front. As soon as the elephant 
on which the Envoy was seated was in line with the 
troops a salute of thirty-six guns was fired. The 
mournful though very original air of the Afghan National 
March was struck up.13
The Russian Mission was received with all due 
honors, a fact which upset the Viceroy a great deal, in 
view of the Amir's steadfast refusal to receive a British 
Envoy.




The Russian Envoy was received in Durbar by the 
Amir. He told Sher Ali that the Russian authorities wished 
to strengthen and perpetuate the friendship with Afghanistan 
by means of a treaty of amity. The Amir responded that such 
a matter would necessarily require "consideration and 
consultation with his Ministers and the Grandees of his 
State, and that a proper reply would be given after this 
had been done. . . ."14
July 30
Lytton telegraphed Cranbrook to inqure whether 
the Russian Mission was to be treated as an Imperial 
question with Russia, or a local matter between the Amir 
and the Government of India. In the latter case, he 
proposed, with the approval of the Home Government "to 
insist on immediate suitable reception of a European 
Mission. . . . The alternative would be continued policy 
of complete inaction, difficult to maintain, and very 
injurious to our position in India.
At this time Lytton had very few facts regarding 
the Russian Mission. He did not know how large it was,
^^Parliamentary Papers, V. LXXX (Central Asia,
No. 2), 1878, p. 1.
^^Parliamentary Papers, V. LIII (Afghanistan,
No. 1), 1878, p. 227.
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or what its purpose was. Nevertheless, he viewed it as a 
serious threat, serious enough to demand immediate action.
August 1
In response to Lytton's telegram regarding the 
Russian Mission, Cranbrook wanted to make an immediate 
protest to Russia, but was talked out of it by Salisbury. 
Instead, he wired the Viceroy as follows:
Make yourself certain of the facts before insisting 
on the reception of British Envoy. Perhaps you might 
send a native to ascertain whether Russians are really 
there, and telegraph to me when the truth is k n o w n . 16
August 2
Twice on this date Lytton telegraphed Cranbrook 
urging immediate action be taken. In one telegram he 
said:
To remain inactive now will, we respectfully 
submit, be to allow Afghanistan to fall as certainly 
and as completely under Russian power and influence 
as the Khanates. We believe we could correct this 
situation if allowed to treat it as question between 
us and the Ameer, and probably could do so without 
recourse to force. But we must speak plainly and 
decidedly, and be sure of your s u p p o r t . 17
In this same telegram, Lytton informed Cranbrook 
that the Russian Envoy was General Abramoff, a piece of 
misinformation. In the other telegram, he again suggested
IGlbid., p. 228.
l^Lytton to Cranbrook, August 2, 1878, C.A.W.,
p. 1 7 3 .
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that the Government of India be allowed to insist on the 
reception of a British Mission at Kabul, and after such 
reception to attempt to make arrangements with the Amir 
as outlined in Salisbury's instructions to Lytton in 1876, 
but avoiding all dynastic guarantees.
The Viceroy felt that it was necessary for the 
protection of India to reestablish the preponderance of 
British influence in Afghanistan. If such arrangements 
could not be made with Sher Ali, then it would be neces­
sary to "consider what measures are necessary for the 
protection and permanent tranquility of the North-West 
Frontier. . . ."18 Lytton preferred to view the Afghan 
situation as a local matter, rather than considering it 
in the larger context of European affairs. The threat to 
British India was utmost in his mind at this time.
August 3
Cranbrook accepted the general outline of Lytton's 
ideas, and telegraphed permission to send a British mission 
to Kabul. On the same day Lytton wrote a detailed letter 
to the Secretary of State, setting forth his views on 
frontier policy, together with his proposals for what 
action should be taken.
He first noted his belief that eventually all
ISibid., p. 174.
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intermediate states lying between British India and Russia 
would be absorbed by one or the other power, resulting in 
a conterminous boundary with Russia on the Northwest 
frontier. Thus, the British should decide, while they 
still had the opportunity, just where that boundary should 
be. In making this decision, they must take into account 
the most advantageous position, especially from the 
standpoint of affording a strong military line. He also 
pointed out that the present frontier line was militarily 
disadvantageous, that to stand behind a mountain range was 
outdated. In securing a better frontier, he particularly 
stressed the importance of Herat and the necessity of 
keeping it from falling to any other power, be it Persian 
or Russian.
In order to secure a suitable frontier, Lytton 
saw only three possible courses of action:
1. To secure an alliance with the Amir of Kabul 
which would permanently exclude Russian influ­
ence from Afghanistan.
2. If this failed, to withdraw promptly and 
publicly all support from the Amir, to dis­
integrate the Afghan kingdom, and to replace 
the present ruler with one more friendly to 
the British and dependent upon them for 
support.
3. If the above failed, to conquer and hold as 
much of Afghanistan as necessary for the 
maintenance of the Northwest frontier.19
l^Lytton to Cranbrook, August 3, 1878, quoted in 
Lady Balfour, p. 255.
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The Viceroy did not believe the last alternative to be as 
formidable as had often been represented. He was convinced 
that British India's military might was far superior to 
any of the small neighboring countries, including 
Afghanistan.
In accordance with the suggestions and priorities 
listed, Lytton proposed first to send a British Mission 
to the Amir. The Mission was to be headed by Sir Neville 
Chamberlain. It was to be a rather formidable mission, 
for Lytton proposed that the British Envoy would be 
instructed to use "every endeavour to conciliate and 
convince the Amir," but at the same time he would "be 
armed with a formidable bill of indictment against His 
Highness; setting forth all his inimical and hitherto 
unpunished acts towards us, his attempts to stir up a 
holy war against us, his systematic maltreatment of our 
subjects, etc., and the culminating insult of his reception 
of Russian officers at his capital after his flat refusal
nf)to receive there our own officers. . . ."
The terms that Lytton proposed to be offered the 
Amir by the British Envoy were a treaty binding the Amir 
not to enter into negotiations or receive agents from any 
other State without the consent of the British; the 
right to send special British missions to Kabul; and the 
permanent location of a British Agent at Herat. He also
ZOlbid., p. 256.
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wanted the right to have agents at Balkh and Kandahar, but 
he would not insist upon it. The Amir was to be advised 
that if he rejected the terms, the British would openly 
break with him, and it was to be intimated to him that 
the British would then occupy the Kurram Valley and Kandahar,
Lytton further suggested to Cranbrook that, should 
the Mission fail, the second course of action should be put 
into action immediately. "That is to say, we must upset 
Sher Ali or pare his c l a w s ."21 while these were merely 
proposals, the Viceroy was already setting the plans in 
action, for he was having the proposed military operations 
planned and preparations made at the time he was writing 
to the Secretary of State.
Lytton's attitude toward Sher Ali is made apparent 
in his letter. His bill of indictment against the Amir 
was made up in reaction to his resentment at not being 
treated as a superior, and to the misinformation he 
possessed. The only thing Sher Ali had done to the 
British was to refuse to receive an Envoy in 1876. The 
Viceroy had closed the Peshawar Conference at a time when 
the Amir seemingly was in a mood to cooperate. It was 
also the Viceroy who withdrew the Native British Agent from 
Kabul, thus severing relations with Afghanistan; and it was 
the Government of India which had ordered a military
21lbid., p. 260.
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build-up on the Northwest frontier. The Russian Mission 
was not wanted by Sher Ali, but under pressure of threats 
he had received it. Lytton revealed his belief that the 
British had been greatly insulted and mistreated by the 
Amir, but the basis he had for this belief was misinforma­
tion and bias.
This letter also shows the Viceroy's objective of 
obtaining dominance in Afghanistan, be it through peaceful 
means or by war, in order to protect India from a future 
Russian menace. He revealed his conviction that there 
would eventually be problems with Russia in that area, and 
a consequential need for a strong military position on the 
Northwest frontier. This position was to be secured with 
or without Sher Ali's cooperation.
The Peshawar newsletter of the same date contained 
information which recounted how the Amir had received a 
petition stating that Russia, England, and Persia were 
planning to partition Afghanistan, and suggesting that 
the Amir should declare war against the three nations.
The report stated that Sher Ali was very angry upon hear­
ing this, and tore up the letter.^2 Sher Ali was well 
aware of the threat to his country from both sides, but 
he was not in favor of war, except as a defensive measure.
22c.A.W., p. 308.
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August 6 or 7
Owen Tudor Burns, head of the political department 
of the India Office, learned that it had been decided not 
to send a formal protest to Russia. He believed this to 
be due to Salisbury's influence, and he "was furious and 
took a blood and thunder draft to Lord Cranbrook which . . . 
he adopted in its essential parts."^3
August 8
Cranbrook instructed Sir L. Mallett to address 
the Foreign Office regarding the Russian Mission. He told 
Mallett that he did not consider the sending of the 
proposed British Mission as adequate in itself, but that 
it was also.necessary that the British Ambassador at 
St. Petersburg should address the Russian Cabinet con­
cerning the activities of the Russian authorities in 
Turkestan. He went on to say.
It is the Russian Cabinet alone which is responsible 
for the acts of its Agent; and it is the Russian 
Governor-General of Turkistan, rather than the Ameer 
Shere Ali, who, with or without authority, is at this 
moment pursuing a policy of which the effect must be 
to seriously agitate the minds of Her Majesty's 
subjects throughout I n d i a . 24
At this time Cranbrook did not place the blame on the
2Scowling, p. 65.
24cranbook to Mallet, August 8, 1878, quoted in 
C.A.W., p. 309.
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Afghan Amir, but instead saw him as victim of Russian 
intrigues. While he had led Lytton to believe that the 
matter would be treated as a local issue, at this point 
he changed his mind, and it became an imperial issue 
instead.
Burne's draft was forwarded at this time to the 
Foreign Office for approval, and Cranbrook also telegraphed 
Lytton, giving permission to send a British mission to 
Sher Ali, but neglecting to inform him of the protest 
being prepared for transmittal to St. Petersburg.
August 13
Lytton telegraphed to Cranbrook further details
pertaining to the organization of the mission, and stated,
"I cannot propose it [the mission] unless I have authority
2 5to insist on it." This was an indication of the Viceroy's 
intentions, but it went unnoticed at the time by the Home 
Government. To Lytton, once the project was set in motion, 
it must be carried to the end. Thus, once he had the 
sanction from the Home Government to send the mission, he 
construed it to mean carrying through the plans regardless 
of intervening circumstances.
Z^Lady Balfour, p. 270.
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August 14
M. de Giers assured the British Charge d'Affairs 
at St. Petersburg that the political and military prepara­
tions in Central Asia had been stopped. He also intimated 
that the preparations, including the Russian Mission, had 
been made as a precaution against the importation of Indian 
troops to Malta.2G
These statements of M. de Giers are important for 
several reasons. First, they help to verify the fact 
that the Russian Mission was sent as a reaction to British 
interference in the Russo-Turkish affair. Second, they 
assert that the military and political actions had been 
stopped. Thus Russia no longer intended to pursue those 
activities in regard to Afghanistan which the British 
Government had so deplored. Any motivation for military 
aggression in Afghanistan as a necessity to the defense of 
India from Russia thereby should have been removed, and 
indeed, in the eyes of the Actors in London, it had been.
August 17
Lytton wrote to Cranbrook, giving his considered 
views on the Afghan situation. The letter was very 
detailed, consisting of some seventeen typewritten pages.
In this letter the Viceroy stated that Sher Ali preferred
26c.A.W., p. 310.
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Russian protection to British, and moreover, he had been 
alienated from the British for a long time "by the systematic 
stupidity and insincerity of our p o l i c y . "2? This policy was 
not that pursued by Lytton, but the one followed by his 
predecessors. He expressed the opinion that if Sher Ali 
were not with the British for all practical purposes, he 
should be treated as against them.
Lytton expressed his theory relating to the main­
tenance of the Indian Empire when he said, "Our present 
Empire, and the long repose it has enjoyed of late years, 
are the results of measures taken in time to crush the 
power, not of actively inimical, but of undoubtedly ill- 
disposed and untrustworthy neighbours, before it could 
gather to a head. The dangers averted by these measures 
were only apparent to the statesmen who were closely 
watching the situation on the spot; they were incipient 
dangers, rarely realised in time by the home p u b l i c . "28 
In this statement he showed his belief that the man-on- 
the-spot was the most competent to judge the situation, 
and implied that as a result he should take action when­
ever it appeared necessary.
Lytton saw the Afghan situation as a parallel to 
past situations in India, and concluded that the same




policy should be followed as in those cases. But his 
use of parallels was inconsistent, for the circumstances 
more closely resembled those preceding the First Afghan 
War, which ended in disaster for the British. However, 
he never compared those events. His selectivity in 
drawing parallels was a tool used to reinforce his beliefs. 
Here his lack of knowledge of Afghanistan helped to cloud 
his vision. The Afghan people were entirely different from 
the Indian subjects with whom he was familiar, but he 
failed to understand this. Sir G. Campbell emphasized 
the differences, and described the Afghan character thus:
I have always thought and said that if the mountains 
of Afghanistan had been occupied by a people in any 
degree resembling those of the Himalayas,— if the 
Afghans had in any degree resembled in character the 
people of Cashmere or of the hill country of the Kangra, 
Simla, or Kumoan districts, or even those of Nepaul—
I should have thought it extremely desirable that we 
should in some shape occupy that country and so complete 
our defences; but we know by painful experience that 
the Afghans are a people of a totally different 
character— turbulent— bred from infancy to the use 
of arms— and with a passion for independence in which 
they are exceeded by no people in this world. This 
love of independence is such as to make them intolerant, 
not only of foreign rule, but almost of any national, 
tribal or family rule. Experience has shown, too, 
that these traits are not of a passing kind; the 
Afghans are not to be tamed by subjection and peace; 
nothing induces them to surrender that love of 
independence which seems to be the essence of their 
nature.29
The Viceroy went on in his letter to state that 
the objective in Afghanistan was to effect "the permanent
29sir G. Campbell, M. P., The Afghan Frontier 
(London: Edward Stanford, 1879), pp. 1-2.
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settlement of the Afghan question on a basis of our own 
selection, thus ensuring the stable tranquility of our 
Central Asian frontiers."30 to attain this goal he saw 
two alternatives. The first was to come to an immediate 
and definite understanding with Afghanistan, a course which 
could best be carried out by the Government of India.
The second was to reach an agreement with the Russian 
Government, and this task would best fall to the Home 
Government. Lytton strongly favored the first course of 
action. He had several strong objections to the second 
course. He felt that any peaceful settlement with Russia 
would result in British abandonment of northern Afghanistan 
to Russian influence, and the adoption of the Hindu Kush 
and the Helmund as the ultimate limits of British influence. 
The result would be a conterminous boundary with Russia 
from the Oxus River almost to the Persian Gulf, and 
moreover, "to surrender without a struggle either to Russia 
or Persia, Herat and all the neighbouring towns and terri­
tory of Northern Afghanistan would be a serious blow to our 
prestige."31
Lytton believed that the present situation presented 
Britain with a "golden opportunity" to gain supremacy over 
Russia in that area, if the first course of action, that
^^Lytton to Cranbrook, August 17, 1878, quoted
in Hardy, p. 88-
31lbid., p. 91.
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of direct arrangements with Afghanistan, were followed. 
Such an arrangement would, at the very least, involve a 
pledge by the British to defend the Amir's dominions 
against unprovoked aggression on the part of any other 
power. This course would unavoidably increase Britain's 
future liabilities, but it would "not only be the most 
efficacious as regards our present prestige and permanent 
interests, but also the most pacific, the least violent, 
and on the whole the most justifiable."3%
Lytton was convinced that his proposed course of 
action could be carried out with the full support of the 
Government, for he had confidence in Lord Beacons field's 
support of a "spirited" foreign policy, and he believed 
the Cabinet was united behind him, and that the Government 
was in command of a large majority. Furthermore, "his 
[Beaconsfield's] insight, patriotism, ingenuity, and 
energy, gratefully recognised by the common-sense of the 
whole country, and the most high-spirited and straight­
forward of his chief colleagues at the India Office. For 
this is the best guarantee that the opportunity now 
offered us will not be lost or m i s u s e d . "33 Thus the 
Viceroy was confident in the strength of the Government, 




This was also the day when Abdullah Jan, the son 
and heir of Sher Ali, died. This was a great personal 
loss to the Amir. A forty day period of mourning was 
declared in Afghanistan, and all business was suspended 
for that period.
August 19
Salisbury had revised the protest to Russia, 
drawn up by Burne, to a routine demand for the withdrawal 
of the Russian Mission from Kabul, and sent it back to 
Cranbrook for approval. Although Burne "minuted against 
the reduction of the original protest to 'milk and water 
by the combined Cranbrook and Salisbury process,' . . . 
his modification . . . [was] scratched out by C r a n b r o o k . "^4
The draft was again sent to the Foreign Office which 
dispatched it to St. Petersburg on the above date. The 
Home Government's action on this was very slow, which seems 
to indicate that they did not consider the matter of 
great importance.
August 21
The news of the death of Abdullah Jan reached the 
Viceroy. In view of this development, Lytton delayed the 
departure of the native emissary (the Nawab Ghulam Hasan
34cowling, p. 65.
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Khan), who was to have left Peshawar on August 23rd. The 
Nawab was to carry word to the Amir concerning the coming 
of the Chamberlain Mission to Kabul.
August 23
The Amir sent word by messenger to General Kaufman 
of the impending return of General Stolietoff and other 
members of his mission.
Augus t 25
The Russian Envoy and a party left Kabul. Some 
of the subordinate members of the mission remained behind, 
due to illness.
August 30
The native emissary, the Nawab Ghulam Hasan Khan, 
departed for Kabul to announce the arrival of the British 
Mission. The Nawab carried with him two letters, one, 
dated August 14th, announcing the Mission and requesting 
safe conduct, and the other a letter of condolence. The 
emissary was stopped at Jellalabad and told to wait, as the 
Amir was "unfit to attend to business, and that the matter 
must be deferred until after . . . the month of m o u r n i n g . "^5
The Viceroy believed this to be a delaying tactic
^^Lady Balfour, p. 265.
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on the part of the Amir to give him time to consult the 
Russians as to what to do.^G However, the Amir changed 
his mind, and the envoy was allowed to proceed to Kabul.
September 8
M. de Giers wrote from Livadia to Mr. Plunkett 
that the Russian Mission to Kabul, which had been sent in 
prospect of war, was now, due to the results of the 
Congress of Berlin, "of a provisional nature, and one of
simple courtesy."37
At Calcutta, Lytton telegraphed Cranbrook that 
the Mission would leave Peshawar on September 16th. He 
also announced that Chamberlain would be dispatched, 
together with 1,000 men, through the Khyber Pass on his 
way to Kabul.38
September 9
A copy of Lytton's instructions to Chamberlain 
arrived in London. In these instructions the Viceroy 
insisted that before any negotiations were begun in 
Kabul, the Russian Mission must be withdrawn. If the 
Russians were still in Kabul when Chamberlain arrived, he
36Ibid., p. 266,
^^Parliamentary Papers, V. LXXX (Central Asia 
No. 1), 1878, p. 147.
38Lady Cecil, p. 338.
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was to ignore them, but at the same time to refuse to 
make any terms with Sher Ali until they had left the city.
The receipt of this information concerning the 
Viceroy's intentions caused a great deal of consternation 
in the Home Government. It was alarming, for if Sher Ali 
attempted to dismiss the Russians, it might provoke 
hostilities between Afghanistan and Russia, and such 
hostilities would conceivably involve Britain at a time 
when peace with Russia had just been established. When 
the telegram containing the instructions arrived at the 
India Office in London, Cranbrook was in the northern 
part of Scotland. His private secretary, Horace Walpole, 
thought it serious enough to call for immediate action, 
and therefore sent a copy of the telegram to Cranbrook, 
one to Beacons field at Hughenden, and one to Salisbury 
at the Foreign Office.
Salisbury, receiving his copy the same day, wrote 
to Disraeli, "Lytton's telegram has gone to you tonight 
and will give you matter to sleep and dream over."^^
September 10
Salisbury went to Hugheden to dine, sleep and talk 
Indian policy with Disraeli. The two considered that 
Lytton's proposal involved war as the immediate alternative
39lbid.
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to surrender. To avoid such a collision, they felt quick 
action was needed.
This was also the day when the Nawab Ghulam Hasan 
Khan arrived in Kabul with the Viceroy's letter announcing 
the advent of the Chamberlain Mission.
September 11
Salisbury returned to London and took the initiative 
by officially requesting the India Office "to prevent any 
action being taken in India until we have received and 
communicated a letter from de Giers on this subject which 
we are advised left Livadia on S u n d a y ."40
Cranbrook forwarded Lytton's correspondence with 
the India Office, regarding Afghanistan, to Disraeli.
September 12
Chamberlain and the other officers in his party 
reached Peshawar in preparation for the Mission.
Disraeli wrote to Cranbrook expressing his alarm 
at Lytton's telegram of the 8th. For the first time he 
realized that perhaps Lytton did not know of the com­
munications with Russia. He also informed Cranbrook that 
it appeared that the explanations of the Russian Govern­
ment were satisfactory. He went on to express concern in
40galisbury to Beaconsfield, September 11, 1878,
quoted in Lady Cecil, p. 338.
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regard to Lytton's policy;
What injurious effect Lytton's policy, ostenta­
tiously, indiscreetly, but, evidently, officially 
announced, in the Calcutta correspondence of The 
Times of yesterday, may produce, I cannot presume 
to say. But I am alarmed, and affairs require, in 
my opinion, your gravest attention.41
By this time Cranbrook had received word from 
Salisbury advising him that the Foreign Secretary was 
officially requesting the India Office to hold the Mission 
until the reply from Russia was received. Salisbury was 
not sure how Cranbrook would react to his interference, 
but on this date the Secretary of State replied favor­
ably, saying, "Pray let me know your feelings without 
scruple about mine— in such grave affairs frankness 
ought never to do h a r m . "42
September 13
Cranbrook telegraphed Lytton to delay the Mission 
until a reply had been received from the Home Government's 
protest to Russia. This was the first that Lytton had 
heard of the remonstrance. The Secretary of State sent 
another telegram stating that he would not send detailed 
approval and modification of Chamberlain's instructions 
until the Russian reply arrived in London.
41oisraeli to Cranbrook, September 12, 1878, 
quoted in Monypenny and Buckle, p. 1253.
42Lady Cecil, p. 339.
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Upon sending the telegram to the Viceroy, Cranbrook 
wrote Disraeli to inform him that Lytton had been told to 
delay the mission. In this letter he also set forth his 
views on the Afghan situation. He felt that it was 
necessary to send the mission, but not under the instruc­
tions as set forth by Lytton. These needed modification. 
The terms which Cranbrook proposed to offer the Amir 
involved four points. First, he believed it would be 
beneficial to have a British resident on the frontier as 
a means for obtaining more accurate information. Second, 
he proposed to offer the Amir a subsidy to secure his 
good-will. Third, he advocated a "very qualified" recogni­
tion of Sher Ali's successor. Fourth, in regard to the 
defense of Afghan territory, he felt that such defense 
must be strictly limited, and must be contingent upon the 
Amir acting upon the advice of the British, "for we could 
not be responsible for what he may bring upon himself by 
independent action."^3
Disraeli also wrote to Cranbrook, acknowledging 
receipt of the Lytton papers which had been forwarded to 
him by the Secretary of State. Referring to Lytton's 
letter to Cranbrook of August 17th, the Prime Minister 
wrote :
Lord Lytton grapples with his subject, and grasps 
it like a man. I always thought very highly of his
43cranbrook to Disraeli, September 13, 1878,
quoted in Hardy, p. 84.
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abilities, but this specimen of them elevates my 
estimate. With his general policy I agree in great 
measure, but the all important question which disturbs 
me immediately arises. Is he acquainted with the 
negotiations now going on with R u s s i a ? 4 4
Of course Lytton did not know of the negotiations 
at the time he wrote the letter referred to by Disraeli.
In fact, he had just been informed of them on the very day 
when the Prime Minister wrote to Cranbrook. Thus, up 
until this time, which was just three days before the 
Chamberlain Mission was to depart, all plans had been 
made by the Government of India without the knowledge of 
the Home Government's actions. The Viceroy had been 
acting under an entirely different assumption. He was 
under the impression that the matter was being dealt with 
as a local concern, and the Mission had been planned on 
that assumption. At the eleventh hour the circumstances 
were suddenly altered, but Lytton had committed himself 
too far, in his own opinion, to change course. The lack 
of communication between the Home Government and the 
Government of India was in great measure responsible for 
the creation of a potentially dangerous situation.
September 14
The Commandant of the fort at Ali Musjid sent to 
Peshawar to summon back to the Khyber Pass all the
^^Disraeli to Cranbrook, September 13, 1878,
quoted in Hardy, p. 96.
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Khyberi headmen, who were afraid to disobey for fear their 
allowances from the Amir would be cut off. This presented 
a serious situation, for Major Cavagnari had been negotiat­
ing with the tribesmen for the safe conduct of the Mission. 
Accordingly, Sir Neville Chamberlain wrote to the Com­
mandant, Faiz Mohammed, explaining that the negotiations 
with the tribesmen had been for the sole purpose of 
obtaining safe passage through the Khyber Pass, and were 
not intended in any way to be prejudicial to the Amir.
He also asked for assurance that the Mission would be 
safely conducted to D a k k a . ^ S
September 16
The Mission was to have left for Kabul on this 
date, but in accordance with Cranbrook's instructions, 
Lytton telegraphed Chamberlain at Peshawar to delay the 
start for five days.
Chamberlain also received a reply to his letter 
from Faiz Mohammed, who advised him that the Mission 
would not be allowed to pass without the Amir's consent, 
and so far he had received no orders concerning it. He 
also advised that Mir Akhor was expected to arrive any 
day from Kabul, and perhaps he would bring some word 
about the Mission.
45Lady Balfour, p. 269.
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September 17
Disraeli wrote to Cranbrook that he had not yet 
seen the answer from Livadia, but that Mr. Plunkett had 
sent a summary of its contents by telegraph, and the 
reply was not satisfactory. Five days earlier he had 
expressed his belief that the Russian explanations were 
satisfactory. He went on to express his opinion that the 
situation called for action and firmness, and his belief 
that there should be no delay in the Mission. The instruc­
tions to Chamberlain he left up to Cranbrook for modifi- 
46cation.
In Calcutta, Lytton heard that an abstract of 
the Russian reply had been received by Mr. Plunkett, 
and that it was unsatisfactory. This information helped 
to reinforce the Viceroy’s determination to proceed with 
the Mission.
September 19
Chamberlain received letters in Peshawar from the 
British Emissary at Kabul. The Nawab stated that the 
Amir was very upset by the "harsh words" of the Viceroy, 
and was still very afflicted with grief over the loss of 
his son. The Amir had intimated to him that he would 
receive the Mission if the British would just be patient
^^Disraeli to Cranbrook, September 17, 1878, 
quoted in Monypenny and Buckle, p. 1253; Hardy, pp. 96-97.
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and wait until he was able to make the necessary arrange­
ments and send permission for the Mission to advance. The 
Emissary further remarked:
He [the Amir] denies that the Russians came for 
any other purpose than to exchange civilities in 
consequence of their having a common boundary with 
Afghanistan. He believes that a personal interview 
with British Mission will adjust misunderstandings.
He has no wish to give Russians a right of way through 
his country. He says that there has been sickness in 
Cabul, and that some of the Russian servants are lying 
ill; but that, as soon as they recover, he hopes to 
give them their conge^ in a suitable manner, after which 
he will send a confidential messenger to escort the 
British Mission. He undertakes to be responsible for 
the safety of the Mission and its good treatment, if 
he invites it . . .  in two or three days he will send 
for the Nawab, and . . . will fix a date and make all 
arrangements for the coming of the Mission; that the 
Nawab should write and say that the sending of the 
Mission without Ameer's consent will be a slight on 
the Ameer. Nawab thinks that the Russian Envoy will 
be dismissed after the Eed, that the Ameer will then 
send for the British Mission.47
The Amir's position was made clear. He was 
willing to receive a British Mission, but it must be on 
his invitation and not forced upon him. The Amir's pride 
was at stake, not so much his personal vanity as the 
necessity to save face before his subjects. However,
Lytton had received word from a dubious source, that the 
Amir "was so disgusted with the British Government that 
he could not bear to see anyone connected with it, not even 
this m i s s i o n . "48 As Lytton had all along believed that
47The Nawab Ghulam Hasan Khan to Chamberlain, 
C.A.W., pp. 176-177.
48Lytton to Cranbrook, October 3, 1878, quoted in
Lady Balfour, p. 267.
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the Amir was hostile to the British, this served to further 
confirm that opinion.
Chamberlain was convinced that if the Mission 
proceeded before the Amir sent for it, it would be stopped, 
by force if necessary. Therefore, he telegraphed Lytton 
that the Amir was intent on asserting his claims to 
total independence of action with regard to the Mission, 
but at the same time he held out the hope that if his 
wishes were complied with, he would receive the Mission 
honorably. He then advised the Viceroy that "Unless 
your Lordship accepts this position, all chance of a 
peaceful solution seems to me gone."^^
Lytton replied by wire that the information did 
not change the situation and that the plans for the 
Mission already made should not be delayed. Lytton did 
not believe in the Amir's sincerity, and interpreted his 
move as a delaying tactic to allow time for the return 
of the Russian Envoy to Kabul.
September 20
Salisbury forwarded M. de Giers' note of September 
8th to Lord Cranbrook, remarking that he inferred from the 
note that "his Excellency acknowledges that all the formal 
assurances of the Russian Government in regard to Afghanistan
^^Chamberlain to Lytton, September 21, 1878,
C.A.W., p. 178.
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have now resumed their former validity."^® Here again 
Salisbury displayed his belief that the Russian threat 
had been neutralized.
September 21
The Chamberlain Mission was advanced to Jamrud, 
against the orders of the Home Government. Major Cavagnari 
and a small party proceeded to the fort at Ali Musjid to 
ask for passage through the pass. The Commandant of the 
fort, Faiz Mohammed, advised them that he had not received 
any word from the Amir to allow the Mission to pass, and 
therefore, he could not permit them passage. However, if 
they wished to wait, he would send word to the Amir, 
requesting permission. The British party was further 
advised that if they attempted to pass, they would be 
stopped by force. Chamberlain decided to withdraw and 
return to Peshawar.
September 22
Major Cavagnari issued a report on the incident 
at Ali Musjid. The Mission was formally dissolved, with 
full aid and protection being guaranteed to the Khyberi 
tribes who had given passage and had escorted the Mission. 
At the same time a letter was sent to Faiz Mohammed
SOgalisbury to Cranbrook, September 20, 1878,
C.A.W., p. 310.
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intimating that his reply to the mission was understood 
to be dictated by the Amir of Kabul, and instructions were 
sent to the Nawab Ghulam Hasan to leave Kabul immediately.
The Viceroy, interpreting the incident at Ali 
Musjid as a hostile action on the part of the Amir, 
ordered the Punjab Government to instruct the frontier 
officers "to lose no time and spare no efforts to detach 
from all political connection with the Afghan Government 
those independent tribes lying outside the northern 
portion of the border, whom it was most important, either 
upon political or military grounds, to bring permanently 
under our influence, to the exclusion of that of the 
Amir."51
The repulse of the British Mission had the desired 
result of convincing many, who were opposed to the "forward 
policy," of the hostility of the Amir. The head of the 
Mission, Sir Neville Chamberlain, who had been carefully 
selected by Lytton because of his advocacy of the Lawrentian 
policy of "masterly inactivity," was of the opinion that 
British prestige had been damaged. Writing to Lytton he 
declared.
No man was ever more anxious than I to preserve 
peace and secure friendly relations, and it was only 
when I plainly saw the Amir's fixed intention to drive 
us into a corner that I told you we must either sink 
into the position of merely obeying his behests on
SlLady Balfour, p. 281.
146
all points or stand on our rights and risk a rupture. 
Nothing could have been more distinct, nothing more 
humiliating to the dignity of the British Crown and 
nation. . . .52
At this particular moment the Actors in the Home
Government were scattered. Salisbury was at Dieppe, and
Cranbrook was at Balmoral in Scotland. Disraeli, not 
yet aware of the events at Ali Musjid, wrote to Cranbrook 
stating his view that the Afghan matter must be handled 
by himself, Cranbrook, and Salisbury, as it was not the 
time for a Cabinet meeting. He expressed the opinion 
that Salisbury was too cautious, and that the situation 
called for action, saying, "we must control and even 
create events." He further observed, "when you and the 
V-Roy agree, I shall, as a general rule, always wish to 
support you.
In this letter the Prime Minister showed his
desire for action, and his confidence in Cranbrook and
Lytton. He wanted the Afghan matter settled in a manner 
advantageous to Britain, and he displayed no doubts that 
this could be readily accomplished, without placing 
England in a position which could lead to hostilities. 
From the signing of the Treaty of Berlin up to the time 
of the incident at Ali Musjid, the members of the Home
^^Chamberlain to Lytton, September 22, 1878,
quoted in Lady Balfour, p. 2 81.
S^Disraeli to Cranbrook, September 22, 1878,
quoted in Monypenny and Buckle, p. 1254.
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Government expressed no thoughts of the possible necessity 
of war with either Russia or Afghanistan. In their minds, 
this possibility had been eliminated. Disraeli's desire 
for action was in the political arena. He wrote Cranbrook 
that he was certain that Chamberlain would make the best 
terms he could. The objective of the Mission, in Disraeli's 
mind, was, "to prove our ascendency in Afghanistan," and 
in order to accomplish this, he emphasized that "we must 
not stick at t r i f l e s . " ^ 4  This would tend to indicate that 
the Prime Minister was prepared to make a reasonable 
political settlement with Sher Ali, and that his intentions 
towards Afghanistan were political and not military. His 
whole career had been based upon the principle of action, 
and in this matter he too wanted action and was not 
content to sit back and wait indefinitely, but the action 
alluded to did not include war.
September 23
Cranbrook received news of the repulsion of the 
British Mission. His first reaction was to wire Lytton, 
advising him to make certain that the rejection was 
ordered by the Amir himself, and was not merely Faiz 
Mohammed acting without authority. He also told the 
Viceroy to avoid coercive action until he heard from the 
Nawab Ghulam Hasan. Cranbrook was not prepared to rush
5 4 i b i d .
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into war until he was certain that the affront was the 
Amir's doing. If the facts showed that the Amir had no 
part in the incident, then hostilities could be avoided.
At the same time Lytton wrote to Cranbrook giving 
his motives regarding the Mission. Herein he clearly 
showed that he had anticipated an affront, but regarded 
it as necessary to unite public opinion at home behind 
whatever action the Government might feel necessary. He 
stated that Chamberlain, who was also expecting an affront, 
wished to break off negotiations with the Amir without 
leaving Peshawar. The Viceroy would not hear of this 
because it would place the Government of India in an 
embarrassing position, since if "Relations with the Amir 
[had] been broken off without any overt act of hostility 
on his part, our public would never have understood the 
cause of the rupture. . . . He concluded that diplo­
matic action had been exhausted and other measures were 
now necessary.
Lytton revealed in this letter that his real 
quarrel with the Amir was not over the affront at Ali 
Musjid. In fact, this incident had been deliberately 
precipitated by the Viceroy himself, as the means for 
obtaining public support for the more aggressive measures 
he wished to take to bring the Amir to his knees. It is
^^Lytton to Cranbrook, September 23, 1878, quoted
in Lady Balfour, p. 285.
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also obvious that Lytton's purpose in organizing the 
Mission was not to seek a reasonable and pacific settlement 
with the Amir, but to provide a motive for more direct 
action.
September 24
Salisbury wrote to Beaconsfield, strongly pro­
testing the Viceroy's independent action. He also expressed 
the hope of avoiding the necessity for an advance on Kabul. 
He recognized that in view of such a public affront, 
hostilities had become necessary, but he hoped they would
be minimal.56
September 26
Salisbury again reiterated his position against 
any attempt to take Kabul, in a letter to Cranbrook, saying, 
"If we go up the Bolan and take Candahar, we can keep it, 
and shall not be bound to meddle with the fanatical tribes 
who inhabit the Cabul-Khyber country."^7
By now Disraeli had had time to learn of the 
results of the Chamberlain Mission, and wrote to Cranbrook 
complaining of Lytton's action in sending the Mission 
against orders. This letter shows a significant change
56Lady Cecil, p. 341.
5^Salisbury to Cranbrook, September 26, 1878,
quoted in Lady Cecil, p. 341.
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in attitude on the part of the Prime Minister, who just 
nine days earlier had advocated action, and stressed the 
necessity to advance the Mission without delay. Undoubt­
edly he wanted action, but not of the sort that compelled 
hostilities. He did not want his success at the Congress 
of Berlin to be offset by a needless war in Afghanistan. 
What he did want was a political settlement with Afghan­
istan favorable to British interests. The action he was 
seeking and the action he got were two quite different 
things. This accounts for his irritation at Lytton's 
actions.
Lytton telegraphed Cranbrook, proposing measures 
which would result either in the unconditional submission 
of the Amir, or his disposition and subsequent disintegra­
tion of his kingdom. To accomplish this he proposed within 
a month to reinforce Quetta with 6,300 men and twenty- 
seven guns. This would threaten Kandahar. At the same 
time, he would assemble 4,000 men and twelve guns at 
Thull. From there they would advance to the Kurrum 
Valley, posing a threat to Kabul and Jellalabad. He also 
advised the Secretary of State that arrangements were 
being made with the various frontier tribes to gain their 
support, and he further proposed opening up communications 
with the influential Sirdars at Kabul for the purpose of 
winning their support away from the Amir.
He was intent on gaining control over Afghanistan. 
This was the golden opportunity he had been waiting for.
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and which he had worked to create. He was now ready for 
immediate action, and impatient of delay.
September 27
Again harping on the same subject, Salisbury 
wrote to Sir Stafford Northcote, "I am urging Beacons field 
and Cranbrook to be satisfied with taking— and keeping—  
Candahar as a material guarantee."^8 The Foreign Secretary 
wanted to minimize any hostilities, and thus avoid an all- 
out and full-scale war. He felt that the situation did 
not call for such drastic action.
October 1
Cranbrook, after consultation with the Prime 
Minister, telegraphed approval of measures proposed by 
Lytton in his telegram of September 26th. The Viceroy 
promptly set the measures in action. Troops were dis­
patched to Quetta and Thull. In order to aid the Khyberi 
tribesmen, who had escorted the Mission, Lytton decided 
to place a regiment of guides and a mountain battery from 
Kohat at Major Cavagnari's and Colonel Jenkin's disposal, 
to undertake the task of storming the fort at Ali Musjid 
and expelling the Afghans. Sir Neville Chamberlain, who 
was in Simla, suffering from an attack of Peshawar fever.
SBgalisbury to Northcote, September 27, 1878,
quoted in Lady Cecil, p. 341.
152
opposed the scheme, but it had already been sanctioned 
by the Government of India. When the Home Government 
learned of it, "a somewhat alarmed and reluctant assent 
was telegraphed. However, the project was abandoned when 
it was discovered that the fort had been reinforced by 
the Amir's troops.
October 3
Lytton wrote to Cranbrook, justifying his action 
in advancing the Mission before he had received permission 
to do so. He offered as his main defense the negotiations
which had been completed with the Khyberi tribesmen to
escort the Mission. When the call came to the Khyberis 
to return to the pass, it meant that the Mission must go 
too, or lose, not only the escort, but the respect of the 
frontier tribesmen as well. The Viceroy further justified 
his move by stating his belief that the Russian reply 
could not have affected the necessity for the mission, and
by again emphasizing the hostility of the Amir and his
attempts to evade and delay contact with the British, 
"while the British Government remained with all India 
and Central Asia the spectators of its ludicrous and 
discreditable performance, dancing attendance on the will
^^Lady Balfour, p. 289.
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and pleasure of a weak and insolent barbarian p r i n c e ."^0
The Viceroy also made much of the fact that the 
Amir had neglected to answer his letter of condolence, 
telling Cranbrook that some native notables at Peshawar, 
when asked by Chamberlain what they thought about the 
repulse of his mission, replied, "It is doubtless a 
studied and great affront to the British Government, but 
not greater than the Amir's omission to answer the Viceroy's 
letter of condolence, for amongst us (natives) such an 
omission is one of the greatest insults one man can offer 
an o t h e r ."Gi The "insult" was not as great as intimated by 
Lytton. Moreover, he neglected to mention the strong 
letters he was continually sending the Amir during the 
mourning period, with one even accompanying the letter of 
condolence. But the Viceroy was motivated to constantly 
present the Amir in the worst possible light.
October 5
The Cabinet met in London. The members were 
annoyed at Lytton's action in sending the Mission before 
the Russian answer was received. The results of this 
action were particularly displeasing to the Cabinet 
members as it might necessitate calling a special session
G^Lytton to Cranbrook, October 3, 1878, quoted in 
Lady Balfour, p. 282.
G l l b i d . , p. 283 .
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of Parliament, which they preferred to avoid because of 
uncertain conditions of English finance and the prospect 
of trade. It was also felt that "the case to be presented 
though reasonably justified in Beaconsfield's eyes, was 
not one that could without great embarrassment be pre­
sented to the c o u n t r y . "62
The Cabinet decided to reprimand Lytton for 
disobeying orders on September 21st. Some of the Cabinet 
members also voiced suspicions of the Viceroy's reckless­
ness. Their position was that no act of open hostility ’ 
should be undertaken as long as it was possible to delay 
matters until a more opportune time as far as English 
politics were concerned, or until the Amir had time to 
change his mind. The reprimand, along with the Cabinet's 
opinion, were telegraphed to Lytton the day of the Cabinet 
meeting-
October 6
Sher Ali wrote a reply to Lord Lytton's letter of 
August 14th. In this letter he pointed out that before 
he had had an interview with the Nawab and saen the 
Viceroy's letter of the 14th, one of his officials arrived 
in Kabul with a letter he had received from Major Water- 
field. Commissioner of Peshawar. Of this communication
62cowling, p. 75.
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Sher Ali said, "what can be the result, meaning and advan­
tage of such a vehement communication to an ally and friend, 
and of advancing by force a friendly Mission in this 
m a n n e r ? H e  also mentioned seeing three other letters,
"in the same tone and style" addressed to officials of 
his government, plus several others in the course of a few 
days, which "were not free from harsh and rough words and 
expression, which are inconsistent with the forms of 
courtesy and civility, and contrary to the mode of friend­
ship and courtesy."G4
The Amir further commented on his great sorrow 
and his opinion that the British Government should have 
been patient with him on this account. Although all 
through the letter he stressed his disturbance over the 
correspondence from the Viceroy and his officials, he also 
observed that his functionaries, "notwithstanding the 
threatening communications of the officials of the British 
Government . . . will not evince any hostility or opposition
to the British G o v e r n m e n t . "^5
October 19
p. 179.
The Nawab Ghulam Hasan Khan returned from Kabul 




bringing the Amir's reply to the Viceroy. Lytton telegraphed 
the Home Government announcing the receipt of the Amir's 
"insolent" letter, and at the same time stating that he 
wished to begin moving troops across the frontier at once.
He also stated that he would issue a proclamation disclaiming 
any intentions to interfere in Afghanistan, and stating that 
the British Government's quarrel was with the Amir, not the
people.66
In the opinion of the officials of the Indian 
Government, the tone of the Amir's letter was intentionally 
rude and conveyed a direct challenge. Lytton's interpreta­
tion of the letter, as presented to the Home Government, was 
to have a great impact on the Cabinet, removing any hope 
for a peaceful settlement. The text of the letter was not 
immediately released to the Cabinet, and was not made 
public until November 29th, after war had been declared.
October 25
In view of the developments concerning Afghanistan, 
a Cabinet meeting was held, and it was at this meeting that 
the final decision was reached. All the Cabinet members 
were in agreement that some form of action must be taken, 
and their common reason for this agreement was their belief 
that the British nation had been insulted by the Amir, and
66cowling, p. 73.
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consequently, Britain's prestige was at stake. One of 
their main concerns was the possibility of obtaining 
Parliamentary approval should they decide upon war. Some 
of the members felt that they did not have a casus belli 
that would stand up in Parliament, and without Parliamentary 
approval, funds could not be allocated for a war.
Lord Cairns and Mr. Secretary Cross, the Leader 
of the House of Commons, declared that they saw no cause 
for war. Lord Salisbury followed, condemning the actions 
of the Viceroy, particularly Lytton's disobedience in 
sending the Mission by way of the Khyber Pass, and advancing 
the Mission contrary to explicit instructions to await 
orders. According to Disraeli's account of the Cabinet 
meeting, Salisbury spoke with "great bitterness of the 
conduct of the Viceroy, and said that, unless curbed, he 
would bring about some terrible disaster."G?
Lord Cranbrook responded to the statements of 
his colleagues, taking the strong Indian view of the 
situation, and asserting that the casus belli consisted of 
the sum total of the hostile acts of the Amir towards 
the British. At this point Disraeli proposed an alter­
native to a declaration of war. This alternative was to 
take a material guarantee by sending a force to occupy 
the Kurram Valley. Such an action would be in the nature
^^Disraeli to the Queen, October 26, 1878, quoted
in Monypenny and Buckle, p. 1259.
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of a reprisal which was sanctioned by public law and 
not considered as active hostility. In this way British 
power would be demonstrated, her prestige restored, and 
best of all, there would be no need to call Parliament.^8
Disraeli's proposal was supported, first by the 
Duke of Richmond, and then by Salisbury, who declared that 
"such a course would content him— in demonstrating power, 
and not necessarily leading to any di saster."^9 The Lord 
Chancellor and Mr. Cross also approved the suggestion.
It was at this point that Cranbrook startled the 
Cabinet by asserting that he would not take the responsi­
bility for such a course; "that his own opinion was for 
war, immediate and complete; that he believed it inevitable 
sooner or later, and very soon."^^ In his estimation the 
taking of a material guarantee was only a half-way measure, 
and he feared it would be looked upon as an act of timidity,
The decision had to be based on two considera­
tions— that of how best to restore British prestige, and 
how best to gain the support of Parliament. All the 
members of the Cabinet were in agreement that these two 
ends must be obtained. They finally concluded that 
Cranbrook's opinion for full-scale military preparations, 





British prestige. For, in Disraeli's words, "after this 
extraordinary statement by the Secretary of India, in 
addition to the fact that none of the forces had as yet 
arrived at their stations, and that all was a matter of 
calculation and estimate, there seemed only one course to 
take. The military preparations were ordered to be 
continued and completed, and even on a greater 
scale. . . . But in order to have a good case to 
present to Parliament, it was decided to give the Amir one 
more chance by sending him an ultimatum. Thus it would 
seem that if the Amir wanted peace, it was up to him to 
reply favorably to the ultimatum. If he did not, then 
the British Government would be justified in declaring 
war upon him.
The time limit set by the Cabinet for receipt of 
a reply from the Amir was actually determined by the 
Viceroy, who had earlier pointed out that if any action 
were to be taken before spring, it would have to be done 
before the winter snows began. His military advisers had 
fixed November 21st as the latest possible date such 
operations could be begun. The Cabinet adopted this date 
for two reasons, the first being to delay as long as 
possible in order to satisfy public opinion, while the 
second was not to delay so long that military operations
7 1 l b i d .
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would be h a m p e r e d . "72
In the minds of the decision-makers there were 
no alternatives to some sort of aggressive action. The 
idea of the ultimatum offered slight chance for a peaceful 
solution, due to the time allotted for a reply and the 
prejudicial attitude of the Viceroy. It was not seriously 
considered by any of the decision-makers that the ultimatum 
would have any effect beyond that of strengthening the 
Government's position in Parliament. The alternative of 
leaving the Amir in peace for the time being, and later 
attempting to reestablish friendly relations was never 
considered by any of the Actors, for there was no question 
in any of their minds that Britain could not afford to 
lose face. The affront at Ali Musjid, though it could 
have been avoided if the Viceroy had not disobeyed orders, 
coupled with the Amir's insolent letter, had been a blow 
to British prestige which demanded rectification.
British military capability was barely mentioned, 
as there was no doubt in anyone's mind of the superiority 
of British forces in both numbers and weapons.
Although the Cabinet meeting revealed disagree­
ments among the Cabinet members, as well as a certain 
degree of resentment on the part of some members towards 
the Viceroy's actions, they were finally convinced that
72cowling, p. 79.
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Lytton's policy must be supported. The Queen urged upon 
Disraeli the necessity of the Cabinet's support of the 
policy "with as much cordiality as if there had been no 
initial difference of o p i n i o n . D i s r a e l i  agreed with 
the Queen, and the Cabinet presented a united front.
October 26
The Cabinet decision reached Lytton, who was 
unhappy about the delay which would be caused by sending 
an ultimatum. Accordingly, he summoned the Viceregal 
Council. The Council reached a unanimous agreement to 
urge reconsideration of the matter by the Home Government, 
The members favored declaring war at once. The Council 
reflected the general feeling among the British in India 
who feared that any sign of weakness could lead to new 
uprisings in India, and were highly sensitive to frontier 
matters. Consequently, they were impatient with the 
maneuverings of the Home Government.
October 27
Lytton sent the draft of the ultimatum he had 
composed to Cranbrook by telegraph. He still considered 
such a message useless and unnecessary.
73Monypenny and Buckle, p. 1260.
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October 28
The draft of the ultimatum was modified in London, 
and returned to Calcutta. The contents of the ultimatum 
stressed Sher Ali's hostility to the British, and the 
fact that he had received a Russian Mission when he had 
steadfastly refused to permit a British Mission to cross 
his borders. The Viceroy demanded a suitable apology from 
the Amir, and his consent to receive a permanent British 
Mission. He also demanded protection for the tribes who 
had escorted the Chamberlain Mission. If these conditions 
were not met by sundown on November 20th, the Viceroy 
declared, "I shall be compelled to consider your intentions 
as hostile, and to treat you as a declared enemy of the 
British Government.
October 31
The Viceregal Council met to give effect to the 
final resolve of the Home Cabinet.
November 2
The ultimatum was sent to the Amir. One copy was 
given to the Commandant of Ali Musjid, Faiz Mohammed, 
and another copy placed in the Amir's mailbox in Peshawar.
^^Ultimatum to Sher Ali, quoted in Lady Balfour, 
p. 299; C.A.W., p. 181.
163
November 4
Lord Beaconsfield made a speech at the Lord 
Mayor's dinner in which he spoke of rectifying the North­
west frontier of India. He was not considering declaring 
war in order to secure a better frontier, but since he 
was almost certain that war would be declared, such an 
advantage was not to be overlooked, and it might help to 
win support for the war. However, the Opposition made 
much of this statement, holding it up as proof that the 
Prime Minister was deliberately involving the country in 
war to obtain a more advantageous frontier.
November 18
An Afghan Committee had been formed to oppose going 
to war against Afghanistan. It was headed by Lord Lawrence, 
and had such prominent members as the Duke of Westminster, 
Earl Grey, the Right Honorable W. E. Forster, Lt. General 
Beecher, Lt. Colonel Colin Mackenzie, and Mr. Fawcett.
On this date Lord Lawrence sent a letter on behalf of the 
Committee, asking Lord Beaconsfield to receive a deputation 
on or before the next day. The object of the deputation 
was to try to induce the Government to "at once telegraph 
to Lord Lytton instructing him not to commence hostilities 
until the reply of the Ameer to the ultimatum has been 
made public in England, and until the promised papers on 
the Central Asian and Afghan questions have been
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produced. . . . However, the Prime Minister refused 
to receive the deputation from the Afghan Committee, and 
"it became evident, if indeed such had not been recognised 
from the beginning, that such efforts would have no influence 
on the immediate result, whatever might be their value as a 
protest and as influencing Public Opinion with a view to the 
future.
November 20
At 10:00 p.m. the Viceroy received a telegram from 
Peshawar stating that a message had been received from 
Jamrud that no communication from the Amir had arrived at 
any of the British outposts. Accordingly, Lytton issued 
orders for the British troops to advance at daybreak.
November 21
British troops crossed the frontier. General Browne 
at the Khyber, General Roberts at Kurrum, and General 
Biddulph at Quetta. At the same time the Viceroy issued a 
proclamation to the Sirdars and the people of Afghanistan. 
This proclamation again set forth the grievances against 
Sher Ali, stressing the reception of the Russian Mission.
75The Times, November 19, 1878.
"^^George Cars lake Thompson, Public Opinion and Lord 
Beaconsfield (London: Macmillan Co., 1886), V. 2, p.
502.
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It was designed to place the blame solely on the Amir, 
thereby encouraging the Afghan people to abandon him and 
support the British. In the Viceroy's words, "With the 
Sirdars and people of Afghanistan this Government has 
still no quarrel, and desires none. . . . Upon the Ameer 
Shere Ali Khan alone rests the responsibility of having 
exchanged the friendship for the hostility of the Empress 
of India."77
From the information he had received, and his inter­
pretation of it, the Viceroy was convinced that Sher Ali 
would lose the support of the Afghan people, and that the 
British would be well received. In this respect his 
information was erroneous.
Lytton wrote to Cranbrook announcing almost 
gleefully that no word had been received from the Amir, 
and that consequently, the troops had been advanced. Lytton 
had no qualms as to the success of the military operations. 
They had been carefully planned, and he had used the 
month's delay to build up the military forces and to detach 
the Khyber tribes from the Amir's authority. Everything 
was going according to plan.
The decision to embark upon a Second Afghan War 
was not an isolated decision, but the direct result of
^^Proclamation issued by the Viceroy to the 
Sirdars and People of Afghanistan, November 21, 1878, 
C.A.W., p. 184.
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the change in policy towards Afghanistan, inaugurated with 
the appointment of Lord Lytton as Viceroy of India. From 
the time when the Amir first refused the Viceroy's request 
to receive a British Mission (in the summer of 1876),
Lytton was convinced of the Amir's hostility and of the 
necessity to bring him under British domination, one way 
or the other. His actions from that point on were all 
aimed in this direction, and following the Peshawar 
Conference, he confided to one of his friends his intention 
of embarrassing Sher Ali by all possible means. He desired 
either to gain the Amir's complete submission to the British 
will, or to depose him and disintegrate his kingdom. The 
necessity of such action was determined by the Russian 
threat to British India which in the eyes of the Viceroy 
was very serious.
The Home Government, unaware of the Viceroy's 
deep-seated plans, took a more practical view of the 
situation, but unwittingly played into Lytton's hands by 
accepting his biased opinion of Sher Ali, his view of the 
incident at Ali Musjid, etc. The one single event which 
almost made war inevitable, was the affront at Ali Musjid. 
This was the result of Lytton's carefully planned strategy, 
as revealed in his letter to Cranbrook of September 26th.
His exaggerations regarding the details of the incident, 
and his implication that the Mission was rejected on orders 
of the Amir, greatly helped to achieve the results he so
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fervently desired. When it was apparent that the Cabinet 
was still doubtful of the Amir's implication, Lytton 
removed that doubt by his interpretation to the Home 
Government of the Amir's letter pertaining to the reception 
of the Mission. What factual information Lytton supplied 
the Home Government during this crucial period was slanted 
by adding his own comments and interpretations. He knew if 
he could convince the Cabinet members that the British 
nation had been insulted, they would have no alternative 
but to declare war against the Amir, and on this point he 
was right. The Cabinet decision of October 25th could thus 
be considered as predetermined. It was the logical 
response to the stimulus created by Lytton.
CHAPTER VI
DETERMINANTS OF DECISION: COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION
Many factors enter into decision-making. Thus in 
viewing even a single decision, the researcher is faced with 
a mountain of data. To facilitate the utilization of these 
data, it is helpful to break it down into various cate­
gories. While each piece of information is in some way 
connected with others, it is beneficial in clarifying many 
points to view a particular piece of evidence as it 
contributes to one of the major determinants. For the 
purpose of this study the determinants of decision have 
been divided into three categories: Communication and
Information, Motivation, and Capability. Accordingly, 
data have been collected, sifted, and arranged in each 
category with the purpose of obtaining a more accurate 
picture of the role of each in the decision-making process.
The communication network closely parallels the 
organizational system and its chain of command. The 
efficiency with which information is transmitted through 
the network may have a direct bearing on certain decisions. 
The quality of information is of singular importance, and
16 8
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is affected by many factors, including reliability of 
sources, interpretation, motivation, and competence, 
among others. It is useful to look at all the information 
available to the Actors— not just that information which 
was utilized— for the reasons behind non-utilization of 
certain information can be of extreme importance in 
analyzing the decision. Communication becomes an important 
focal point in the present study, for here the Actors were 
separated by a great distance, and thus the communication 
of information, as well as instructions, became a serious 
matter. Weaknesses or inadequacies in the communication 
network, in such circumstances, have the potential for 
producing grave results.
The communication network of the British Empire, 
relating to foreign affairs, in the 1870s was not as 
efficient as might have been desired. Some of the ineffi­
ciency was due to physical conditions, such as long 
distances, lack of telegraphic equipment, etc., but an 
even greater cause lay in the human element. The line of 
communications between India and the Home Government 
generally followed the same line as the chain of command. 
Thus information from the Government of India was sent 
directly to the Secretary of State for India. The India 
mail might then remain in the India Office forever, 
unless the Secretary of State for India deemed the cor­
respondence of sufficient importance to pass it on to the
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Foreign Office. Here the Foreign Secretary would either 
handle the matter, or again, if the situation was of 
great importance, he would transmit it to the Prime 
Minister. The Prime Minister, in most cases, would take 
care of the matter, but of course if the situation was 
grave, he would then consult with the Queen.
Communications from the Home Government to the 
Government of India followed a like sequence in reverse. 
Here, however, for the most part, in the conduct of 
ordinary business communication was initiated by the 
Indian Secretary. However, in important matters com­
munications were initiated, sometimes by the Foreign 
Secretary, the Prime Minister, or even by the Queen. 
Nevertheless, the communication was almost never sent 
directly from one of these officials to the Indian Govern­
ment, but went through the proper channels, i.e.. Queen--» 
Prime Minister-»Foreign Minister-»Secretary of State for 
India— Government of India. This naturally involved extra 
time; especially if one or more of the members of the chain 
happened to be out of London.
The Foreign Office was the direct recipient of 
communications and information from parts of the world 
other than India. So, while information might reach the 
Foreign Office that had some bearing on Indian affairs, 
it was not as a matter of course channeled to the India 
Office. A good example of this was the case of the
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Llamakin Circular. On June 23, 1874, General Llamakin, 
the newly appointed Governor of the Russian provinces on 
the Caspian Sea, issued a circular letter to the Turkoman 
tribes of the Attrek and Goorgan Rivers, giving them 
warnings and advice. The British Ambassador in St. 
Petersburg, Lord Augustus Loftus, learned of the circular 
on June 23rd. The same day he sent a dispatch to the 
Foreign Office in London, reporting on the explanation 
given him by the Russian Government. This dispatch was 
received in London June 29th, but no action was taken. A 
little over a month later (August 2) a copy of the circular 
was sent to the Foreign Office by the British Envoy at the 
Court of Persia. It was accompanied by further informa­
tion, noting that the circular implied the assertion of 
the supremacy of Russia in that region, and her power and 
will to enforce obedience. Again, nothing was done.
Finally, news of the circular turned up in India, 
and the Indian Government, taking alarm, dispatched a 
letter to Lord Salisbury, the Indian Secretary, pointing 
out the dangers. This letter reached London October 30th, 
and was then referred to the Foreign Office for considera­
tion. Of course by this time the Foreign Office had had 
the information for three months. On November 6th, Lord 
Derby directed the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg 
to discuss the matter with the Russian Chancellor. These 
instructions reached St. Petersburg on December 14, 1874,
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almost six months after the initial information had been 
received.^
Salisbury, who at that time was Secretary of 
State for India, commented, "For knowledge of what passes 
in Afghanistan, and upon its frontiers, they (her Majesty's 
advisors) are compelled to rely mainly upon the indirect 
intelligence which reaches them through the Foreign O f f i c e . " 2  
The Duke of Argyll interpreted this as an indication of a 
rivalry between the India Office and the Foreign Office. 
Salisbury was not alone in criticizing the Foreign Office 
for the handling of information. During the Eastern Crisis 
Disraeli had cause to complain of information being withheld 
from him, and wrote to Lord Derby, then Foreign Secretary,
"I must again complain of the management of your office. . . . 
It is impossible to represent the F. 0. in the House of 
Commons in these critical times without sufficient informa­
tion."^ On another occasion he remarked: "The 'Intelligence 
Dept.' must change its name. . . . It is the department of 
Ignorance.
On the other hand, the India Office did not 
consistently communicate information regarding India,
^George D. Campbell, 8th Duke of Argyll, The Eastern 
Question (London: Strahan and Co., 1879), I, pp. 350-355.
^Ibid., p. 367.
^Monypenny and Buckle, VI, p. 593.
'^Blake, p. 613.
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which might be of an imperial nature, to the Foreign Office 
During the years 1877 and 1878 the problems connected with 
the Northwest Frontier of India formed part of the larger 
Eastern Question, as Russia's moves in Central Asia were 
designed to counteract Britain's moves in Turkey.^ How­
ever, since the India Office had jurisdiction over affairs 
in Afghanistan rather than the Foreign Minister, the 
Foreign Office generally kept hands off, assuming that the 
Indian Secretary would handle matters and relate anything 
of importance.
One other weak link in the chain of communication 
was that between the Government of India and the India 
Office. As long as Salisbury was Secretary of State for 
India, he maintained close communication with the Viceroy, 
but when Cranbrook assumed that role, the close contact 
was not sustained. The lack of communication was on both 
sides. The crisis that was precipitated by the arrival 
of a Russian Mission in Afghanistan, and subsequently led 
the Viceroy to take action that could lead to hostilities, 
was being handled in London by dispatching a protest to 
St. Petersburg. This very important fact was not conveyed 
to the Viceroy for a month, the protest having been sent 
on August 12th, and the Viceroy finally being told to wait 
for an answer on September 13th. But the Viceroy had been
^The Times (London), October 27, 1878.
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making his own plans without the knowledge of the Prime 
Minister, the Foreign Secretary, and as it turned out, 
the Indian Secretary. The telegrams which the Viceroy 
sent to London during July and August of 1878, were vague 
and sketchy. A letter outlining his plans for sending a 
British Mission in answer to the Russian one arrived in 
London on September 9th. And it was not until this date 
that his views were known by the Home Government. Salis­
bury, by this time Foreign Secretary, assumed that Cranbrook 
was in constant touch with Lytton. It wasn't until the 
full details of Lytton's instruction to the head of the 
mission arrived in London that he realized that contact 
had not been maintained.^
The fact that Lytton did not keep the Home Govern­
ment fully informed of his actions and intentions was 
partly a result of his belief that he knew better than 
those in London what action was called for by the situa­
tion. While he believed that Cranbrook and Disraeli would 
concur in his proposals, he was not as sure of Salisbury's 
agreement. His friend Burne, who was in the India Office, 
kept him informed of the situation in London, and con­
firmed Lytton's belief that Cranbrook was too much under 
Salisbury's thumb, and that Salisbury was not altogether
^Cowling, p. 67.
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friendly towards Lytton and his ideas.?
It is apparent that the communication system 
between London and India, and also between the various 
offices within the Home Government, was far from perfect. 
Telegraphic communication existed between Calcutta and 
London, making it possible to relay information in the 
matter of one or two days. Letters, of course, took 
somewhat longer, but in a crisis situation communication 
between the two points could be fairly rapid. It seems 
that it took communications and information longer to 
pass from one department to the other than it did to 
transmit it from one country to the other.
In considering the decision on Afghanistan, it is 
also important to take a look at the communication system 
between the government of that country and the Government 
of India. No railways existed in Afghanistan and no 
telegraph line to the Indian border. Communications were 
carried from the border by messengers, usually on horseback. 
It took an average of eleven days for a message to reach 
Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, from the British 
border town of Peshawar. As a general rule, communications 
from the Viceroy, whose official residence was Calcutta, 
went first to the Commissioner of Peshawar, and thence to 
Afghanistan. Sometimes the Commissioner sent his own
^Ibid., p. 70.
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messenger direct to the Amir. At other times the messages 
were given to the British Native Agent to present to the 
Amir.
The question of information was an extremely perti­
nent one in the Afghan situation, not merely because of the 
importance of information to the making of any decision, 
but because of the importance given by the Actors to the 
procurement of accurate information from Afghanistan, 
which they felt necessary to achieve their goals in Central 
Asia. Thus the acquisition of information from Afghanistan 
became a prime motive of the Conservative Government, 
leading first to a request for the reception of a British 
Mission, and finally to a demand.
The first question that arises is that of the need 
for more accurate information from Afghanistan. While 
serving as Secretary of State for India, Salisbury first 
expressed his doubts as to the adequacy of information in 
a dispatch to Northbrook, then Viceroy of India, dated 
January 22, 1875. Up until this time he had been content 
with the situation, but the Eastern Crisis which created 
the possibility of a confrontation with Russia, made the 
British Government more apprehensive of Russian movements 
in the direction of Afghanistan.
For many years previous, Afghanistan had been 
closed to European residents, but the British were allowed 
to have a Native Agent stationed in Kabul. In his dispatch.
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Salisbury stated his belief that the Native Agent was 
not allowed to supply any information without the approval 
of the Amir, thus negating its value in his eyes. Even if 
this were not the case, and even though the information 
submitted was accurate, in Salisbury's opinion a Native 
Agent could not possibly have "sufficient insight into the 
policy of Western nations to collect the information you 
r e q uire."8 This could only be accomplished by a European.
This brought forth the question as to the com­
petency of the British Native Agent, or Vakeel, as he was 
called, who at that time was Nawab Atta Mohammed, who had 
held that position for eight years, together with the 
question of the adequacy of information then being obtained. 
The Government of India's reply to Salisbury's question as 
to the quality of the information, was misinterpreted by 
him, and he, as well as others in the Home Government, 
continued to labor under these misconceptions long after 
the error in his interpretation had been pointed out.
Salisbury chose to believe that the Viceroy and 
his Council, supported by such frontier officers as 
Captain Cavagnari and Sir Richard Pollock, concurred that 
the information obtained from Afghanistan was insufficient 
and unreliable. The Government of India responded, pointing 
out that, as stated in their previous dispatch, their
^Dispatch from Salisbury to Northbrook, January 22,
1875, C.A.W., p. 55.
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opinion was :
, . . that though there might be doubts as to the 
sufficiency of the intelligence given by our Agent 
at Cabul, the value of the information was not 
destroyed by such defects; that while the position 
of the Agent compelled him to be cautious in com­
municating news to the British Government, we had no 
reason to believe that information of importance was 
withheld; that on the contrary, the information 
supplied was fairly full and accurate and that the 
diaries contained internal evidence that the intel­
ligence reported in them was not submitted to the 
Ameer for approval.9
The British Native Agent, Nawab Atta Mohammed, a 
"Mohammedan gentleman of rank and character, had been 
appointed to that post by Lord Lawrence in 1867, as one 
in 'whose fidelity and discretion' he had 'full c o n f i d e n c e  
Atta Mohammed enjoyed the confidence of the Amir, who allowed 
him to be present at durbars. It was unlikely that a 
Britisher would have been permitted to attend a durbar, 
and, as Northbrook and his Council pointed out to Salisbury, 
it was also unlikely that a Britisher could obtain trust­
worthy information, as he would be constantly guarded and 
spied upon. Moreover, it was highly unlikely that the Amir 
would consent to having a British Agent stationed anywhere 
within his borders.
All of this had no effect on Salisbury's opinion, 
and while he was temporarily blocked by the obstinancy of
^Secret dispatch from the Government of India to 
Salisbury, January 28, 1876, C.A.W., p. 74.
lÜArgyll, p. 375.
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the Indian Government, the stationing of a British Agent 
in Afghanistan for the purpose of gathering adequate 
information, remained a primary goal. Thus with North­
brook's resignation and the appointment of Lytton as 
Viceroy, plans were inaugurated to achieve this objective. 
Lytton fully agreed with Salisbury's attitude, and became 
almost fanatical on the subject. During the short time 
he was in London, before sailing for India, he visited 
with the Russian Ambassador, Count Shouvalov. During this 
interview Lytton asked the Count what means Russia had of 
communicating with the Afghan Amir. The Count replied,
"I suppose that we must have, just as you have, safe and 
easy means of private communication with Sher Ali."^^ 
Lytton's interpretation of this statement was written in 
a confidential paper following the interview.
The Russian Government has established those 
means of direct, convenient, and safe communication 
which Sher Ali refuses to us, and which we are 
afraid of proposing to him, although we openly 
subsidise His Highness.12
Lytton thus led himself to believe that Russia had been
permitted direct communication with the Amir, but there
was no Russian Agent stationed in Kabul,.and Shouvalov did
not say there was. In fact, the British were fully able
to communicate with Sher Ali through their Native Agent,
l^Lady Balfour, p. 37.
l^ibid., p. 39.
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and as both governments employed secret agents for intel­
ligence purposes, there is every reason to believe that 
both governments had equal access to information and com­
munication. But the facts were not important to Lytton's 
actions, for they were not dictated by the facts, but by 
his interpretation of them.
On his way to India, Lytton met Sir Bartle Frere 
in Egypt. Frere, a member of the Indian Council and an 
acknowledged authority on Indian affairs, was just returning 
from India after visiting the Punjab and Peshawar. He 
helped to confirm Lytton's convictions by relating that 
he had been particularly impressed with the fact that the 
officers through whom all diplomatic correspondence with 
the Amir was conducted, "were completely ignorant of his 
feelings and wishes and intentions, and had no means of 
obtaining information on which reliance could be placed."13
The visit with Frere was important for another 
reason. For the discourse that Lytton received from Frere 
was to form the basis of his understanding and beliefs 
regarding the Afghan question. The main ideas which he 
took from Frere were: that the Amir was bitterly hostile
to the British; that Russian influence in Afghanistan must 
be prevented; that relations with the Amir should be 
improved, if possible, but if the Amir seemed disinclined
13ibid., p. 44.
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to better relations, it should be taken as proof of 
hostile influence (presumably that of Russia), and the 
Indian Government should look elsewhere for alliances.
Once in India, the sources of information from 
Afghanistan available to Lytton and his Council were of 
four main kinds. First, news supplied by the Native 
British Agent; second, the information obtained from 
paid intelligence sources; third, rumors brought by 
travelers, or the "grapevine"; and fourth, information 
received from British agents and government officials in 
other countries. Lytton consistently gave greater credence 
to the information supplied by, what to all appearances 
seems, the least reliable sources. When Lytton first 
arrived in India he received information regarding the 
Amir's attitude from a pensioner of the British Government, 
who in the time of Dost Mohammed (Sher Ali's father), had 
taken a prominent part in Afghan politics. This informa­
tion, which he accepted and believed, confirmed the 
opinion of Sir Bartle Frere and had now become Lytton's 
opinion.
Another significant example of the type of informa­
tion received and the credibility given it by the Viceroy, 
concerns information regarding communications between the 
Amir and the Russian General Kaufman. Atta Mohammed, the 
British Agent at Kabul, told the British authorities in 
Simla (October 7, 1877) that the Amir "regarded the
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Russian agents as sources of embarrassment."^^ On the 
other hand, Lytton was convinced that permanent diplomatic 
contact had been established between General Kaufman and 
the Amir, that messages from Kaufman had been incessant, 
and that a Russian agent was almost constantly in Kabul.
In a dispatch to the Secretary of State, dated September 
18, 1876, Lytton related that there had been secret nightly 
conferences between a Russian agent and the Amir, and he 
referred to his information as having come from an unof­
ficial source which the Government of India was "of course, 
unable to v e r i f y . A r g y l l  refers to this information 
as the "baggage-animal story," because the source was a 
letter from a native newswriter at Kandahar, who stated 
that he received the news from a man who hired baggage- 
animals in Turkestan, Bokhara, and Kabul. This man said 
that he had heard the story from a certain Sirdar, now 
deceased, who had secretly escorted a Russian to K a b u l .
It is obvious that such information was subject to question, 
but the Viceroy chose to accept it.
One other example is probably sufficient to show 
the predilection of the Viceroy for accepting information 
that corresponded to his beliefs, although from dubious 
sources, rather than information that might be expected
l^Argyll, p. 441.




to be more reliable. In. September 1878 the Commissioner
of Peshawar sent his agent, Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan, to
deliver a letter to the Amir from the Viceroy, requesting
the reception of a British Mission. The Nawab sent back
letters on the 17th, 18th, and 19th, intimating that the
Amir would consent to the reception of a British Mission
under certain circumstances —  "if conciliatory letters were
sent to the Amir and his dignity studied, all might be
arranged."IB However, at the same time other information
was received from the Mustaufi, Bukhtiar Khan, who had
just returned from a meeting with Sher Ali, indicating
that the Amir would not receive the British Mission, and
that he was anxiously awaiting the return of the Russian
Envoy. Lord Lytton commented upon this, "I cannot, of
course, vouch for the complete accuracy of the above
information, but I think it was given our messenger by
the Mustaufi himself, who is obviously unwilling to pull
19and sink in the same boat with the Amir."
Although both the Home Government and the Government 
of India felt that their sources of information in Afghan­
istan were inadequate, the Viceroy withdrew the British 
Agent, Atta Mohammed, from Kabul following the Peshawar 
Conference, so that from March 1877 on, there was no 
official source of information in that country. The
l^Lady Balfour, pp. 266-267.
ISlbid., p. 268.
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London Times commented on the quality of information 
coming from Afghanistan in such remarks as:
The reported mutiny of the Ameer's troops at 
Kurram is not well authenticated.20
The Lahore paper, in a leading article states 
that advices from Cabul are still harping upon war 
and warlike preparations; that at Jellalabad, Lalloora, 
and Ali Musjed the troops are represented as waiting 
eagerly for orders. . . . These statements are 
unconfirmed officially. I am informed moreover that 
the Ameer has, on the contrary, been actually putting 
pressure to deter Afreedis from allying themselves 
with the Jowaki tribe in the present contest with 
our people.21
A rather sinister rumour of doubtful authority, 
transmitted through official channels, reports that 
the Ameer of Cabul is massing troops at Candahar. . . . 
Russian envoys are represented as constantly passing 
to and from Cabul. . . .2
Little or no accurate intelligence is received 
from Afghanistan. News stated as authentic today 
is, as a general rule, flatly contradicted tomorrow.23
Lord Cranbrook also held the view that information coming
out of Afghanistan was inadequate when he wrote to Disraeli
September 13, 1878 that a British resident on the Afghan
frontier would be helpful as far as obtaining information
was concerned, for, "we get the most unreliable information
at present when we get any at all."24
Lytton himself felt that the withdrawal of the
2^The Times, June 5, 1877. 
2^I b i d ., December 3, 1877. 
22ibid., January 28, 1878. 
23ibid., November 18, 1878 
24nardy, II, p. 83.
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British Agent had not diminished the quality of information 
obtained from Afghanistan. Instead, he insisted in a 
letter to Major Cavagnari that "our intelligence from 
Afghanistan has been more constant, complete, and trust­
worthy since the withdrawal of the native agent than it 
was before." He attributed this to two factors, the 
completion of the Khelat telegraph, and the operations 
opened up with Kandahar by Major Sandeman, the British 
representative at Khelat.^5 Lytton proposed to further 
improve the quality of information through a reorganization 
of the frontier, which included the establishment of an 
intelligence department in Peshawar to be directed by 
Major Cavagnari.
The quality and veracity of the information the 
Government of India received from its secret agents is 
open to question. The Viceroy, as well as members of the 
Home Government, had expressed the opinion that natives 
were, in the first place, not to be completely trusted, 
and secondly, that even if they were, they would not be 
able to interpret events like a European. As no Britishers 
were permitted to enter Afghanistan, those secret agents 
were necessarily natives, and thus, in the eyes of the 
Actors, untrustworthy. But whereas Lytton had not trusted
^^Lady Balfour, p. 161.
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his own native agent, he gave credence to the information 
from native spies. The improvement of intelligence under 
the new frontier system is made further doubtful when 
considering the case of news regarding the Russian Mission 
to Kabul. The first rumors of the approach of the Russian 
Mission reached India on June 7, 1878, but it was not until 
the end of July that the information could be verified.
While the quality of information received from 
Afghanistan by the Government of India left much to be 
desired, and its validity could well be questioned, the 
Viceroy was willing to accept the veracity of much of it, 
and to base his decisions upon it. Thus, whether the 
information was true or not, the important fact remains 
that he regarded it as such, and took what action he felt 
necessary according to the situation as he saw it. The 
main points derived from the information from Afghanistan 
which most affected Lytton were: (1) That Sher Ali was
hostile to the British and was unlikely to accept a British 
Mission on his own volition. (2) That Russia was attempting 
to gain political ascendency in Afghanistan with a view to 
a possible war with England in that area. (3) That Sher 
Ali had for a long time been dealing with Russia, and was 
on the verge of an alliance with her. And (4) That the 
Amir was unpopular in his country, and that the Afghan 
people would support the British against him.
The question arises as to whether the Home
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Government had the same information, and whether they 
interpreted it in the same way. The Viceroy was much 
more conscientious about furnishing the India Office 
with data on the information he had received, than he was 
on furnishing information on his own actions. Thus, for 
the most part, the information available to Lytton was 
made available to the India Office, and thence to the 
Foreign Office and the Prime Minister when deemed neces­
sary. However, the Actors in London did not completely 
accept the information or interpret it in the same way, 
particularly in regard to Russia, for events were taking 
place in Europe about which the Home Government knew but 
that the Indian Government did not know. Whereas Britain 
and Russia had been on the verge of war, this had been 
averted by the Congress of Berlin, which held its first 
meeting at approximately the same time that the Russian 
Mission under General Stoletoff started from Tashkent for 
Kabul. The Mission had been in Kabul for several weeks 
before the peace was known in Asia.
Thus Lytton's great alarm at news of the Russian 
Mission was caused, in part, by his lack of knowledge of 
the peace, and he interpreted it as a direct threat to 
British India. The Home Government was not nearly so
26p. E. Roberts, The British Empire in India, 
XII of Cambridge Modern History, ed. by A. W. Ward [New 
York: Macmillan Co., 1916), p. 469.
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alarmed, assuming that the mission had been ordered 
before the conclusion of the peace. However, the Govern­
ment issued a protest to St. Petersburg on August 13th.
Unfortunately, they neglected to inform Lytton of the 
protest or the communications going on between the Foreign 
Office and the Russian Minister, M. de Giers.^^ The 
Viceroy did not receive this information until September 
13th.
In the meantime, the information available to the 
Home Government indicated that there was no threat from 
Russia as can be seen in the following extract from a
letter to Cranbrook from Disraeli;
As far as they have proceeded [communications 
between the British and Russian governments] and as 
far as I can now judge, the explanations of the 
Russian Govt, are satisfactory, and the whole matter 
would have quietly disappeared, the Russian projects 
having been intended for a contemplated war with 
this country, which I trust is now out of the 
question.28
While the Actors in London had access to informa­
tion on foreign relations with countries other than 
Afghanistan, which gave them a broader view of the situa­
tion, they were in the dark as to the Viceroy's intentions 
during this critical period. As Blake points out, "For 
whether or not Cranbrook was keeping Lytton properly
^^Hardy, p. 82.
2^Letter from Disraeli to Cranbrook, September 12,
1878, quoted in Monypenny and Buckle, VI, pp. 1252-1253.
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informed, it seems clear that Disraeli, along with Salisbury 
and Cranbrook, did not appreciate the nature of the Vice­
roy's plans until very late in the day."^^ The Viceroy 
had proposed to send a British Mission to the Amir in 
response to the Russian Mission, a proposal which the 
Home Government had approved the first part of August.
But, as previously mentioned, his real intentions were 
not known in London until his instructions to the head of 
the mission. Sir Neville Chamberlain, arrived in London 
on September 9th. Both the Government of India and the 
Home Government had been acting in the dark, each unaware 
of the other's intentions and actions.
One other important point regarding information 
is the kind and quality given to Parliament and to the 
public. Members of the opposition party point to many 
instances when Parliament was uninformed or misinformed.
The incident which they made the most of occurred in the 
House of Lords, June 15, 1877, when the Duke of Argyll 
asked Lord Salisbury about the Peshawar Conference. He 
was told that the Conference had been arranged at the 
Amir's own request; that there had been no attempt to force 
an envoy on the Amir at Kabul; and that British relations 
with the Amir had undergone no material change from the 
preceding year.^® All of these statements proved to be
^^Blake, p. 661. 
^^Argyll, p. 490.
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untrue, but as the Conference took place in March 1877, 
and an account of it was not printed until November 6,
1878 by the Globe, a false impression was given to 
Parliament.
The opposition again complained of the lack of 
information when Parliament was called in December, 1878.
In the House of Lords the Marquis of Hartington complained 
of the long delay in publishing correspondence relating 
to Afghanistan, which made it impossible to pronounce a 
judgment on the ministerial policy. 2̂ Gladstone, in the 
House of Commons, noted the "extraordinary confusion and 
inconsistencies of the evidence on which the government 
have based their case for this unjust and disastrous 
war; . . . "  and also the "extraordinary and prolonged 
secrecy in which a policy had been enveloped, the earlier 
disclosure of which would have put Parliament on its guard, 
and elicited remonstrances which must in all probability 
have stopped the war."^3
Information given the Press by the Government was 
slanted to elicit public support for the anticipated war. 
When the British Mission was refused passage at Ali Musjid, 
the Times commented:
^^Annual Register, 1878 (London: Longmans and Co.,
1879), V. 120, p. 178.
32lbid., p. 214. 
33lbid., p. 229.
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In view of the long continued ungracious and 
hostile conduct of the existing ruler of Afghanistan, 
aggravated as it is by the contemptuous slight offered 
to our national dignity, all possibility of renewing 
friendly relations with this uncompromising and 
morose barbarian is utterly hopeless; and even if the 
prospects were still hopeful, their realization could 
only be accomplished at the complete sacrifice of 
proper self-respect, and at the grave risk of very 
considerable loss of prestige. . . .34
And again;
The Commandant of Ali Musjid Fort threatened 
Major Cavagnari, saying that for his personal friend­
ship he would be shot on the s p o t . 35
Major Cavagnari's report to the Indian Government 
of the incident throws a different light on the matter.
He stated that the Commandant of the Fort, Faiz Mohammed, 
told him that he had not received any orders from the 
Amir to allow the mission to pass, and "that without such 
orders, he could not let it proceed; but that if the 
mission would only wait a few days he would communicate 
with Kabul and ask for orders." He further noted that 
Faiz Mohammed pointed out to him that if they were not 
friendly to the group, he would not have consented to the 
interview, nor would he have "restrained his levies from 
firing on my p a r t y . C a v a g n a r i  took care to show that 
Faiz Mohammed was extremely courteous to them. In
^^The Times, September 23, 1878.
35ibid., September 26, 1878.
Report of Major Cavagnari to the Government of 
India, September 22, 1878, quoted in Lady Balfour, p. 277.
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elaborating on his first report in a letter to the Govern­
ment of India the following January, the Major emphasized 
the hostility of the Afghans and the insult, but he still 
did not mention a threat to shoot him, other than to say 
that he was told that "if the Mission advanced, it would 
be opposed by for c e ."3? Major Cavagnari, the Government 
of India, and the Home Government all chose to interpret 
this incident as an affront to the British nation, and 
consequently, the information given to the press emphasized 
this aspect.
The Amir's reply to the request to send the mission 
was finally received after the mission had been stopped at 
Ali Musjid. The newspaper accounts stated that the 
reply was "discourteous and h o s t i l e ."^8 This information 
was officially announced by Lytton, but the text of the 
letter was not made public until November 29th, nine 
days after the war had begun. It is noteworthy that the 
Daily News was informed "that the Ameer bade us 'do our 
worst and let God decide the i s s u e . '"^9 What the Amir 
actually said was that he and his officials had not wished 
to show any enmity to the British Government, nor did they 
desire any strife, "but when any other Power without cause 
or reason, shows animosity towards this Government, the
^^Parliamentary Papers, LVI (1878-1879), p. 687.
^^The Times, November 5, 1878.
^^Annual Register, 1878, p. 170.
193
matter is left in the hands of God and to his will."^®
On the whole the British Press was more balanced 
than the Indian Press. The anti-Afghan news items came 
from information provided by the Government and were 
naturally slanted towards the Government's opinion. 
Following the repulsion of the Chamberlain Mission, a rash 
of letters and articles began appearing in the papers, 
both advocating and opposing the Government's actions in 
regard to Afghanistan. Some of the leading contributors 
to the running battle in the newspapers were Lord Lawrence, 
Earl Grey, and the Marquis of Hartington for the Opposition, 
with Sir James Stephens and Sir Henry Rawlinson supporting 
the Government's position.
The Indian press tended to be more belligerent.
As the Standard noted, "The Indian newspapers universally 
consider that the affront to the mission demands an 
apology or the occupation of Afghanistan. A war feeling 
is prevalent among the Europeans. . . ."41 There was a 
well-known connection between at least one Indian journal, 
the Pioneer, and the Government of I n d i a . ^2 Lytton on 
various occasions used this organ to announce official 
policy. At other times information was given to the press 
unofficially. Argyll contended, in the face of data
40lhe Times, November 29, 1878.
4lAnnual Register, 1878, p. 137.
42Argyll, p. 494.
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published by these papers, that the Viceroy communicated 
certain messages to the press with the idea of appealing 
to the popular opinion of the Indian services.^3
Perhaps the most important single fact having to 
do with communication and the final decision reached in 
regard to Afghanistan, is the time-limit given Sher Ali 
to respond to the Ultimatum issued him by the British 
Government following the affront to the Chamberlain 
Mission. Instructions were sent from England at the end 
of October to issue the Ultimatum. Operations were to be 
commenced on November 21st if no reply was received by 
then.^^
There is some doubt as to whether the Ultimatum 
reached Ali Musjid on November 2nd or November 5th. Lytton 
states that the Ultimatum was handed to Faiz Mohammed at 
Ali Musjid on the 2nd, but goes on to say that confirmation
of the Ultimatum was received from London on the 5th.
An editorial in the London Times, dated November 5th 
stated :
From the telegrams we publish this morning it 
appears that Lord Lytton has officially announced 
that the text of the Ameer’s reply to the missives
handed to him by Nawab Tholam Hussein Khan is
43lbid., p. 510.
44&ady Balfour, p. 303. 
45ibid., p. 294.
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discourteous, even hostile. Nevertheless, a further
ultimatum will be forwarded to him.46
This would tend to indicate that the Ultimatum had not 
been delivered prior to the 5th, or if it had, there was 
no report of it given to the press. Authors, such as 
Blake and Cowling accept the November 2nd date without 
question. Whether the Ultimatum was delivered on the 2nd 
or the 5th, the fact remains that, generally speaking, it 
took an average of eleven days for a letter from Peshawar 
to reach Kabul. As Ali Musjid was only some hours distance 
from Peshawar the length of time would be approximately 
the same. It was not uncommon for correspondence between 
those points to take twelve or thirteen days, although 
on a few occasions messages were received in nine or ten 
days. If the Ultimatum was delivered at Ali Musjid on the 
2nd this allowed nineteen days for it to reach the Amir, 
to be answered, and to be returned to Peshawar. If it 
was delivered on November 5th, the time would be cut to 
sixteen days. Either way, twenty-two days would ordinarily 
have been required just in transit, not allowing any 
time for consideration or consultation. It is known that 
the Amir was in the habit of summoning a Durbar when any 
decision regarding the British was to be taken. He was 
not in the habit of making such decisions without first 
seeking the advice of the prominent men in his country.
46The Times, November 5, 1878.
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The method of transmittal of the Ultimatum was 
related in the Times.
Instead, as would ordinarily have been done, of 
sending a messenger to Cabul and giving directions to 
hand to the Ameer in person the Viceroy's letter, so 
great a dread was entertained for the messenger's 
safety . . . that the ultimatum was hurriedly placed 
in the hands of the commandant at Ali Musjid and a 
copy put in the Ameer's private post office atPeshawur.47
Doubtless, this method of conveyance did not lessen the 
time required for the message to be delivered.
The Amir's reply was received on November 30th, 
just twenty-five days after the Ultimatum had been ordered 
sent. Thus, if the dispatch had reached Kabul in the average 
time of eleven days, it would have been in Sher Ali's hands 
three days, as his reply was dated November 19th. The 
fact that the reply reached Ali Musjid on the 30th, helps 
confirm the eleven day time-table. The opinion was held 
by Major Cavagnari and others in official circles was that 
the Amir's reply was rewritten after receipt of the news 
of the fall of Ali M u s j i d . L y t t o n claimed that the 
messenger delivering the reply got as far as Bosawal, and 
upon hearing the news, returned with the letter to Kabul 
and that the Amir had to redispatch the letter.^9 This 
seems unlikely since, according to Lytton, the message
47The Times, November 11, 1878.
48ibid., December 7, 1878.
49Lady Balfour, p. 303.
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supposedly arrived at Bosawal on the 22nd. 0̂ As the Amir's 
reply was dated the 19th, the messenger would have been 
on the road at least two days before he reached Bosawal.
If he returned to Kabul, an additional two days' journey, 
four days would have been added to the time necessary for 
the message to reach Ali Musjid. The letter arrived 
there November 30th, eleven days after the date on the 
correspondence, and the average time necessary for a 
message to be transmitted that distance. A four day 
delay would normally have resulted in the letter arriving 
on December 4th.
But assuming the letter could have arrived in less 
time, if we subtract the four days required for returning 
to Kabul from Bosawal from the eleven we know it actually 
took the Amir's reply to arrive, we come up with seven 
days, less time than any previous correspondence had taken. 
While it is not completely impossible that the reply could 
have been carried to Ali Musjid in seven days, it would 
have been exceptional.
In either event, it would have been most difficult 
for the Amir to have responded to the Ultimatum before the 
deadline. He had at the maximum nineteen days, and under 
the best conditions he would have been sorely pushed to
Parliamentary Papers, LVI (1878-1879), No. 154 
of 1878, Government of India Foreign Department to Viscount 
Cranbrook, December 12, 1878.
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meet that deadline. It is possible that the Home Govern­
ment was not aware of the actual time required for the 
transmittal of a communication to Afghanistan, but the 
Indian Government, having over the years had intermittent 
correspondence with Kabul, could not have been ignorant of 
the length of time needed. Why then did Lytton allow the 
deadline to be set at the 21st? Why wasn't more time allowed 
for a reply to be received which might possibly have averted 
war? For an answer to these questions it is necessary to 
consider another determinant of decision— motivation.
CHAPTER VII 
DETERMINANTS OF DECISION: MOTIVATION
In order to pursue the question of the why of 
state behavior, it is necessary to probe into the motiva­
tions of the decision-makers. The areas under investiga­
tion for this purpose are national objectives, influence 
of the Actors' social values, influence of the needs and 
values of society on the Actors, and the role played by 
the Actors' personalities. Motivation is not an observ­
able entity, but an inference drawn from behavior which is 
goal directed. The path of behavior which connects a 
presented quality to a desired one, is motivated. "It is 
based on the present prediction of a specific outcome over 
this behavior pathway, and the want for the specific 
outcome."^
National Objectives
When the Disraeli Government came into office in 
1874 it had several overall national objectives in regard
loids, p. 19 7.
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to India and its Northwest frontier. The overriding 
objective was the security of India from outside aggres­
sion. In connection with this was the goal of halting 
Russia's progress in Central Asia, which in particular 
meant the prevention of Russian aggression or political 
influence in Afghanistan. As the Russian advance con­
tinued, both in Europe and Asia, anxieties increased and 
the objectives became more fixed. In Asia, despite 
repeated assurances from the Tsar and his officials,
Russia continued advancing her frontier by annexing the 
decadent Tarter and Turkoman states, which lay between 
Afghanistan and Russia. General Kaufman, the Governor 
of Turkestan, captured Samarkand and Bokhara in 1868, 
subdued Khiva in 1873, and captured Khoknad in 1875. If 
this in itself had not been cause for alarm, further reason 
was given when Kaufman opened friendly communications with 
the Amir of Afghanistan in 1870.
These events had not particularly upset the 
Liberal Viceroy, Lord Northbrook, and his Council, who 
treated the matter lightly, accepting the assurances of 
the Russian government that it regarded Afghanistan as 
outside the sphere of Russian influence. But the Con­
servative Government was not as confident of Russia's 
good intentions. The annexation of Khiva had occurred 
just before the Disraeli Government came to office, and 
it was generally believed in Conservative quarters that
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Russia's next move was Merv.^ For its own sake, Merv was 
of minor importance. It was a small Turcoman town on the 
edge of a vast wilderness. Such commerce as existed in 
that region, was by camel between Merv and Herat.^ But 
its proximity to Herat, the westernmost point of Afghan­
istan, gave cause for concern, not because a military 
invasion was feared at that time, but because of the 
possibility of extending Russian political influence from 
that direction. Salisbury wrote to Northbrook in the 
summer of 1874, "Russia must advance to Merv ultimately . 
and we have no power or interest to prevent it. Herat is 
quite another matter.
The fear of the extension of Russian influence in 
Afghanistan, which was viewed by all the Actors as a 
threat to India, motivated them to desire another, more 
precise, objective, that was to obtain more adequate 
information from Afghanistan. Salisbury's opinion, which 
was supported by Disraeli, was that the best means to 
accomplish this was to station a British European Agent 
in that country. From the time of the appointment of 
Lord Lytton as Viceroy (January, 1876) to the close of 
the Peshawar Conference (March 26, 1877), the policy of
^Lady Cecil, II, p. 70.
^"The Military Position of Russia and England in 
Central Asia," Edinburgh Review, V, 151 (January, 1880), 
86.
^Lady Cecil, p. 70.
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the British and Indian Governments towards Afghanistan 
was dominated by this objective. The stationing of a 
British agent was intended as the first step in opening 
Afghanistan to more direct contact with the Indian Govern­
ment, so that in case of Russian aggression, the British 
would be in a more favorable position to counteract it.
The secret instructions from the Secretary of 
State which Lytton carried with him to India, stated the 
overall objective of British policy towards Afghanistan;
The maintenance in Afghanistan of a strong and 
friendly power has at all times been the object of 
British policy. The attainment of this object is 
now to be considered with due reference to the 
situation created by the recent and rapid advance 
of the Russian army in Central Asia towards the 
northern frontiers of British India.5
The same memorandum stated the objectives which
were given to the Russian Ambassador, and prime among
these was to secure Afghanistan against aggression.^
Salisbury advised Lytton to impress upon the Amir that
the British Government would assist him in repelling
any invasion by a foreign power, but in order to do this,
precautionary measures would be necessary. He was careful
to point out that this did not mean the establishment of
British garrisons in that country, but that the British,
. . . must have for their own agents undisputed 
access to its frontier positions. They must also
^Salisbury's instructions to Lytton, February,
1876, quoted in Lady Balfour, p. 89.
Gibid., p. 90.
203
have adequate means of confidentially conferring with 
the Amir upon all matters . . . [where there existed] 
a community of interests. They must be entitled to 
expect becoming attention to their counsels ; and the 
Amir must be made to understand . . . territories 
ultimately dependent upon British power for their 
defence must not be closed to those of the Queen's 
officers or subjects who may be duly authorised to 
enter them.^
The unanimity of opinion among the Actors was
short-lived. Salisbury altered his objectives somewhat
after Lytton was able to effect a treaty to control the
Bolan Pass, which was the most practical gateway to
India, and to station a garrison at the fort of Quetta,
which guarded the eastern approach to the pass. Thus, as
far as Salisbury was concerned, the importance of the
Amir's cooperation was diminished. He wrote along these
lines to Lytton in the summer of 1876, suggesting to him
for consideration, "whether— if the Cabul mission fails—
it would not be wise to give great prominence and emphasis
to the Khelat mission . . . the agent would reside nominally
with the Khan— but chiefly at Quettah. . . ."®
Negotiations with the Amir were getting nowhere ■
until finally the Amir consented to send his Minister,
Syud Noor Mohammed Shah, to a conference to be held on the
border with the British Envoy, Sir Lewis Felly. The
Peshawar Conference began on January 30, 1877, but before
7lbid., pp. 92-93.
^Salisbury to Lytton, August 22, 1876, quoted
in Lady Cecil, p. 74.
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anything had been settled upon, on March 26th Syud Noor 
Mohammed died. Although the Amir dispatched another envoy 
to take his place, Lytton closed the conference, an event 
which marked the end of the policy to improve relations 
with the Amir and to establish British agents in Afghanistan. 
Salisbury welcomed the suspension of negotiations which 
followed because the crisis that was taking place in 
European affairs made the Afghan question a part of a far
9wider and more dangerous one.
While from this point on the overall goal of all 
the Actors remained the same as regarded the protection 
of India and the preserving of Afghanistan from Russian 
influence, either political or military, their actions from 
this point on to the final decision stemmed from different 
motivations. Lytton's statement of June 23, 1877, proved 
to be a correct prophesy, when protesting the indifference 
of the Cabinet to the Russian advance in Central Asia, he 
referred to the policy as "dictated by the heart of a hen 
to the head of a pin. . . .  I have lost confidence in my 
own capacity to understand what it (your Indian policy) 
now is, and am haunted by a horrible fear that, for want 
of a common signal code, we may be acting at cross pur­
poses . "10
9lbid., p. 75.
l^Lytton to Salisbury, June 23, 1877, quoted in
Gopal, p. 80.
205
The decision to send a British Mission to Kabul 
in September of 1878 had an entirely different motivation 
than the original idea of a British mission. Diplomatic 
contact had been broken with the Amir since the termination 
of the Peshawar Conference, and no further solicitations 
were made for the reception of a mission. The sudden 
appearance of a Russian Mission in Kabul in July, 1878 
provided the new stimulus for sending a British mission. 
While both the Indian Government and the Home Government 
agreed to the necessity of sending a mission in response 
to the Russians, again they differed in their real 
objectives.
The final Cabinet decision to send troops into 
Afghanistan had as its main objective the restoration of 
the prestige of the British and Indian Governments. The 
Cabinet reached the decision with great reluctance, as 
some of the members felt that Lytton had needlessly 
gotten them into a situation from which it was difficult 
to extricate themselves. Disraeli summarized the pre­
dicament well when he described what he had said during 
the crucial Cabinet meeting of October 25, 1878:
It would doubtless be dangerous to summon Parliament 
to sanction a war, if our casus belli was not unim­
peachable; but he was of the opinion that a demonstra­
tion of the power and determination of England was 
at this moment necessary.H
And also in his letter to Queen Victoria of the 26th, he
l^Monypenny and Buckle, VI, p. 1259.
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lamented, "It is certainly unfortunate that the Afghan 
business should have been precipitated, which was quite 
unnecessary. . . .''12
Thus despite disagreements, the Cabinet was 
finally able to unite itself behind the national objective 
of maintaining British interests and prestige.
Influence of the Actors' Social Values
In trying to analyze the split in motivations 
which occurred at the end of the Peshawar Conference 
(March 1877), it is necessary to look first at the influences 
of the Actors' social values. It was during this period 
that the Russian threat was emerging in the form of a Russo- 
Turkish War, and there was a great deal of Russophobia afoot 
in England. This was not something new, but a revival of 
the sentiments of the thirties. Gleason finds the seeds 
of Anglo-Russian hostility, first, in "competitive imperial 
ambitions, which in the nineteenth century transformed into 
neighbors in the colonial world two powers hitherto 
remote."13 Secondly, in the absence of common interests 
which caused minor incidents to assume exaggerated impor­
tance. Thus "differences with regard to method appeared to 
reveal divergence of aim. Lack of sympathy induced
12lbid., p. 1260.
lljohn H. Gleason, The Genesis of Russophobia in 
Great Britain (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1965), p. 1.
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distrust, suspicion fostered jealousy, alliance trans­
formed into r i v a l r y . "14
The extent to which the Actors accepted Russo­
phobia as an intrinsic part of their beliefs, influenced 
their motivations. The Queen, herself, was a great 
Russophobe, and Disraeli tended toward that direction too, 
though his was tempered by political considerations. The 
Colonial Secretary, Carnarvon wrote to Salisbury, December 
25, 1876,
I see pretty plainly . . . that Lord B. [Beaconsfield] 
contemplates and as far as it depends on him, intends 
us to take part in the war and on behalf of Turkey. . . .
I may do him wrong but his mind is full of strange 
projects and I feel uneasy as to what he intends and 
what he may be able to do before there is time or 
knowledge enough to stop him. . . .15
And he wrote again on March 25th, 1877, "She [the Queen] is
ready for war— says that rather than submit to Russian
insult she would lay down her crown. . . . Unlike Derby,
he [Disraeli] has plenty of courage and I am not sure that
it is not all things considered the best game for him to
play."16
In the spring of 1877 Disraeli's Cabinet was split 
on the Russo-Turkish question. The group opposing war with 
Russia, known as the three Lords, consisted of Carnarvon,
14jbid., p. 290.
IScarnarvon to Salisbury, December 25, 1876, quoted
in Blake, p. 6 22.
IGcarnarvon to Salisbury, March 25, 1877, quoted
in Blake, p. 622.
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Derby, and Salisbury. Derby probably made the greatest 
effort to preserve the peace, even to the point of giving 
Cabinet secrets to the Russian Ambassador Shouvalov.
Derby, convinced that Russia did not want war with England, 
was certain that the greatest threat to peace was the 
"bellicose pronouncements by the British Government 
likely to provoke the Tsar into doing the very things 
which Britain least wanted him to do."^^
Salisbury advocated moderation. His disinclination 
to be pro-Turk or anti-Russian stemmed in part from his 
religious sympathies. As the Turks had been committing 
atrocities on the Bulgarian Christians, which was Russia's 
avowed motive for declaring war on Turkey, Salisbury's 
sympathies were certainly not with the Turks. He would 
have been inclined to oppose Russia only in the event she 
became a direct threat to British interests. Although he 
supported the unanimous Cabinet decision of July 22, 1877 
to advise Russia that if she occupied Constantinople, 
Britain was prepared to declare war against her, he did not 
really consider that she was a great threat. During the 
summer he cautioned Lytton to avoid warlike incidents and 
to "resist military seducers, if they are besetting your 
virtue."18 Again in September he wrote, "The period
l^Blake, p. 625.
18salisbury to Lytton, quoted in Gopal, p. 83.
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when Russia was an object of apprehension seems centuries 
ago."19
The Queen was upset by the seemingly pro-Russian 
actions of Lord Derby. She was so pro-war that it was 
embarrassing to her Prime Minister. She wrote to Disraeli 
that she would not submit to a "miserable cotton-spinning 
milk and water, peace-at-any-price policy. . . ."20 Disraeli 
for his part, was suspicious of Russian intentions, but he 
did not actively seek war, although he believed that Britain 
should always be in a position of strength. Thus he did 
not flinch from threatening war, nor from backing up words 
with action, if necessary. While he could not get the 
Cabinet to agree upon sending Russia a threat to declare 
war should she enter upon a second campaign, he, with only 
the Queen's knowledge, sent such a secret message to the 
Tsar in the fall of 1877.
The Actors in the Home Government during 1877 had 
differences of opinion on the Russo-Turkish War, as already 
noted. However, all, except the Queen, had the same 
objective, that of maintaining neutrality— at least up to 
a point— but for different reasons. Derby's actions were 
motivated, not by a fear of Russia, but by a fear of 
British Russophobes dragging Britain into an unnecessary
19lbid.
^^Queen Victoria to Disraeli, September 22, 1877,
quoted in Blake, p. 626.
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war. Salisbury was motivated by a sympathy for the 
Christians and by a disbelief in any real Russian threat 
to Britain. Disraeli was motivated by his belief that 
Russia did pose a real threat. Nevertheless, for whatever 
reasons, they were trying by various means to avert war.
Their concern with Afghanistan at this time was 
minor, since there seemed to be more important things to 
consider, but it was not completely overshadowed for at 
least two of the Actors, Disraeli and Salisbury. Disraeli 
was of the opinion that in the event of a war with Russia, 
"Russia must be attacked from Asia, that troops should be 
sent to the Persian Gulf, and that the Empress of India 
should order her armies to clear Central Asia of the 
Muscovites, and drive them into the Caspian. We have a 
good instrument for this purpose in Lord Lytton, and indeed 
he was placed there with that view."^^
Salisbury, on the other hand, was attempting to 
restrain Lytton from creating any military provocation.
His only public pronouncement on Afghan policy came in 
response to questions put before him by Liberal members 
of Parliament, June 15, 1877. At that time he stated that 
nothing of any significance had occurred with regard to 
Afghanistan, that there had been a conference at Peshawar, 
held at the Amir's own request, that there had been no
Z^Disraeli to Queen Victoria, July 22, 1877, quoted
in Monypenny and Buckle, VI, p. 155.
211
attempt to force an Envoy on the Amir at Kabul, and that 
relations with the Amir had undergone no material change 
since the preceding year.^^ While subsequent events and 
information seemed to negate the truth of these affirma­
tions, they may well accurately state what Salisbury believed 
the situation to be, or what he hoped it to be.
Did the Actors in the Home Government have a cultural 
bias? Probably everyone does to a certain extent, but in the 
case of these individuals was that bias strong enough to 
serve as a motivation in their decisions? They were all 
inclined to support imperialism as a part of England's 
right, and they all thought England was at the top of the 
heap. They felt a certain sense of superiority over peoples 
of underdeveloped nations, but not in any exaggerated form. 
Salisbury, on the contrary, often expressed a strong 
condemnation of race-arrogance. He advocated making the 
Indian aristocracy a sort of partner in governing India, 
and he once wrote to Lytton on this subject;
Cooperation for the common prosperity and security 
is a pleasanter idea, a more grateful subject of 
contemplation, than consultation for the better order­
ing of mutual chastisement. Eton schoolboys might like 
to place constitutional checks on the Headmaster, yet 
a meeting for devising the best means of beating Harrow 
at Cricket would be more popular than a meeting for 
drawing up a code of regulations under which boys should
be flogged.23
2^Argyll, p. 490.
23iady Cecil, p. 69.
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Some of Disraeli's critics charged that his 
actions, particularly in regard to the Eastern Question, 
were motivated by his racial background. They made much 
of the fact that he was Jewish, which to them meant that 
he was oriental. These criticisms were not limited to 
the opposition. As Justin McCarthy points out, "Every 
discontented Conservative was ready to whisper something 
about his chief's Jewish descent. But although there was 
an inexcusable want of generosity in thus making Mr. 
Disraeli's extraction and ancestral faith a source of 
objection, it must be owned that as a matter of historical 
fact his foreign extraction has had a very distinct 
influence on his political tendencies and his ministerial 
career."^4
Mr. McCarthy's statement may be considered fairly 
accurate if taken moderately. Certainly in his novels 
Disraeli shows his admiration for the Jewish race, to the 
point of a feeling of superiority which is perhaps a 
vindication. In his novel Tancred he speaks of the 
English aristocracy as having "sprung from a horde of 
Baltic pirates. . . ." And in speaking of the Christian 
Church he says, "That Church was founded by a Hebrew, and 
the magnetic influence still l i n g e r s . "25 The mere fact
Z^McCarthy, IV, p. 351.
25B l a k e ,  p .  203 .
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that his background was often used as a point against him 
served to heighten Disraeli's awareness of it, and also 
to make it necessary for him to strive harder to arrive 
at that position which he felt rightfully belonged to 
him. His conscious knowledge and interest in his back­
ground also helped to create his extreme interest in foreign 
affairs and far away places.
Disraeli's ambition was very keen. He wanted to 
increase the glory of England, thereby increasing his own 
light. For this reason he favored abandoning the old 
policy of "masterly inactivity," and in its place to 
substitute a "spirited" foreign policy. He once commented 
on a question of foreign policy, "the situation at present 
allows and demands, bold action. Every Power is too 
embarrassed to act except England. It is a moment when 
what is called prudence is not wise. We must control, and 
we must create events."^6 This feeling, of course, applied 
to Afghanistan as well as to other regions, and helps to 
account for the change in Indian frontier policy.
When the Cabinet had virtually decided upon war 
with Afghanistan, subject to the issuance of an ultimatum 
to Sher Ali, the Prime Minister, in a speech at the Lord 
Mayor's dinner, drew attention to the situation and the 
impending war. His justification for such action harks
Z^Monypenny and Buckle, p. 1248.
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back to his belief in British superiority, and rather 
suggests that Afghanistan had not been living up to the 
norms expected of her from the British.
Our north-western frontier is a haphazard and 
not a scientific frontier. It is in the power of 
any foe so to embarrass and disturb our dominion that 
we should be obliged to maintain the presence of a 
great military force in that quarter, entailing in 
the country a proportionate expenditure. These are 
unquestionably great evils, and former Viceroys have 
had their attention called with anxiety to the state 
of our frontier. Recently, however, some peculiar 
circumstances have occurred in that part of the 
world, which have convinced Her Majesty's Government 
that the time has arrived when we must terminate all 
this inconvenience and prevent all this possible 
injury. . . .27
The Liberals pounced on the phrase "scientific 
frontier," and accused Disraeli of seeking war to rectify 
the frontier. The true significance of this passage does 
not lie in the desire for a rectified frontier, but in the 
reasons given for such a desire. It was necessary to 
prevent "embarrassment" and to "terminate inconvenience."
To a person or a nation with strong national arrogance 
this might seem like a justifiable reason for initiating 
a war. Certainly Disraeli must have thought so, and he 
must have assumed that the bulk of the British population 
would think likewise.
Did Russophobia enter into Disraeli's motives?
Of course it did, but it was not because Disraeli perceived 
Russia as an imminent danger, nor would he have gone to
2?Ibid., pp. 1262-1263.
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war solely for that reason. But he did present the 
Russian threat to Parliament as a justification for recti­
fying the Northwest frontier, quoting Lord Napier that 
"Afghanistan in the hands of a hostile power, may, at any
n p ,time deal a fatal blow to our Empire." But here again 
it was the Empire that was of primary importance. He had 
previously emphasized to both Salisbury and Cranbrook that 
Russia was no longer a threat in Central Asia. His use of 
this non-existent threat to justify the Government's policy 
was from long habit. Then, as now, a Russian threat was 
apt to elicit public sympathy for an adventuresome foreign 
policy.
It was Lord Cranbrook who moved the Cabinet to 
decide on full-scale war against Afghanistan instead of 
material guarantees. His motivation in this decision, as 
with intermediate ones, was not prompted so much by 
Russophobia as by national pride. He was as aware as 
Disraeli and Salisbury that the Russian menace had been 
nullified by the Treaty of Berlin, and he had attempted 
to stop Lytton's precipitous action. He had supported 
Lytton's policy of sending a mission to Afghanistan for 
reasons of British prestige, and when the mission was 
advanced against orders, he wrote in his diary, October 6, 
1878,
28The Annual Register, 1878, p. 195.
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They [the Cabinet] were naturally annoyed at 
Lytton's action before the Russian answer. . . .  I 
hope the Ameer by his own advance will show plainly 
his intentions. I see no escape from action, and 
if so it should be vigorous and effective.29
Cranbrook wrote the first official manifesto of 
the Government in relation to the war with Afghanistan 
the day after the commencement of hostilities. The 
Russian threat was not given as a cause for hostilities, 
rather it is a denunciation of Sher Ali for not cooperat­
ing with the Viceroy in "putting his empire under the 
surveillance of the British Empire."30 In his speech to 
Parliament in December he added two more motives: an
attempt by Russia to "turn our watch-dog, the Ameer, into 
a bloodhound against us," and to obtain a safe frontier.
He ended his speech with an appeal to support the motion to 
permit the revenues of India to be used to support the 
war for "the sake of the honour and safety of the Queen's 
Indian possessions."31
It is an interesting sidelight that during this 
debate Lord Derby spoke on the question, defending the 
Afghan policy up to 1877, and strongly condemning it after 
that date, which was approximately the time he left the 
Foreign Office, and which closely coincided with the
2^Gathorne-Hardy, II, p. 100. 
30Annual Register, 1878, p. 195.
31lbid., p. 218.
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beginning of the Peshawar Conference. While in the 
Cabinet, Derby had acted as a modifying influence, and 
the change in Afghan policy can be dated from the end 
of the Peshawar Conference.
A very important consideration is how the cultural 
values affected the motivations of the catalyst of this 
situation, the Viceroy, Lord Lytton. Lytton shared many 
of his values with his fellow-actors, particularly Russo- 
phobia and national pride, but in his person they assumed 
an exaggerated form. From the time of his appointment on, 
he was distrustful of Russia and Russian intentions. While 
others were too, and at times it seemed that England and 
Russia might be on the verge of war, he became obsessed 
with the idea to the point of seeing Russian intrigues 
everywhere. This naturally colored his thinking and his 
judgment. From the time of the Peshawar Conference he 
expressed the opinion that the Amir was intriguing with 
Russia, and upon hearing that a Russian mission had 
arrived at Kabul, he was certain that his worst fears were 
now verified.
In a letter to Cranbrook, April 8, 1878, he expressed 
his ideas on the situation in Central Asia. Herein he noted 
that India was permanently threatened by Russia's presence 
in that area. He felt that India could best be safeguarded 
if an occasion should arise for war with Afghanistan. He 
went on to say.
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. . .  I am persuaded that the policy of building up 
in Afghanistan a strong independent State over which 
we can exercise absolutely no control, has been 
proved by experience to be a mistake. If by war, 
or the death of the present Amir . . .  we should 
hereafter have the opportunity (and it is one which 
may at any moment occur suddenly) of disintegrating 
and breaking up the Kabul Power, I sincerely hope 
that opportunity will not be lost by us. . . .3̂
Upon confirmation of the news of the Russian 
mission, Lytton again wrote to Cranbrook, advocating a 
policy definitely motivated by Russophobia. His agita­
tion is apparent, when he says, "Now the Russian outposts 
are actually 150 miles nearer than they were then. Now 
the Russian officers and troops have been received with 
honour at Kabul, within 150 miles of our frontier and 
our largest military garrison. And this is a distance 
which, even on the large scale maps recommended to us, 
looks very small indeed. . . ."33 in this letter he put 
forth the "vacuum theory," that "all intermediate States 
between our own Asiatic Empire and that of Russia must 
ere long be absorbed by one or other of the two rival 
P o w e r s . "34 Thus, for military reasons of defense, he 
felt that they could not remain behind the Hindu-Kush 
mountain range. His fear of Russian aggression prompted 
him to advocate a military occupation of Afghanistan in
3^Lytton to Cranbrook, April 8, 1878, quoted in 




the event the British were unable to persuade Sher Ali 
to permanently exclude Russian influence from Afghanistan. 
He then advocated the sending of a British Mission to the 
Amir as a counter to the Russian Mission, and with the 
purpose of once more attempting a political settlement 
with Sher Ali.
The fact that Lytton was unduly disturbed over 
the appearance of the Russian Mission at Kabul, a Mission 
that was small in number and certainly not of a military 
nature, is perhaps understandable in a time when the two 
powers were on the verge of hostilities. But when Lytton 
finally knew that peace had been established, and that a 
diplomatic protest had been sent to Russia, and that in 
reality no threat existed any longer, he acted as if it 
hadn't happened or if it had, he for one didn't believe it, 
Russia might claim to be at peace, but to his mind this 
didn't prevent her from continuing her expansion in the 
direction of India. The threat had become so real to him 
that he still saw it long after it had ceased to exist.
Lytton's extreme Russophobia, combined with his 
excessive national arrogance, was bound to lead to trouble 
in his dealings with Afghanistan. He considered that 
country and its inhabitants as barbaric. When the Amir 
refused the Viceroy's first overture to send a British 
mission, Lytton's pride was stung, and from then on he 
was distrustful of him. In his subsequent dealings with
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Sher Ali, Lytton assumed the attitude of a superior 
treating with an obstreperous inferior, who didn't seem to 
realize that he was supposed to be the humble servant of 
the master. Lytton was constantly infuriated by Sher Ali's 
aloofness. His reply to Sher Ali's first refusal shows 
something of this feeling.
Your Highness has indeed suggested that it would 
answer all purposes were you to depute a confidential 
agent to learn from the Viceroy the views of the 
British Government. My friend, the Viceroy cannot 
receive an agent from Your Highness when you have 
declined to receive His Excellency's trusted friend 
and E n r o y . 3 5
The Viceroy felt it was beneath his dignity to 
receive an agent from the Amir after the Amir had the 
affront to refuse to receive a British Envoy. Lytton gave 
no consideration to Sher Ali's reasons for this, dis­
missing them as mere excuses.
When the Amir finally agreed to send his represen­
tative to the Peshawar Conference for the purpose of 
making some sort of a settlement with the British, it 
seemed that the prospects for an agreement were good. 
However, the Amir's envoy died suddenly, and Lytton 
closed the Conference, even though another envoy was on 
his way from Sher Ali. The Viceroy justified his action, 
stating:
In return for all this generosity and forebearance, 
the British Government has received from the Amir
S^Lytton to Sher Ali, July 8, 1876, quoted in
Lady Balfour, p. 62.
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nothing but discourtesies, only rendered insignificant 
by his absolute impuissance. Our latest offers to 
protect his dominions and his dynasty, with much 
expense and trouble to ourselves but with no inter­
ference in his authority, have been answered by an 
attempt to stir up open hostility against us.3°
This "open hostility" referred to by Lytton was a holy
war (jehad) against the English, which he claimed was
being stirred up by the Amir while the negotiations were
going on. This account was first published in the Indian
Pioneer, and then in the London Times, and it alleged that
"this sudden change of policy [closing the Conference] is
due to the fact that the Ameer is trying to stir up a
religious war in Candahar with a view to the expulsion of
the British troops from Khelat."^? The validity of this
report was denied in the April 18th issue of the Times,
which attributed the story to rumors, and the real cause
for the closing of the Conference was claimed to be the
death of the Afghan Envoy. A further clarification
appeared in a story in the Times on October 19th, which
told of an attempt to raise a jehad, not by Sher Ali, but
by the fanatical Akhood of Swat, and not during the
Peshawar Conference, but after the British had closed
it.38 The significance is not in the true facts, but in
Lytton's view of them. It clearly shows that he was
36viceroy's Minute on the Close of the Peshawar 
Conference, March, 1877, quoted in Lady Balfour, p. 155.
3?The Times, April 16, 1877.
^^The Times, October 19, 1877.
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ready to believe the worst of the Amir.
The Viceroy also considered that since Britain was 
a great power and Afghanistan a weak one, she should bend 
her knee to the British. In his estimation it was beneath 
the dignity of a great Empire to treat a small nation on 
equal terms. As he once wrote to Cavagnari, " . . .  the 
radical defect in the conduct of our past relations 
with Sher Ali is that the tone of it has never been in 
wholesome accordance with the realities of our relative 
positions— the weakness of his position and strength of 
our o w n . L y t t o n  tried to correct this defect. After 
the Peshawar Conference, he expressed what his future 
policy towards the Amir was going to be, when he said in 
a letter to Sir Robert Egerton, Lt. Governor of the 
Punjab, "My present objective is to weaken and embarrass 
the position of the Amir by all the indirect means in my 
power."40
Lytton's demand for the reception of the British 
Mission to be headed by Sir Neville Chamberlain, was not 
particularly courteous. Three days after it was written, 
the Amir's son and heir apparent died. A forty-day 
mourning period followed. Lytton, in a letter to
S^Lytton to Cavagnari, May 19, 1877, quoted in 
Lady Balfour, p. 162.
40g . J. Alder, British India's Northern Frontier 
1865-95, A Study in Imperial Policy, Imperial Studies, 
XXV (London: Longmans! Green and Co.l 1963), p! 117.
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Cranbrook, tells that the letter requesting the reception 
of the mission was "accompanied by a friendly letter of 
condolence on the death of the heir a p p a r e n t . I t  
would seem that Lytton did not consider it a breach of 
etiquette to send such a demand and a condolence together, 
but it was an unpardonable affront that Sher Ali did not 
answer at once the letter of condolence. Moreover, Lytton 
did not comply with customary etiquette in his observation 
of the mourning period, for he continued to send a barrage 
of messages, which the Amir himself later characterized 
as "harsh," not only to Sher Ali, but "moreover these 
fiery messages were repeated to the subordinate officers 
of Sher Ali at the forts and citadels on the road. . . ."^2 
Sir Neville Chamberlain's report to the Viceroy stated that 
Sher Ali's Minister told him the Amir was very annoyed 
"by the various unbecoming communications, some to his own 
address, some to his officers. Communications should not 
be written in an authoritative tone, nor should any be 
addressed to his officials, as they are servants of the 
Cabul Government, and not of the B r i t i s h . "43
Lytton did not wait until the end of the forty-day
4lLytton to Cranbrook, October, 1878, quoted in 
Lady Balfour, p. 272.
^^Afghan Correspondence II, 1878, Nos. 16 and 17, 
quoted in Argyll, p. 504.
43chamberlain to Lytton, September 19, 1878,
C.A.W., p. 178.
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mourning period to advance the mission. Chamberlain had 
informed him that reports of the Native British Envoy in 
Kabul indicated a willingness on the part of the Amir to 
receive the Mission in proper time.44 Besides, Lytton 
had been ordered by Cranbrook to await orders before 
advancing the mission, and also not to go by way of the 
Khyber Pass. The Viceroy's motive for disobeying orders, 
and for ignoring the sensitivities of the Afghan ruler, 
were clearly dictated by his arrogance which had prejudiced 
him against the Amir. It is not going too far to declare 
that Lytton's haste was deliberate, that the whole project 
of the mission was designed to secure an affront so that 
the Government of India would have a casus belli that would 
stand up in England. It cannot be doubted that Lytton 
wanted war with Afghanistan after he had failed to bring 
Sher Ali into submission to the Indian Government. British 
pride was at stake, and it is difficult to say which motive 
was stronger, that or the Russian threat, but put together 
they made war an object to be greatly desired, as far as 
Lytton was concerned. In a letter to Cranbrook, justifying 
his actions, Lytton stated three facts of importance. First, 
that he deliberately selected Sir Neville Chamberlain to 
head the Mission because he was a member of the Lawrentian
44ibid.
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School,and  thus failure could not be ascribed to the 
Viceroy's rash action in departing from the old policy. 
Second, that he felt certain an affront would take place 
if the Mission proceeded. Third, that he sent the Mission 
anyway to prove to the British Public that the Amir was 
hostile, and to do it in such a way as to "make the public 
a partner with the Government in the duty of counter­
acting it."46
The Proclamation of War against Sher Ali, written 
by Lytton, clearly combined the two motives, for much to 
Cranbrook's distress, he implied that the invasion was 
designed not only to punish Sher Ali, but also to expel 
the Russians from Afghanistan.4?
Influence of the Needs and Values of Society
Decision-makers cannot help but be influenced in 
their decisions by the needs and values of the society in 
which they live. This influence may be quite subtle or
4^Those who concurred in the ideas of Lord Lawrence, 
who served as Viceroy of India from November 1863 to 
January 1869. His frontier policy was one of cautious 
maintenance of the status quo. To stand on the defensive, 
to wait and watch, to make the peoples within his own 
frontier prosperous and contented, and to leave the 
peoples beyond it independent without interference, was 
in his opinion, the only safe way of meeting the advance 
of Russia in Central Asia.
46Lytton To Cranbrook, September 23, 1878, quoted 
in Lady Balfour, pp. 284-285.
4^Cowling, p. 79; The Times, November 23, 1878.
226
very obvious. Since a decision-maker is a product of his 
culture, there is the question of whether this influence 
is not the same as that of the Actor's social values. The 
distinction made here is in regard to those needs and 
values which are external to the Actors, but which never­
theless influence him. For example, all Britishers must 
share a certain cultural background, and to an extent, a 
certain cultural bias. But within the country are varying 
opinions. Times change, so do ideas, so do needs. Thus 
this section will deal with those needs and ideas outside 
the sphere of the decision-maker's basic make-up, which 
either acted upon him to change his ideas and values, or 
caused him to act against his basic orientation for some 
practical necessity.
A good illustration of this is seen over and over 
again in Disraeli's actions during the Eastern crisis, when 
he bowed to public opinion. On one occasion he made light 
of the stories of the Bulgarian atrocities, which released 
such a storm of protest that he had to think carefully in 
regard to his Turkish policy. Disraeli and the Queen feared 
that the atrocity stories would supply Russia with an 
excuse for invading Turkey, and that any such movement 
would surely end in the-Russian occupation of that country. 
While they were inclined to support Turkey militarily, in 
the event of such an invasion on Russia's part, they felt
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4 Rthat public opinion would not permit such a move. It 
was therefore the moral indignation of the British public 
which countermanded the Prime Minister's inclination to 
enter the war.
With the signing of the Treaty of Berlin, Disraeli 
reached the pinnacle of his success in foreign affairs.
He had obtained for England, "peace with honor." This 
altered his position on Afghanistan. Whereas before he 
was inclined to support the Viceroy in a military build-up 
on the Northwest frontier, with an object to be prepared 
for a war with Russia in that area, now that peace had 
been obtained, he was desirous of cooling off that situation, 
He did not want his accomplishment of peace with Russia 
marred. For this reason, when Lytton was ready to send the 
Chamberlain Mission, Disraeli, as well as Salisbury and 
Cranbrook, wanted the Mission postponed until the Foreign 
Office could receive an answer to the protest sent to 
Russia.
After the British Mission was repulsed at Ali 
Musjid, the Cabinet insisted upon an ultimatum being sent 
to Sher Ali, to give him another chance to vindicate 
himself through an apology for the affront and an agreement 
to receive a British agent. The Cabinet's motivation was 
not the real hope that an acceptable reply would be
^%lake, p. 608.
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received, for there was hardly sufficient time allowed 
for that contingency, but it was to strengthen the casus 
belli, as many of the Cabinet members had expressed their 
doubts that a real cause for war existed, at least not one 
sufficient to convince the public. Here again, while their 
inclination was for war, considering the predicament they 
were in, there had to be a better justification for public 
acceptance.
Disraeli's position before and after the incident 
at Ali Jusjid, reveals a contradiction which can best be 
explained by his desire for public acceptance of his policy. 
He made much of Lytton's disobedience after the affront 
occurred, and wrote in this vein to Cranbrook,
He [Lytton] was told to wait until we had received 
the answer from Russia to our remonstrances. I was 
very strong on this, having good reasons for my 
opinion. He disobeyed us. . .
And to Salisbury he wrote;
His [Lytton's] policy is perfectly fitted to a 
state of affairs in which Russia was our assailant; 
but Russia is not our assailant. She has sneaked out 
of our hostile position . . . and if Lytton had only 
been quiet and obeyed my orders, I have no doubt that, 
under the advice of Russia, Sher Ali would have been 
equally prudent.50
Disraeli's anger at Lytton's disobedience in 
sending the Mission ahead before being given permission
^^Disraeli to Cranbrook, September 26, 1878,
quoted in Monypenny and Buckle, p. 1254.
^^Disraeli to Salisbury, October 3, 1878, quoted
in Monypenny and Buckle, p. 1255.
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by the Home Government, is rendered a little incredulous 
by his note to Cranbrook of September 17th, three days 
before the mission set out, wherein he stated that he had 
learned of the contents of the Russian reply, although it 
had not been formally received, and that it was unsatis­
factory. He also stated that he agreed entirely with 
Lytton's general policy, and expressed his belief that 
it was necessary to act with firmness on the Afghan ques­
tion because, "the feeling is strong, and rising, in the 
country." But most significant of all was his statement 
that he thought, "there is no doubt that there shd. be 
no delay in the Mission. . . it appears that his
criticism of Lytton was not based on the action so much 
as the results, for he complained to Cranbrook, "When 
V-Roys and Comms.-in-chief disobey orders, they ought to 
be sure of success in their mutiny. Lytton, by disobeying 
orders, has only secured insult and failure. . . ."52 
From the time of the appearance of the Russian 
Mission, Salisbury had advised restraint. He was much put 
out with the Viceroy's impetuous actions. Even a year 
before he had deprecated military preparations being made 
by the Government of India.Salisbury was not in favor
S^Disraeli to Cranbrook, September 17, 1878,
quoted in Monypenny and Buckle, p. 1253.
52Disraeli to Cranbrook, September 26, 1878,
quoted in Monypenny and Buckle, p. 1254.
53Lady Cecil, p. 340.
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of war because he thought it unnecessary, and he was 
afraid that the military build-up might trigger hostili­
ties. He wanted to avoid such a public affront as that 
which occurred, because he knew that it would make war 
inevitable. He was concerned with the connection of 
Afghanistan with European foreign affairs, and his motive 
for keeping the peace with the Amir was to strengthen 
Britain's hand with Russia. As he told Beaconsfield.
That a breach with the Amir was inevitable sooner 
or later, I quite believe, but the time has been 
chosen with singular infelicity. It would have 
strengthened us much in our struggle to get Russia 
out of the Balkan Peninsula if we could have deferred 
this affair for a y e a r . 54
Throughout his association with Afghan affairs, 
first as Secretary of State for India, and then as Foreign 
Secretary, Salisbury viewed the situation in the total 
perspective of foreign affairs. Thus his motivations 
stemmed in part from the external conditions of the 
international scene. His objectives in foreign policy 
were influenced by his belief that "in the last resort, 
the English people and not the Cabinet were the arbiters 
of foreign p o l i c y . "^5 Therefore, if a policy could not 
command a large degree of public support, he was against 
it. Where Russia was concerned, he was cautious, for.
S^salisbury to Disraeli, October 22, 1878, quoted
in Lady Cecil, pp. 341-342.
55crenville, p. 17.
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as he said of negotiations with Russia, "[they] have this 
peculiarity about them;— that the mere mention of them, 
however innocent they may be, drives a considerable number 
of people in this country immediately i n s a n e . "56
The Actor least affected by the external forces 
of society was Lord Cranbrook. His views on Afghanistan 
were fairly consistent, and he, unlike Disraeli, supported 
Lytton even after his disobedience. In Parliament Cran­
brook stated that Lytton had "strictly carried out the 
policy of the Government, which held itself responsible 
for all that had been d o n e . "57 He did not form his 
policy because of the pressures or fear of public opinion, 
but he appealed to public opinion to support his views.
An example of this is found in the same speech to Parlia­
ment, when, answering the Liberal contention that there 
was room for both England and Russia in Central Asia, he 
replied that this might be true but "there was not room 
for both in A f g h a n i s t a n , "58 and he appealed to British 
pride by citing the justice of the cause.
In the case of Lytton, it is evident that his 
attitudes and opinions were affected by his close contact 
with the Indian society, and by this is meant the British
56salisbury to Sir Henry Elliot, April 16, 1879, 
quoted in Lady Cecil, p. 347.
57Annual Register, 1878, p. 218.
58ibid.
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element of that society, who, for the most part, were 
highly susceptible to any threat of danger from the 
direction of the Northwest frontier. The military 
preparations taken by Lytton following the close of the 
Peshawar Conference, were influenced by the military class 
of the Indian society. Salisbury had warned Lytton 
against succumbing to their counsels.
The decision to advance the Chamberlain Mission 
before permission was received from the Home Government, 
and indeed the sending of it through the Khyber Pass 
instead of Kandahar, as had been directed by London, was 
due to the actions of the military authorities. As 
Lytton explained to Cranbrook, the officers had made 
arrangements with the Khyberi tribesmen for safe conduct 
of the Mission. However, on September 14 a summons from 
the Amir reached Peshawar ordering all the Khyberi headmen 
back to the Pass. They had to return or lose their 
allowances from the Amir. The Viceroy delayed as long 
as possible, but felt he had to act when he did, or he 
would lose both the escort and the respect of the Khyberi 
tribes.
The affront to the British Mission at Ali Musjid 
led Lytton to desire immediate military intervention in 
Afghanistan. To the motives already mentioned can be
59Lytton to Cranbrook, October 3, 1878, quoted
in Lady Balfour, p. 273.
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added the pressures of public sentiment in India. As 
a reporter for the London Times observed:
We gather that in India an absolute concurrence 
of opinion that a vigorous policy and determined 
action are urgently needed, but we know full well 
that the predominant class there is the military.
They naturally are enthusiastic at the prospect of 
war. This enthusiasm has evidently affected the 
civilian element, always foremost in time of danger 
in the East. Hence the delay is unpalatable to 
all but the most thoughtful of our fellow-countrymen 
in India.60
The reason the affront seemed to them to demand 
immediate action, was their fear that if left unanswered 
it might give ideas to the discontented elements of the 
native Indian society. They feared such groups might 
interpret the delay as weakness on the part of the British 
Government, arid such an interpretation could lead to 
mutinies and insurrections. Lytton pointed out that if 
promp action were not taken, the Amir would be able to 
strengthen his position, and that "the apparent want of 
courage, power and policy on the part of Britain would 
seriously undermine both external prestige and internal 
security. To accept apologies would be to run a risk of 
losing India.
The final influence of the military officers on 
Lytton is seen in the time allowance given the Amir to
6ÛThe Times, November 5, 1878.
SlLytton to Cranbrook, October 11, 1878, quoted
in Gopal, p. 87.
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respond to the British Ultimatum. The November 21st 
deadline was dictated, not by hopes of receiving a reply, 
but by the military necessity of entering Afghanistan 
before the winter snows blocked the passes, which usually 
occurred by the end of November. Failure to move in time 
would cause a considerable delay which would be to the 
Amir's advantage in preparing for war, for the passes 
would be blocked for six m o n t h s . 2̂
The Role of Personality
In considering the influence of personality on 
motivation, Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin suggest limiting 
this observation to the sociological conception of 
personality.Thus the personality of the individual 
decision-maker is viewed as it relates to his role in the 
decision-making system. Since a decision-making unit 
requires an inter-play among its members, it is important 
to see how the individual members view their relationships 
to one another in the decision-making process.
Disraeli, as the Chief-of-State, liked to keep a 
large degree of control on foreign policy. He did not 
think it either desirable or necessary to call Parliament 
to decide questions of foreign policy. During the years
62Lady Balfour, p. 291.
63snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p. 161.
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1876-1878, he made the bulk of decisions relating to 
India in private consultation with Cranbrook and Salisbury.
He did not make a practice of calling the Cabinet together, 
except on what he considered to be extremely important 
issues. After the repulsion of the Chamberlain Mission, 
he was loathe to call the Cabinet together, for he feared 
such a move would "agitate all Europe."^4 But on October 
3rd he was "obliged to summon the Cabinet. I found they 
were talking all sorts of nonsense over the country; 
especially some in whose prudence I still had some lingering 
trust; and there were already 'two parties in the Cabinet,' 
and 'all that.'"65
Disraeli was always opposed to "masterly inactivity." 
He himself was a man of action, and he admired others for 
those same qualities of boldness and action. Lytton seemed 
to be a counterpart of Disraeli. He was brilliant, witty, 
theatrical, and prone to quick, daring action. Thus for a 
long time the Viceroy enjoyed Disraeli's confidence and 
support, to the degree that he was left pretty much to 
his own devices.
Salisbury was a different story. Disraeli had 
perceived in him the same qualities of boldness and 
action as he had in Lytton, but unlike Lytton, Salisbury
G^Disraeli to the Duke of Richmond, September 24, 
1878, quoted in Monypenny and Buckle, p. 1254.
65oisraeli to Salisbury, October 3, 1878, quoted 
in Monypenny and Buckle, p. 1255.
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was to turn out to be more of a traditionalist. He was 
by far the most conservative of the group. He deprecated 
quick action which was taken without going through the 
proper channels of authority. He approved of Lytton as 
long as he was Secretary of State for India and could 
exercise proper control over him. But he later came to 
distrust the Viceroy, and even to say of him that he had 
been '"forcing the hand of the Government,' and had been 
doing it from the very first; he thought only of India, 
and was dictating by its means, the foreign policy of the 
Government in Europe and Turkey.Salisbury's bitterness 
stemmed from a conflict of role interpretation. He felt 
that Lytton was overstepping the bounds of his office into 
that of the Foreign Secretary.
Salisbury was inclined to be cautious. He always 
took into account the possible ramifications of any 
action under consideration. Some of his colleagues were 
not as prone to do this, and were impatient with his 
deliberations. In fact, while he, Disraeli, and Cranbrook 
were considering what should be done in regard to the 
British Mission, Lytton was acting.
Cranbrook was to a degree responsible for Lytton's 
actions, first, by agreement with the Viceroy's general 
policy, and second, by his lack of control over him. His
GGoisraeli to Queen Victoria, October 26, 1878,
quoted in Monypenny and Buckle, p. 1259.
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paucity of knowledge and interest in Indian affairs led 
him to rely on the opinions and judgments of others.
Lytton, an expressive writer, convinced Cranbrook for 
the most part, of the soundness of his ideas. As the 
Indian Secretary's previous post had been as head of the 
War Department, it is not too surprising to find him 
inclined to use military force in settling the Afghan 
problem. He was even more prepared to use full-scale 
military intervention than even Lytton. While Cranbrook 
was noted for his rather haphazard handling of the India 
Office, once he set his mind on something, he was quite 
resolute. So, while he appeared to be the weakest of 
the Actors, it was he who moved the Cabinet to undertake 
full-scale military action in Afghanistan.
In Lytton the personality factor is most notable. 
Although he went to India knowing little of Indian affairs, 
he soon came to consider himself an expert. Anyone who 
doubts this has only to read his long letters to Cranbrook, 
telling the Secretary of State what action should be taken 
in various situations. In many instances he took the 
initiative upon himself, such as in ordering a military 
build-up on the Northwest frontier in 1877, following the 
Peshawar Conference; in withdrawing the Native Agent from 
Kabul; in the change of frontier policy and the reorganiza­
tion of the frontier as regarded both administration and 
demarcation of boundaries; and of course, his disobedience
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in sending the Chamberlain Mission contrary to orders. He 
always had what he considered good reasons for his actions 
However, throughout all of his justifications runs the 
thread of the idea that he knew best what to do under 
the circumstances.
Lytton may be considered an innovator, not that 
he was responsible for the change in British policy 
towards Afghanistan, for he had taken such instructions 
with him to India, but rather because he presumed to know 
the Government's intentions better than the Government 
itself, and was not hesitant in taking some risks. Still, 
he operated within certain limitations. He felt it 
necessary to ask for permission to send the British 
Mission, and although he later violated instructions, 
he rationalized that he was not exceeding his bounds by 
advancing the Mission, because the Government had ordered 
the delay for the purpose of receiving a reply from their 
protest to Russia. He felt that such a reply could be 
forwarded to the Mission on its j o u r n e y . ^7 This advisory, 
along with the news that the Mission was being advanced, 
was telegraphed to Cranbrook on September 21st. Although 
Lytton desired immediate action after the affront, he was 
again limited and had to wait upon the decision of the 
Cabinet, which was to send an ultimatum to allow more
G^Lytton to Cranbrook, October 3, 1878, quoted
in Lady Balfour, p. 274.
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time. While Lytton issued the ultimatum, as well as the 
subsequent declaration of war, he did so only on the orders 
of the Cabinet. Whatever his feelings in the matter, he 
did recognize that his role as Viceroy demanded the 
sanction of the Cabinet for the measures he now proposed, 
and though he strongly expressed his views to them, he did 
not act until he obtained their permission.
In his dealings with the Afghans, Lytton demon­
strated his acceptance of an Afghan stereotype, for 
whether referring to Sher Ali, his Minister Syud Noor 
Mohammed, or other high Afghan officials, he tended to 
view them in the same light— that of barbarians, hostile 
to the British Government. He also appeared to have a 
set view of the situation as well as what should be done 
regarding British policy in that area. Many of his views 
he took from Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Henry Rawlinson, both 
opponents of the Lawrentian School of "masterly inactivity." 
The Viceroy's judgments were colored by preconceived 
notions, both about the Afghans and the frontier problem. 
Nothing else can account for his unreal interpretation of 
facts. Some of the Home Government's decisions were based 
in great part on information supplied them by Lytton.
Thus, when he asserted to the Government that the Amir's 
reply to his letter requesting the acceptance of the 
British Mission was "discourteous and hostile," and 
entirely unsatisfactory, it was bound to have an influence
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on the attitude of the Home Government. A careful perusal 
of the letter does not reveal hostility to the degree 
intimated by Lytton. Instead, the Amir appears to have 
been complaining of the discourtesy and hostility of the 
British Government towards him. But Lytton in his 
telegram of October 18th announced the arrival of the 
Amir's insolent letter, and demanded immediate war. At 
that point it seemed to the Cabinet that there was no 
longer any question that Sher Ali was determined to keep 
the British out of Afghanistan, and as Cowling points 
out, "Lytton by forcing the emir's and the Cabinet's 
hands, had established his first point. The discussion 
thereafter assumes the things he wants to be assumed."68
The same was true in the case of the Amir's 
response to the British ultimatum. Even though hostilities 
had begun before receipt of that reply, had it been con­
sidered satisfactory, the military operations could have 
been halted. In this letter the Amir stated that his 
government "cherishes no feelings of hostility and opposi­
tion towards the British Government," and that if they 
wished to send "a purely friendly and temporary Mission 
to this country, with a small escort not exceeding 20 or 
30 men, similar to that which attended the Russian Mission,
68cowling, p. 76.
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this Servant of God will not oppose its p rogress."69 By 
this time the Cabinet members had been conditioned by 
Lytton to think the worst of the Amir, and to accept the 
Viceroy's verdict of insolence and deception on Sher Ali's 
part.
Lytton's personality did not leave room for error 
in his judgment. Whenever conflicting information reached 
him, he had no problem reconciling it; he merely chose to 
accept that information which confirmed his personal views 
and beliefs, rejecting all other. This was also true in 
the case of advice, for he accepted only that advice from 
members of his Council with which he agreed. The same 
even holds true in his relations with the Home Government. 
For here too, he followed instructions with which he 
agreed, altered those that were open to interpretation to 
correspond with his own thinking, and ignored those which 
seemed in direct opposition to his considered judgment.
While the personality of any one actor contributes 
to decision-making, some to a much greater degree than 
others, still where a group decision is made, the inter­
action of these personalities tends to modify and to 
synthesize the decision. The Cabinet decision of October 
25, 1878 clearly demonstrates this. Lytton had asked the 
Cabinet for a declaration of war. Cairns, Northcote and
69parliamentary Papers, Vol. LVI (1878-79),
Letter from Sher Ali to Lytton, November 19, 1878, p. 700.
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Cross could not see that they had a sufficient cause for 
war, at least not one that would stand up in Parliament. 
Disraeli was opposed to declaring war because of the 
danger involved in summoning Parliament to sanction it.
At the same time he felt that British prestige required 
England to make some sort of declaration of power. Here 
Disraeli was motivated by political considerations in not 
wishing to summon Parliament, and by national pride, in 
not wanting England to appear weak. He attempted a 
compromise of those two points by suggesting a material 
guarantee project which would not necessitate calling 
Parliament, and would be a show of British strength. 
Salisbury supported the idea, for to him it was more 
realistic than becoming involved in what might be a 
disaster. But Cranbrook, who was much more in sympathy 
with the Indian view, demanded war. He did not believe 
in half-way measures, and he could see no advantage in 
postponing the i n e v i t a b l e . To Cranbrook, who had little 
real interest in Indian affairs, preferring to be off 
hunting in Scotland, the pressures that had been brought 
to bear on him from all sides were distasteful. The best 
and quickest way to eliminate them was to declare war and 
get the whole business over with as soon as possible.
The more decision-makers involved in a decision.
^^Disraeli to Queen Victoria, October 26, 1878,
quoted in Monypenny and Buckle, pp. 1259-1260.
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the more numerous are the alternatives, due to differences 
of opinion. Thus the Cabinet could have refused to 
declare war or take material guarantees, and just leave 
things up in the air, reverting to the old stationary 
policy. It could have, although it was not suggested, 
recalled the Viceroy. It could have gone along with 
Disraeli's proposal for a material guarantee, or it 
could have declared immediate war.
The decision reached once again united the major 
decision-makers in agreement on the national objective of 
upholding and preserving British interests, which in this 
case was national prestige. The decision to order an 
increased military build-up for the occupation of Afghan­
istan was taken to accomplish this goal. The motivation 
for the decision to send another message to the Amir, to 
give him one more chance, was, in Disraeli's words, "to 
strengthen our case for Parliament."71 This latter 
motivation was strictly on the part of the Actors in the 
Home Government, for they, and particularly Disraeli, 
felt the limitations of the Cabinet's role. The Cabinet 
could declare war, but in doing so it would have to 
summon Parliament to approve of using Indian revenues for 
expenditures. It was therefore important to have a strong 
case to present to Parliament.
Lytton, off in India, and having little use for
71lbid., p. 1260.
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Parliament in the first place, considered the decision 
to send an ultimatum a useless waste of time. But the 
Cabinet view prevailed on this point. So, the decision 
combined aggression with a waiting policy, thereby giving 
weight to both the "war" and "peace" elements by holding 
out the chance for peace, while preparing for war if the 
peace overture failed.
CHAPTER VIII 
DETERMINANTS OF DECISION: CAPABILITY
The making of decisions must necessarily go 
beyond the formulation of desired objectives. Before any 
course of action can be taken, the decision-maker must 
take into consideration what the chances are for success 
of the proposed measure. The chances of success may be 
termed capability. Thus in considering a plan of action 
to implement a strongly motivated objective, capability 
becomes an important consideration. The likelihood of a 
decision being made to take a specific action is increased 
in proportion to the available capability as perceived by 
the decision-makers. We must distinguish between actual 
capability and perceived capability, for it is the latter 
which affects the Actors in their decisions, and the lack 
of knowledge of the former which sometimes leads to 
miscalculations. The Actors must deal with the question 
of capability through the information available to them 
at the particular time when the decision is being made, 




We are herein concerned with two types of capa­
bility. The first is the capability of authority, which 
views the limits within which the Actors operate— their 
formal organization authority. The second is material 
capability, or the substance necessary to carry out and 
implement a decision. This may encompass several areas, 
such as military capability, where a decision involves 
war or the possibility of war; financial capability, for 
any projects requiring expenditures; and political capa­
bility, involving the means available for effecting a 
desired political settlement, or obtaining political 
goals.
Capability of Authority
The final authority to declare war rested with 
the Cabinet, and the decision to commence hostilities with 
Afghanistan was properly made in that body. However, 
this final decision was an inevitable result of other 
decisions made elsewhere. It is therefore necessary to 
look into the authority of those most important decisions 
which practically ‘necessitated the final one. Many of 
those decisions were made by the Viceroy, Lord Lytton, 
so we must carefully look at his authority in this area.
The Viceroy of India, as previously noted, was 
the highest administrative authority in India. He, 
together with his Council, had complete control over
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the army, defense, foreign relations, and finances. We 
thus find Lytton engaging in frontier skirmishes with 
native tribesmen, sending punitive expeditions, making 
treaties with local chieftains, all on his own authority, 
and completely within his constitutional rights. While the 
Government of India Act of 1858 intended to give the power
of initiative to the Viceroy, the Secretary of State for
India, beginning with Argyll and followed by Salisbury, 
took steps to bring the Viceroy's actions under his 
direct control. From then on it became the habit for 
Viceroys to secure permission from the India Office 
before undertaking any major action. Lytton adhered to 
this policy for a while, but when Cranbrook became Secretary 
of State, the Viceroy reverted to the role of former days
by initiating policy himself. We thus find Cranbrook in
the role of accepting and agreeing to policies and pro­
posals suggested to him by Lytton. Cranbrook seldom, if 
ever, took the initiative, and while Lytton was not 
theoretically acting outside the limits of his office, he 
was acting beyond the bounds set by the precedent of 
several preceding Viceroys.
Lytton's letter to Cranbrook of August 3, 1878 
set forth the Viceroy's views of the situation in light 
of the reception of the Russian Mission at Kabul. In it 
he also proposed what action should be taken and the 
alternatives possible. He told Cranbrook about the
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mission he proposed to send, which Cranbrook had previously 
sanctioned, and his selection of Sir Neville Chamberlain 
to head it. Although Cranbrook's approval had been 
secured to send a mission, it was Lytton who suggested 
it, and worked out all the details, including policy. In 
reading Lytton's letters to Cranbrook, one is impressed 
by his attitude. It is not one of a subordinate to a 
superior, asking permission to take certain action, but 
rather it smacks of a teacher instructing a rather dull 
student, telling him what he ought to do. Nowhere do we 
find the Viceroy asking advice from the Secretary of 
State, rather he is always handing it out.
Whether in ordering the Chamberlain Mission to 
advance to Ali Musjid, in strict disobedience of his 
orders, Lytton overstepped the bounds of his authority, 
is open to question. For while there might be a con­
stitutional point giving the Viceroy the power to dis­
regard orders from the Secretary of State for India, the 
orders regarding the delay of the Chamberlain Mission, 
though transmitted by Cranbrook, came from the Prime 
Minister and the Foreign Secretary. Disraeli and Salisbury 
certainly felt that they had been disobeyed. However, the 
telegram sent to Lytton by the India Office merely stated:
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Official reply to remonstrance from St.
Petersburg on way London. Important to receive 
this before Chamberlain starts.1
The telegram does not indicate any higher source of
authority for these instructions, and also, as Lytton
later pointed out, he received it at a time when he knew
from Cranbrook's correspondence that the Secretary of
State was not in London.
Probably Lytton's greatest justification for his
action, as far as authority goes, is contained in the
following passage from his explanation to Cranbrook:
. . . Again on the 13th of the same month, when 
telegraphing to you further details about the 
organisation and movements of the mission, I took 
special occasion to repeat "I cannot propose it 
unless I have authority to insist on it." To this 
reiteration of the understanding on which I was 
acting no objection was made or suggested by Her 
Majesty's government. . . .2
Since Lytton had already proposed the mission and set 
in operation the necessary preliminaries, he felt that 
the circumstances demanded carrying through the proposed 
project without further delay. As he had not been con­
tradicted as to the necessity of having authority to 
insist on the mission, he interpreted this rather broadly 
to also give him the authority to advance the mission, 
for in his opinion it was a "now or never" situation.
^Telegram from India Office to Lytton, September
13, 1878, quoted in Lady Balfour, p. 271.
^Lytton to Cranbrook, October 3, 1878, quoted in
Lady Balfour, p. 270.
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and to abandon it would be costly in prestige. Thus, 
"authority to insist" became the same to him as authority 
to advance.
Several days after the repulsion of the British 
Mission, Lytton wired Cranbrook for permission to make 
certain political and military preparations. The measures 
were approved by the Secretary of State after consultation 
with the Prime Minister, but instructions were sent that 
any further proposals should be telegraphed to London 
before any action was taken.
Although Lytton was anxious to begin military 
operations against Afghanistan, the Home Government 
insisted upon first sending an ultimatum to the Amir.
Here Lytton was bound by the limitations of his office, 
and though he composed the ultimatum, its terms were 
first approved by the Home Government.^ Upon the expira­
tion of the time limit set for receiving a reply to the 
ultimatum, Lytton ordered the advance of troops into 
Afghanistan, and issued the proclamation of war. Both of 
these actions had been previously sanctioned by the Home 
Government and were thus within the Viceroy's realm of 
authority.
Lytton is depicted by most historians as having 
disregarded the Home Government and having gone his own
^Lady Balfour, p. 292.
251
way to the point that he deliberately, and personally, 
involved Britain in a war with Afghanistan. Viewing the 
situation from the standpoint of constitutional authority, 
Lytton could have exercised greater freedom than he did.
What makes Lytton stand out from other Viceroys in this 
area, is that he reversed custom, not law. The existence 
of a strong Secretary of State generally controlled the 
initiative of the Viceroy, but when the reverse was true, 
the potential for a very independent Viceroy existed.
Salisbury, having been a strong Secretary of State, 
held the initiative of Indian policy in his own hands, 
although he allowed Lytton a certain degree of latitude 
in implementing the policy. However, he kept a close enough 
check on that implementation to be sure it was in the 
right direction. When Cranbrook succeeded him, Salisbury 
assumed that he would carry on in the same tradition, but 
this was a miscalculation. Cranbrook, having no definite 
policy of his own, adopted Lytton's, and the initiative 
shifted from London to Calcutta. In keeping with the 
authority of his office, Cranbrook gave approval to many 
of Lytton's proposals without referring them to either 
Salisbury or Disraeli. However, from the receipt of word 
regarding the Russian Mission, together with Lytton's 
request to send a British one, he did consult them, 
though it was not until the second week in September 
that he forwarded the India Office's file containing
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Lytton's correspondence on the Afghan situation, to 
Disraeli. From that point on, Cranbrook, Salisbury, 
and Disraeli were in frequent touch. The decision to 
delay the Mission seems to have occurred to all three 
almost simultaneously. Salisbury took the initiative 
and with Disraeli's approval wrote Cranbrook to order 
the delay of the mission,  ̂which was within the normal 
chain of command. Cranbrook, who was of the same mind, 
sent the orders the next day.
While the decision to delay the mission lay 
entirely within the scope of the Foreign Secretary and 
the Secretary of State for India, the decision to send 
the mission in the first place was made by the Cabinet 
as a whole. Major decisions on foreign policy were to 
be submitted to the Cabinet for approval, and this pro­
cedure was carefully followed by Disraeli. When the 
situation became serious, due to the repulsion of the 
British mission, he found it necessary to call the Cabinet 
together. The Cabinet had the capability to order hostili­
ties, but it had no power to allocate Indian revenues to 
pay for such an operation. This was strictly in the 
realm of Parliament. Thus, the Cabinet in making a 
decision of this nature had to consider the chances of 
getting Parliament to approve the action by voting the
^Lady Cecil, p. 339.
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use of the necessary funds.
When the matter reached the floors of the House 
of Lords and the House of Commons, the issue of the 
constitutionality of the declaration of war arose. Some 
of the Opposition members contended that Parliament should 
have some say in such a move. Earl Grey, in particular, 
"moved an amendment to the effect that when war was 
probable Parliament ought to have been summoned, to 
provide for the expenses and to consider the grounds upon 
which war might be d e c l a r e d . Another member of the 
Opposition, the Marquis of Hartington, admitted the 
right of the Government to enter the war, "having, 
unfortunately, as he thought, received many proofs of the 
confidence of Parliament. . ." but at the same time he 
claimed the right to censure the Government for undertaking 
the war, for the policy leading to it was unjustifiable.^ 
Thus, while some of the members of the Opposition were 
willing to concede the constitutional right of the Cabinet 
to enter the war, they felt that the Government had pushed 
its authority to the limit through misrepresentations to 
Parliament regarding the true state of affairs in Afghan­
istan, and the real intentions of the Government, the 
knowledge of which might have caused a reaction in the
^The Annual Register, 1878, p. 213.
Gibid., pp. 214-215.
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Houses that would have modified the Government's policy 
and thereby have averted the situation which necessitated 
war.
The Duke of Argyll, one of the greatest critics 
of the Government's Afghan policy, took the realistic 
view of the Cabinet's rights in the matter, for although 
he disagreed with the ministry's policy, he still felt 
that the Cabinet, not only had the constitutional author­
ity, but that it was the best suited agency to exercise 
it.
It is always in the power of any Executive 
Government to get the country into a position out 
of which it cannot escape without fighting. This 
is the terrible privilege of what, in the language 
of the Constitution, is called prerogative. It is, 
in reality, the privilege of every Executive, whether 
of monarchical or of popular origin. I am not one 
of those who are of opinion that it could be lodged 
elsewhere with any advantage, or even with any 
safety. The majorities which support a strong 
Government in power are invariably more reckless 
than the Ministry. . .
The Disraeli Government and the individual Actors, 
in making their decisions regarding Afghanistan, were 
subject to certain limitations of their offices, but 
for the most part they interpreted their roles broadly, 
which gave them much more freedom of action. They did 
not consider taking any action beyond the bounds of 
their authority, but neither did they hesitate to stretch 





When Lytton began seriously considering the 
possibility of hostilities with Afghanistan in the summer 
of 1878, the Indian array consisted of about 200,000
parmed men. The Indian army was well-trained and well- 
disciplined, and had the distinct advantage of modern 
weapons, such as precision arms, mountain guns, and 
field artillery. Estimates as to the number of soldiers 
required for such an invasion varied from 10,000, according 
to Rawlinson, to a more realistic figure of 31,000, pro­
posed by Lord Sandhurst.
An article in the Edinburgh Review in July, 1875, 
disputed Rawlinson's estimate and came up with an estimate 
of 31,000, broken down as follows:
British Cavalry 1,400
Horses & Field Artillery,
10 Batteries 1,800
Garrison Batteries, say 4 400 3,600
British Infantry, 8 Batteries 7,000
Sappers & Miners, 4 Companies 49 9 7,400
Native Cavalry 4,000
Native Infantry 16,000 20,000
31,000
^Tall Tactics (London: G. Phipps, 1879), p. 49.
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To this figure of fighting men would be added the 
officers and artisans for the materiel of the park 
of artillery including siege train, for the engineer's 
park, and the ordnance and commissariat stores. . . .9
When considering the sending of a British Mission 
to the Amir, Lytton took into account the possible con­
sequences of failure which would necessitate some sort of 
military action. He considered conquering and holding as 
much Afghan territory as necessary to protect the North­
west frontier. As to capability, he said, "As a military 
operation, this will not, I think, be so formidable as it 
has often been represented. . . ."10
There was little, if any, doubt entertained by 
anyone as to the possibility of success of a British 
military campaign in Afghanistan. The campaign by Generals 
Pollock and Nott in 1842 had shown that a British army 
could readily advance on the Afghan capital and occupy 
it without too much difficulty. Even such opponents of 
the "forward policy" as Lord Lawrence, Lord Northbrook, 
and Lord Sandhurst, conceded that much.
Rawlinson maintained that Sher Ali had been 
building his army for the preceding five years, and had 
"prepared a most formidable armament; he had collected 
sixty-eight regiments of regular infantry armed for the
^"England and Russia in the East," Edinburgh Review, 
V. 142 (July, 1875), 300.
l^Lytton to Cranbrook, August 3, 1878, quoted in
Lady Balfour, p. 255.
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most part with serviceable rifles, and 16 regiments of 
cavalry; he had at his disposal 300 guns and an enormous 
amount of powder, ammunition and material of war."^^
An article appearing in the Times in the fall of 1877, 
told of a military build-up going on in Afghanistan, 
but it is doubtful that it caused any serious concern 
in official circles, or that it in any way made the 
Indian Government question its own military capability.
The article told of a scrap iron drive, with the iron 
being melted down and recast into guns— at the rate of 
three or four guns a month. On the other hand, the 
number of troops was represented as increasing rapidly, 
with an army of 66,000 men having been raised at that 
t i m e . 12 But Lytton was not impressed, referring to the 
Amir's troops as "badly armed, badly drilled, and badly 
disciplined. . . ."12
The independent tribes of the Northwest frontier 
were another consideration. Dr. Bellew, writing in 1868, 
calculated the number of independent fighting men on the 
frontier at 83,000, spread over a six hundred mile border. 
They were kept in order by a chain of about twenty-five 
forts, interspersed with between eighty and ninety smaller
llRenry C. Rawlinson, "The Situation in Afghanistan," 
The Nineteenth Century, VII, No. 36 (February, 1880), 199.
l^The Times, October 19, 1877.
l^Lady Balfour, p. 258.
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military posts. "They are garrisoned and held by a 
force of 25,000 troops, regular and irregular; and about 
half that number of police, both district and v i l l a g e .  
Lytton had reason to believe that the frontier tribes would 
not support the Amir in a war. He based his opinion on 
two facts. First, the tribes were disenchanted with 
Sher Ali because of his abortive attempts to raise a 
religious war, "which they now thoroughly understand to 
have been only a political experiment"; second, the 
British expedition against the Jowakis had demonstrated 
the deadly effects of the breech-loaders, which would 
"make its inhabitants very careful henceforth how they
expose themselves."15
The main difficulty that would accompany the
military advance into Afghanistan was that of supply and
transport. This was a particularly difficult task because
of the high mountainous terrain of the country. The
Times pointed out the problems that had to be considered;
. . . Taking into consideration the inhospitable 
nature of the country, the very doubtful reception 
our troops will meet with from the Afghans, the 
absolute necessity of providing defensible works 
for the men with abundance of provisions, forage 
and firewood for the army in winter quarters, and 
the present advanced season of the year, it is a
l^Henry W. Bellew, Our Punjab Frontier (Calcutta: 
Wyman Bros. Publishers, 1868), p. 14.
l^Lady Balfour, p. 258.
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very open matter as to whether Lord Lytton will 
risk an immediate advance into Afghanistan.
In order to reach Kabul it was necessary to go through the
Shuturgarden Pass, some 12,000 feet high. The rugged,
steep roads were unfit for wheeled vehicles, necessitating
the use of pack animals. However, the Viceroy seemed to
have little concern over this aspect. The only thing
that appears to have worried him was the closing of the
passes by snow. Thus he was anxious to move the troops
in before the winter snows began.
It was also important to consider the contingency 
of Russian assistance to Afghanistan. Since peace now 
existed between England and Russia, there was little 
likelihood of armed intervention by Russia. But even 
considering such a possibility, it presented no serious 
threat. The fighting army of Russia in Central Asia, which 
could be mobilized and directed by General Kaufman, 
numbered scarcely more than 20,000 m e n . L y t t o n  was 
well aware of Russia's military weakness, and while he 
feared Russian intrigue, he did not seriously believe 
that Russia had either the desire or the capability to 
assist the Amir.
The Government of India gathered together an 
army of 35,000 men, including 12,000 European infantry.IB
16The Times, September 26, 1878.
"The Military Position of Russia and England in 
Central Asia," Edinburgh Review, January, 1880, pp. 73-74.
IB^he Annual Register, 1878, p. 170.
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In addition, two reserve brigades were sanctioned to be 
formed out of the Madras and Bombay troops, and 60,000 
camels were authorized for the Khyber Pass alone.
Financial
In the House of Lords, Lord Northbrook remarked 
that the last Afghan War cost 17,000,000 pounds, and that 
India was too poor to bear the cost of another such war. 
But Lord Cranbrook maintained that the cost of the war 
for the current financial year would not exceed 1,250,000 
pounds, which would be met by the surplus of current 
revenues, and there would still remain a balance of
500,000 pounds.20 He added, "It must be perfectly obvious 
that the Indian Government could pay the whole cost of 
the war during the present year without adding a shilling 
to the taxation or the debt of the country."21 The 
Indian Secretary's statement was challenged in the House 
of Commons when Mr. Fawcett asserted that there was no 
real surplus of Indian revenue, but that the money was 
coming from-a famine fund.22




22ïhe Annual Register, 1878, p. 24.
261
preceding ten years. A famine fund was created by raising 
the salt tax forty per cent, and by taxing incomes of ten 
pounds a y e a r . 23 These taxes fell mainly on the Indian 
people, as official persons and merchants were not subject 
to the taxes. Sir John Strachey, the Financial member of 
Lytton's Council, once remarked of Indian revenues that 
they possessed "no true surplus over expenditures to 
cover the many contingencies to which a great country is 
e x p o s e d . "24 Even Salisbury had once remarked, "The 
difference between England and India in matters of finance 
is this, that in England you can raise a large increase 
in taxation without in the least degree endangering our 
institutions, whereas you cannot do so in I n d i a . "25
From the public statements of the Indian Secretary, 
it appears that the Home Government felt confident that 
the Indian revenues would be more than sufficient to 
cover the costs of the war. The Government of India was 
equally confident, for the war estimates prepared by the 
Military Department and "confidently recommended by it 
to the Financial Department, and adopted by the latter 
without m i s g i v i n g , "2G fell within the resources of India.
2^Tall Tactics, p. 32,
Z^Eastwick, p. 83.
25ibid., p. 79.
2®Lytton to Cranbrook, May 11, 1880, quoted in 
Lady Balfour, p. 501.
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Lytton exerted every effort to keep military 
expenditures down, but he necessarily depended upon the 
Military Department to prepare the estimates, for as he 
said,
I have always carefully refrained from question­
ing or interfering with the final estimates framed 
and passed by the responsible departments for 
sanctioned charges. Any other course would have 
involved tampering with the public accounts by the 
head of the Government, and been destructive of 
that established sense of personal and departmental 
responsibility which is the best, and indeed, the 
only, guarantee for the conscientious preparation 
and verification of estimates by the authorities 
properly charged with the task. . . .27
Consequently, neither the Government of India nor 
the Home Government anticipated a costly war and as late 
as February, 1880 Sir John Strachey estimated the total 
expenditure in the war to be as low as 10,000,000 pounds. 
However, it was to come to light later that the estimates 
of the Government of India were very much in error. But 
of course capability was viewed in the light of the 
estimates, right or wrong.
In 1881 the total war expenditures were set down 
at 23,412,000 pounds, of which 5,000,000 pounds were paid 
by E n g l a n d . 28 The deficits in the yearly budgets amounted 
to about a million pounds in 1879-80, and four million in 
1880-81.29 The war ended up by costing over twice as much
27ibid.
28The Annual Register, 1881, p. 173.
29hady Balfour, p. 500.
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as had been anticipated. This had also been the case 
in the First Afghan War.
Political Capability
The strongest argument by opponents against 
military involvement in Afghanistan was not based on 
military capability, for they, along with everyone else, 
had little doubt that the British army could easily 
conquer Afghanistan, but it was stated over and over 
again that the real difficulties would begin at the 
moment the military difficulties ended. These arguments 
were based on the British experience in the First Afghan 
War, 1838-41.
Lytton recounted that he had been warned of these
dangers, that several high authorities had told him that,
having once crossed the frontier, we could not safely 
arrest our progress till we had completed the entire 
conquest of Afghanistan, that such a conquest could 
not be abandoned without the risk of renewing, and 
perhaps aggravating, our political dangers, nor yet 
maintained without heavily augmenting our financial 
and administrative burdens, and in either case our 
utmost military success would bequeath to the Afghan 
people, whether- as neighbours or as subjects, memories 
and sentiments of inextinguishable animosity, leaving 
to ourselves no practical alternative between the 
helpless contemplation of the confusion and anarchy 
created by our own action and the wholesale annexation 
of a barren country and a turbulent people.30
These warnings did not seem valid to Lytton, for 
he believed that "the Amir could not live a week in Kabul
^^Parliamentary Papers, Despatch, July 7, 1879,
LVI (1878-1879), No. 7.
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in known hostility to us."31 Hints at discontent of the 
Afghan people with the Amir are to be found in various 
news items from Indian sources throughout 1877. To 
Lytton it appeared that the Afghans might welcome the 
British as a means to rid themselves of Sher Ali, and 
indeed, he carefully chose the words of the declaration 
of war with this in mind. He felt that political pressure 
might be of even more value than military pressure, and 
he considered that "we should spare no effort to convince 
the Afghan people that our quarrel was with the Amir, who 
had deliberately forced it on us, and not with them; thus, 
if possible, isolating the Amir from his people, instead 
of uniting his people with him in a national opposition
to our movements."32
Other political considerations were to secure 
the support of the frontier tribes, detaching them from 
the Amir. Lytton felt confident, in the view of recent 
negotiations with the Afridis, and the recent success of 
the Jowaki expedition, that these tribes would support 
the British.
The capacity to hold Afghanistan once the military 
action had ceased, which the critics felt to be an impos­
sible task, appeared simple enough to Lytton. He assumed
3lLytton to Cranbrook, August 3, 1878, quoted
in Lady Balfour, p. 258.
32Lytton to Cranbrook, September 23, 1878, quoted
in Lady Balfour, p. 286.
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that either Sher Ali would be forced into submission, or 
he would be deposed and his kingdom broken up. In the 
first instance, a chastened Sher Ali would have to 
cooperate with the British and do their bidding. In the 
second instance, part of the territory would be annexed 
to British India, and the rest would be divided among 
friendly chieftains. Neither course would involve the 
protracted occupation so fiercely deprecated by the 
Opposition.
To the Government of India, as well as to the 
Home Government, there seemed no question that Britain 
had the capability to carry out any military action 
against Afghanistan she felt necessary. In this area, 
based on factual knowledge, they proved to be correct 
in assessing capability, for a military victory was 
accomplished with relative ease.
While financial capability had been viewed from 
the standpoint of extremely low estimates, India, with 
some help from England, was able to meet them. However, 
she could not.bear the continuing cost of a military 
occupation. Such a contingency had not been considered 
in assessing India's financial capability. So India had 
the financial capability to carry out the Government's 
plans, but not to sustain a long occupation, which was 
not part of the plan. This error in calculation was a 
result of a greater error in estimating capability in the 
political sphere. Here there were no hard facts to go
266
by, and personal value judgments prevailed, based on some 
rather nebulous rumors.
As in the case of the First Afghan War, the 
British found it impossible and costly to hold the country. 
Loyalty was maintained only as long as the British troops 
were present, making perpetual military occupation a 
requisite of any annexation. Sher Ali fled the country, 
and shortly afterwards died, making any settlement with 
him impossible. The solution for a time seemed to be in 
placing Sher Ali's son, Yakub, on the Afghan throne. In 
the signing of the Treaty of Gandamak, Yakub agreed to 
everything the British had wanted from his father. But 
the Treaty was shortly abrogated by the murder of Major 
Cavagnari and his staff who had taken up residence in 
Kabul, where Cavagnari was serving as British Envoy. As 
there were some implications that Yakub himself might have 
been in on the plot, the Amir was mistrustful of regaining 
the confidence of the British Government, and decided to 
resist the advance of British t r o o p s , ^3 and later he 
abdicated.
The country was in a turmoil, and no political 
solution seemed in sight. The difficulties of armed 
occupation had become all too evident to the Indian 
Government, which soon found itself in a dilemma. "It
^^Parliamentary Papers, Viceroy in Council to 
Secretary of State, September 15, 1879, LIII (1880), p. 441
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was ineffective occupation of only a small part of 
Afghanistan. To subdue and hold the whole country with 
the forces at its disposal was utterly beyond its power.
To withdraw without establishing some form of government, 
was to abandon Afghanistan to a n a r c h y .
The solution of the political problem was not 
accomplished by the Disraeli Government, for it suffered 
defeat at the polls in April, 1880, partly as a result of 
its Afghan policy. Lytton resigned as Viceroy, leaving 




ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION
The term situation has been defined as "an 
analytical concept pointing to a pattern of relationships 
among events, objects, conditions, and other actors 
organized around a focus which is the center of interest 
for the decision-makers.The situation as perceived 
by the decision-makers is extremely important because 
their action is based upon their definition of the 
situation. The individual Actor's viewpoint is dependent 
upon his "belief system, " which "may or may not be an 
accurate representation of r e a l i t y . A  look at the 
unrealities of an Actor's view of the situation may be 
helpful in focusing attention on his biases, misinforma­
tion, and incompetency, among other things.
The situation serves as a focal point, wherein 
the many facets of the determinants of decision are drawn 
together. Figure 2 depicts the way in which the various
^Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, pp. 30-31.
^Ole R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National 
Images: A Case Study," International Politics and Foreign 




components contribute, either directly or indirectly, to 
the Actor's view of the situation. Thus the situation 
as seen by the Actor is the sum total of many factors, and 
when viewed in its composite form, it can be quite 
unfathomable. Most of these factors have already been 
discussed. Therefore, the present chapter is concerned 
with showing this composite relationship (situation) as 
well as how the individual factors contributed to it. In 
order to discover the inaccuracies in viewpoint, it is 
helpful to review the situation as it actually was, 
insofar as we are able to reconstruct it.
The Actual Situation
When the Disraeli Government came into office 
in 1874, Afghanistan was maintaining a position of 
isolated neutrality, with a minimum of contact, though con­
genial, with British India. The Amir, Sher Ali, had been 
engaged in civil war for a number of years before finally 
gaining sufficient strength and support to rule the 
country. His success in gaining the throne had not 
blinded him to the necessity of employing skillful politics 
to maintain it, for he was well aware that there were still 
factions which would readily seize upon any opportunity to 
depose him. Because of these enemies within his country, 
he was very reluctant to admit a British European Agent, 






























Afghanistan in the fall of 1877:
. . .  I tell them [the British] that for their 
agents to reside within my territories was not 
desirable, owing to the extreme bigotry of my 
subjects. God forbid, if any of their agents 
were assassinated, they would at once come down 
upon me, and charge me with being the instigator.
In this country of Afghans I am myself surrounded 
with enemies who desire nothing better than my 
ruin, and would designedly be guilty of acts of 
violence for which I would be held responsible. . . .3
Sher Ali's prediction proved to be true, not in 
his own case, for he never admitted the British to his 
country, but in the case of his son Yakub; for after the 
Cavagnari Massacre, September 3, 1879, Lord Cranbrook 
remarked, "Scarcely less obscure . . .  is the further 
question of the complicity of the Amir Yakub Khan, who 
cannot, however, even if wholly innocent of participation 
in the crime, be acquitted of discreditable timidity and 
want of resource in the presence of grave emergency.
Thus Sher Ali's refusal to permit a British 
European agent to be stationed in Afghanistan was based 
on the Amir's knowledge of his subjects, and his desire 
to avoid trouble with the British. As far as his relations 
with the Government of India were concerned, the Amir 
desired two important things. First, that the British 
would recognize the succession of his son, Abdullah Jan,
^Philips, p. 452.
^Parliamentary Papers, LIII, 1880, Cranbrook to 
Viceroy in Council, December 11, 1879, p. 574.
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and second, that they would agree to come to Afghanistan's 
assistance in case of foreign aggression. These con­
cessions the British Government was not willing to give 
unless certain conditions were met by the Amir, namely:
1. The Amir should conduct no external relations 
without the knowledge of the British.
2. The Amir should refrain from provoking his 
neighbors.
3. All communications with Russia should be 
declined and her agents should be referred 
to the Government of India.
4. British agents should be allowed to reside 
at Herat or at other points on the frontier.
5. The Amir's frontier should be demarcated by 
a team of British and Afghan officers.
6. Arrangements should be made for free trade.
7. The Amir should send an envoy to the Viceroy's 
headquarters.
8. The Amir should agree to receive special 
missions from the Viceroy whenever requested.5
Sher Ali was adamant on the point of British 
envoys, and steadily refused to agree to having any 
stationed within his borders. The Prime Minister, Syud 
Noor Mohammed, expressed himself on the point of British 
agents to Dr. Bellew, saying, "We mistrust you, and fear 
you will write all sorts of reports about us, which will 
some day be brought forward against us and lead to your 
taking the control of our affairs out of our hands.
Sher Ali and his officials were very touchy where Afghan 
independence was concerned. They tended to overreact to 
the British, and were highly suspicious of them. They
^Lady Balfour, pp. 84-85.
^Conversation between Dr. Bellew and Noor Mohammed, 
February 7, 1877, C.A.W., p. 117.
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were just as much opposed to Russian encroachment, and 
also wished to have as little contact with them as possible. 
However, the Russians had an advantage, for they had never 
invaded Afghanistan, while the memories of the Afghan War 
of 1838-41 were still in the minds of the people.
The question of the Russian threat to Afghanistan 
and India is an important one, along with that of Sher 
Ali's supposed dealings with Russia, for it was this 
threat that helped determine British policy. The possi­
bility of an armed clash between the British and the 
Russians in Central Asia was often brought to the attention 
of the Russian General Staff. Colonel Matveev even went 
so far as to say in 1877,
Pretended fears for India constantly have been 
and will be the fundamental reason for England's 
hostile policy toward us in Europe and this policy 
will assuredly lead, sooner or later, to armed 
clashes between the English and ourselves in Asia, 
clashes capable of having fateful consequences for 
British might in India.7
A study by Warren B. Walsh of the Collection of 
Geographical, Topographical and Statistical Materials 
on Asia, published by and for the Russian General Staff, 
have led him to conclude that while the possibility of 
an armed conflict between Russia and England in Central 
Asia was constantly under review by the military, no
?Warren B. Walsh, "The Imperial Russian General 
Staff and India: A Footnote to Diplomatic History,"
The Russian Review, XVI, No. 2 (April, 1957), 55.
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plans for an attack on India ever got to a crisis stage. 
Moreover, he maintains that while preliminary planning and 
preliminary studies were made, "This degree of activity, 
at the very least, made the threat of attack a usable 
instrument for Russian diplomacy. It is the tentative 
conclusion that this, politically speaking, was its main 
purpose."8
While Russia contemplated the possibility of a 
Central Asian war, so did Britain, and this was the main 
reason for the change in the British policy towards 
Afghanistan. During the summer of 1877, the Viceroy began 
a military build-up on the Northwest frontier. To the 
Afghans, this appeared as a threat to them, and they 
assumed that the Government of India was planning an attack 
on Afghanistan, rather than preparing a force against the 
Russians. This, led to further distrust of the British on 
the part of the Amir, and coupled with the Viceroy's 
high-handed methods in dealing with the Afghan Government, 
succeeded in further alienating Sher Ali.
In 1877 it had been Disraeli's idea to attack 
Russia in Central Asia in the event she was able to 
occupy Constantinople.9 However, England checked Russian 
ambitions by issuing a circular to all the European
Bibid., p. 58.
^Disraeli to Queen Victoria, July 22, 1877, quoted
in Monypenny and Buckle, VI, p. 155.
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States demanding that Russia should submit the treaty 
with Turkey to a Congress, and at the same time summoning 
Indian troops to Malta. Russia, being thwarted in Europe, 
decided to strike at England in Asia. The subsequent 
Russian Mission to Kabul was a political counter-stroke.
As the Russian Foreign Office once pointed out;
The fundamental meaning of India to us is that 
she represents Great Britain's most vulnerable point, 
a sensitive nerve on which one touch may perhaps 
easily induce Her Majesty's Government to alter 
its hostile policy toward us, and to show the desired 
compliance on all those questions where our . . .  
interests may collide.10
Sher Ali's dealings with the Russians were much of 
the same nature as those with the British, at least up to 
the crucial time of the appearance of the Russian Mission. 
Communications between Sher Ali and General Kaufman began 
in March 1870. The messages from the Russian general 
were, as a rule, read to the British Native Agent, and 
copies sent to the Government of India. At first the Amir 
consulted the Viceroy directly for advice in answering 
Kaufman's letters, but as Lord Mayo and Lord Northbrook 
repeatedly advised him as to the general character of the 
answers to be sent, he began answering them on his own.^^
No objection was made to the Russian correspondence 




St. Petersburg in regard to a specific letter. Later 
complaints to Russia on the nature of General Kaufman's 
correspondence with Sher Ali elicited a denial by the 
Russian Government that the correspondence was in any way 
a breach of the understanding between Russia and England, 
and the Russian ambassador, M. de Giers, wrote to the 
British ambassador giving assurance that "Russia had not 
endeavoured to conclude any arrangement, commercial or 
political, with the Ameer of Cabul and that the rare rela­
tions of our authorities in Central Asia with the latter 
had never borne any other character than one of pure
1 9courtesy, in conformity with local usages in the East."
But the Russian Government did not promise that General 
Kaufman's correspondence with Sher Ali would not continue, 
and indeed it did, but no further protests were made to 
Russia, although the Viceroy complained of it to the India 
Office.
Sher Ali's attitude toward Russia was expressed 
to the Turkish Mission which visited Afghanistan in the 
fall of 1877. He told the envoy that he had shown no 
special favor to Russia, that he had recently received 
Russian envoys (though not Russians) because of the close 
proximity of the Russian frontiers and his need to know 
Russian intentions. In answer to the Turkish Envoy's
^^Parliamentary Papers, LVI (Central Asia, No. 1), 
1878, p. 105.
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question regarding a Russian force of 5,000 men which had 
approached the boundaries of Afghanistan in the vicinity 
of Balkh, the Amir replied that they had come without his 
invitation, and he wanted to know the reason for their 
coming and had consequently sent a messenger to Tashkend 
with a letter for General Kaufman asking for an explana­
tion.^^
During the interview of October 12th with the 
Turkish Envoy, Sher Ali stated his grievances against the 
British, which were mainly British encroachment upon the 
Amir's territory (the British had seized Quetta), and their 
incitement of his son, Yakub, to rebellion. His feelings 
were that he had done nothing against the British to break 
the friendship; it had been the other way around. He 
advised the envoy that, ". . .if the Government of the 
Sultan, in truth, desires me to continue friendship with 
the English, let it enquire of the English why they have 
encroached upon Afghanistan, and let it advise them to 
return to their own limits, and to respect their 
treaty. . . He further pointed out that the Russians
had not, up until then, encroached on his territory, but, 
nevertheless, "if the English desire the Russians to be 
restrained, let them rest assured that, until I have
13c.A.W., pp. 291-292. .
l^interview of the Turkish Mission with the Amir 
of Kabul, October 12, 1877, quoted in Philips, p. 452.
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exhausted all my resources, and risked my very existence,
I shall never give them passage to Hindustan. . . ."15 
Sher Ali was no more desirous of receiving a 
Russian Mission than he was of receiving a British one.
But he was, as Lytton so aptly put it, "an earthen pipkin 
between two iron pots."!^ When the British dispatched 
Indian troops to Malta, Kaufman began to put pressure on 
the Amir, for a pretender to the Afghan throne, Sher Ali's 
nephew, Abdur Rahman, was residing in Russia, where he 
had been given political asylum. In May 1878 the Governor 
of Afghan Turkestan, Shahghassi Sherdil Khan, wrote to 
Sher Ali, informing him that the Russians intended to 
induce Abdur Rahman to submit to them a petition to the 
effect that if the Amir of Kabul did not allow the Russians 
passage of troops through Afghanistan en route to India, 
he, Abdur Rahman, would offer his services "to capture 
Balkh with a small assistance from the Czar, and then 
subdue the whole of Afghanistan." Shahghassi Sherdil Khan 
further indicated that if the Amir refused the request 
of the Russian Government, the Russian officer Ibramoff 
had asserted that "the petition of the Sirdar [Abdul 
Rahman Khan] will be forwarded to His Highness to terrify
ISlbid.
^^Parliamentary Papers, LVI (Afghanistan, No. 1) , 
1878, p. 183.
279
hi m . "17
In setting up the Russian Mission, Kaufman was 
acting very much upon his own authority. He did not 
keep the Government of St. Petersburg accurately informed 
of his movements.IB The motive for the mission was to 
prevent the use of Afghanistan as a base of operation for 
an Anglo-Indian army operating against Russia. Sher Ali 
did not want to receive the mission and gave much the 
same reason as in the case of British missions, advising 
Shahghassi Sherdil to inform Kaufman that "it was not 
advisable to send a European Agent, as the Afghans are 
an uncivilised and ignorant race, and might do the 
European some injury."19
A letter from the Governor-General Kaufman to the 
Amir, stated that the envoy was coming by orders of the 
Emperor, and that the mission was already on its way. Sher 
Ali was in a dilemma, for he had received the implied 
threat that Russia was prepared to support Abdur Rahman in 
a bid for the Afghan throne, if affairs did not go her way. 
His hopes of assistance from the British were slim, as 
relations had been severed since the end of the Peshawar
17parliamentary Papers » LXXX (Central Asia, No. 1) , 
1878, Shahghassi Sherdil Khan to Sher Ali, p. 136.
IBc .A.W., p. 298.
l^Major Cavagnari's Peshawar Diary, June 7, 1878,
C.A.W., p. 300.
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Conference. Nevertheless, information contained in the 
Peshawar diary shows that the Amir did not wish to enter 
into any engagement with Russia that would impose Russian 
interference in his country, and furthermore, "the Ameer 
asserts that he would like an English officer of excellence, 
learning, and acquainted with the affairs of Afghanistan, 
to come to Cabul for a few days, in the capacity of 
Envoy from the British Government."^®
When the Indian Government received news of the 
Russian Mission, the response of the Viceroy was to 
bombard the Amir with threatening letters and demands to 
receive a British Mission, rather than any assurance of 
aid against the Russians. Lytton was well aware of the 
threat of Abdur Rahman held by the Russians over Sher 
Ali, but he took no steps to reassure the Amir.
There is no doubt that the purpose of the Russian 
Mission was to effect a treaty with Sher Ali. But 
presumably Stolietoff the Russian envoy, received word 
from Kaufman of the Berlin Treaty, and as a result, was 
directed to refrain from arranging any distinct measures, 
or making any positive promises, and "not go generally 
as far as would have been advisable if war with England 
had been threatened."^1 After the British occupation of
ZOparliamentary Papers, LXXX (Central Asia, No. 2), 
1878, p. 1.
ZlLord Frederick Sleigh Roberts, Forty-One Years 
in India (London: Macmillan Co., 1898), p. 111.
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Afghanistan, two versions of a draft treaty turned up, 
but both were written from memory, one by the British Agent 
at Peshawar who received his information from an "authentic" 
source, and one by Mirza Mahomed Nabbi, who had copied it 
for Sher Ali.22 The authenticity of these treaties is 
open to question, but the fact that the two agree, for 
the most part, would make it appear that there was such a 
treaty. However, there is no evidence that it was con­
cluded, but rather it was brought for Sher Ali's attention 
and consideration.
Apparently, Sher Ali was given many promises by 
General Stolietoff, and encouraged in the belief that 
Russia was ready to assist him in case of a British 
attack. Even after the mission was hastily withdrawn, 
and after the British attack, Sher Ali still felt confident 
that Russia would come to his aid. This is evident from 
a Firman issued by him to the authorities of Herat on 
December 22, 1878. In this Firman he stated his intention 
to proceed to St. Petersburg, upon the advice of his 
Ministers and of the Russian representatives, to appeal 
his case. He also told of having received a letter from 
Stolietoff, promising that the Russian Government would 
convene a Congress to settle the matter and "We will then
22william Habberton, Anglo-Russian Relations 
Concerning Afghanistan 1837-1907 (Urbana: University
of Illinois Press, 1937), p. 44.
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open an official discussion with the English Government, 
and, either by force of words and diplomatic action, 
we will entirely cut off all English communication and 
interference with Afghanistan for ever, or else events
9 owill end in a mighty and important war."
Sher Ali's hopes were raised by Stolietoff, but 
he was acting contrary to the wishes of the Russian 
Government. M. de Giers made it quite clear to the 
British ambassador, Augustus Loftus, that Russia had no 
intention of aiding Sher Ali, or even of permitting him 
to come to St. Petersburg. M. de Giers further stated 
that Sher Ali "had been already informed that no mediation 
could be undertaken by Russia in his behalf; and that 
General Kaufman had been instructed in regard to the 
reception of the Afghan Mission, and to any proposals 
which they might submit." While the nature of these 
instructions was not disclosed, it was noted that General 
Kaufman "was ordered to get rid of them courteously."^^
It is evident that Russia was playing politics in 
Afghanistan. The Russian Mission was contemplated as a 
counter-stroke to British intervention in Turkey. As 
Russian military strength in Central Asia was weak, it is
23creat Britain, Foreign and State Papers, V. 71, 
No. 57, 1879-1880, Firman issued by Sher Ali, p. 1222.
Z^Great Britain, Foreign and State Papers, V. 71, 
No. 40, 1879-1880, Loftus to Salisbury, February 26,
1879, p.1220.
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doubtful that she seriously entertained any notions of 
aggression on British India. Rather, she set out to 
nettle the British, and by so doing, perhaps, to gain 
some advantages. But even these plans were abandoned with 
the signing of the Berlin Treaty. The results of this 
policy were disastrous for Sher Ali. He had jealously 
maintained his independence from both countries, but it 
now seemed to him that the two giants were going to 
collide, and he would have to choose sides. If his 
inclination had been toward the British, the insolent 
treatment he had received from the Viceroy had served to 
negate that tendency. On the other hand, the Russians 
came promising recognition of the heir-apparent chosen by 
the Amir, as well as Russian assistance in the event of 
external a g g r e s s i o n . ^5 Coupled with these promises was 
the threat of supporting Abdur Rahman's claim to the 
throne.
Even so, Sher Ali might still have listened to the 
British, as his letters regarding the reception of the 
British Mission indicated, had they given him a chance.
The Amir was not anxious for war with the British, and 
neither was he anxious to enter into negotiations with 
the Russians, but he could not afford to cut himself off 
from both. He had been disturbed by the military build-up
25parliamentary Papers, LXXX (Central Asia, No. 1) , 
1878, Provisions of Draft Treaty, p. 132.
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on the frontier, and the British Mission, which numbered 
about 1,000 men, mostly armed,looked more like an army 
than a friendly mission. The Russian Mission had con­
tained an escort of not over thirty men.^?
Sher Ali was in a predicament not of his own 
making. He found himself caught in a power struggle between 
two large nations. The war might have been averted if, 
after the signing of the Treaty of Berlin, the representa­
tives of the two powers had been willing to draw back. But 
Stolietoff continued to hold out promises to Sher Ali, 
promises which he had neither the power nor the authority to 
fulfill; while Lytton continued badgering and threatening 
the Amir- Whatever inclination the Amir had to receive the 
British Mission was offset by Lytton's haste to act. Thus, 
when Sher Ali agreed to receive a mission, it was too late. 
Once hostilities began, he turned to the Russians, who had 
promised aid in such an eventuality, only to find that 
such promises were now embarrassing to the Russian Govern­
ment.
In viewing the situation from the vantage point of 
time, it does not appear that there was any cause for war 
due to a Russian threat. There was never any real military 
danger from Russia's activities, and even if there had
Times, September 16, 1878.
^^Parliamentary Papers, LVI (No. 154 of 1878), 
1878-1879, Sher Ali to Lytton, November 19,1878, p. 700
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been, they were removed by the signing of the Treaty of 
Berlin. It is also evident that any hostility the Amir 
may have felt towards the British occurred late in the 
day and as a result of the Viceroy's conduct towards him. 
Sher Ali was no more pro-Russian than he was pro-British; 
in fact, it would be more accurate to say that he was 
pro-Afghan.
The Situation as Viewed by the Home Government
The Actors in the Home Government were far enough 
removed from the scene to have a more dispassionate view 
of the situation than those Actors in India. Their con­
cern with Afghanistan was more or less indirect, for 
Afghanistan came to their attention as it related to 
Russia. The aim of British policy towards Afghanistan 
was well stated by Lord Cranbrook:
. . . The consistent aim of the British Government 
during a series of years has been to establish on 
its north-western border a strong, friendly and 
independent State, with interests in unison with 
those of the Indian Government, and ready to act, 
in certain eventualities, as an auxiliary in the 
protection of the frontier from foreign intrigueor aggression.28
For many years the attitude of the British Govern­
ment was that Afghanistan was beyond the sphere of influence 
of Russia, and that Russia should maintain a "hands-off"
28cranbrook to the Government of India, November
18, 1878, quoted in C.A.W., p. 186.
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policy in relation to Afghanistan. By the Granville- 
Gortchakoff agreement of 1873, Russia recognized British 
ascendency in Afghanistan. This was indicated by Prince 
Gortchakoff's request that the British control Sher Ali's 
incursions into territory bordering Russia.• Gortchakoff 
wrote to Count Brunnow, for communication to Lord Granville, 
the following request:
.Nous sommes d'autant plus portes k cet acte de 
courtoisie que le Gouvernement Anglais s'engage k 
user de toute son influence sur Shir Ali pour le 
maintenir dans une attitude pacifique et insister 
sur l'abandon de sa part de toute agression ou con­
quête ultérieure. Cette influence est incontestable. 
Elle repose non seulement sur l'ascendant matériel et 
moral de l'Angleterre, mais aussi sur les subsides 
dont Shir Ali lui à l'obligation. Nous pouvons, dks 
lors, y voir une garantie réelle pour la conservation 
de la paix.29
These negotiations with Russia led to a relaxation 
of tensions for a time, but they created a situation 
whereby Britain was made responsible for restraining 
Afghanistan from attacking her neighbors.^0 As Russia 
had nominally recognized Britain's rights in Afghanistan, 
the Conservative Government in 1874 began to feel that 
Russia was breaking the 1873 agreement through the cor­
respondence being conducted by General Kaufman, with Sher 
Ali. Also, the Foreign Secretary, Lord Derby, expressed 
his fears to Russia of the possible consequences of
^^Prince Gortchakoff to Count Brunnow, January 
31, 1873, Argyll Papers, 1873, LXXV, c. 699, p. 15.
S^Alder, p. 180.
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continued Russian advances in Central Asia. Such advances, 
he felt, definitely threatened to upset the peace, for if 
Russia were to advance to the Afghan frontier, it would 
be difficult to restrain Sher Ali from joining the Turkoman 
tribes in a defensive action against the Russians, and 
"Under such circumstances it is unnecessary to observe 
how difficult it might be for the Imperial Government to 
maintain a policy of strict abstention in accordance with 
its present assurances, or how impossible it might be for 
Her Majesty's Government to exert any effectual control 
over the .ctions of the Ameer, without undertaking responsi­
bilities which they would most reluctantly assume, and which 
would virtually involve . . . the contact of the two Powers 
in Central Asia."^^
The British Government viewed the advance of Russia 
in Central Asia as inevitable, but however natural or 
justifiable, such an advance was not regarded by the 
Government with indifference. It was not that Britain 
apprehended any danger from Russian hostility or designs, 
but rather she feared the effect on such countries as 
Afghanistan which were not ready for such proximity. The 
possibility of armed conflict between Afghanistan and 
Russia would most likely necessitate British intervention. 
Thus the British Government wished to "continue pursuance
S^Lord Derby's Memorandum of October 25, 1875,
C.A.W., p. 245.
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of the policy which has hitherto guided both Powers 
alike to maintain the integrity of Afghan territory."
In a speech to the House of Commons in the summer 
of 1876, Disraeli expressed himself on the progress of 
Russia in Central Asia, declaring, "so far from being 
alarmed at the progress of Russian power in Central Asia, 
he sees no reason why Russia should not conquer Tartary 
as England had conquered India," and that "he only wished 
that the people of Tartary should derive no less advantage 
from their conquest by Russia than the people of Hindustan 
had derived from their conquest by England."^3 At this 
time Disraeli showed no apprehension because of the 
Russian advance, but by "Tartary" he apparently meant the 
territories north of the Oxus River.
The change in the attitude of the British Government 
was not a direct result of Russian actions in Central Asia, 
but rather of Russian action in Turkey. Central Asia became 
an extension of the Russo-Turkish conflict. The British 
Government being pro-Turk, considered the possibility of 
attacking Russia in Central Asia, should Russia seize 
Constantinople. Salisbury desired to have more direct 
contact with Sher Ali in order to obtain more accurate 
information regarding Russian movements, and also to
^^Ibid.
^^Parliamentary Papers, LXXX (Central Asia, No. 1) , 
1878, p. 79.
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establish relations which would enable the movement of 
British troops across Afghanistan, should it ever become 
necessary.
When the Viceroy called the attention of the Home 
Government to the objectionable nature of the Kaufman 
correspondence, a protest was sent to St. Petersburg, but 
the protest was not made against the correspondence in 
general, but instead against a specific letter, of which 
Lord Derby said, "Although the tone and insinuation of 
General Kaufman's letter appear to Her Majesty's Government 
to be undesirable, the letter itself does not contain any 
statement of a distinctly objectionable character."^4 on 
June 12, 1877, Lord Salisbury again received a complaint 
from the Viceroy of continuing correspondence between 
Kaufman and Sher Ali. This complaint he forwarded to the 
Foreign Office without comment, and no further remonstrance 
was sent to Russia regarding the correspondence.
While the British Government had anticipated 
taking measures against Russia in Central Asia, the plan 
was to counteract the Russian enterprises in Turkey. Such 
measures were mentioned by the Simla correspondent of the 
official Pioneer journal of Calcutta in a letter dated 
August 28, 1878;
I believe it is no longer a secret that, had war 
broken out, we should not have remained on the
34Derby to Loftus, October 2, 1876, C.A.W., p. 252.
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defensive in India. A force of 30,000 men, having 
purchased its way through Afghanistan, thrown rapidly 
into Samarcand and Bokhara, would have had little 
difficulty in beating the scattered Russian troops 
back to the Caspian, for, coming thus as deliverers, 
the whole population would have risen in our favour.
In the feasibility of such a programme the Russians
fully believed.35
A letter published in the October 5, 1878 Times 
also mentioned such a possibility. The letter was written 
by a Colonel Brackenbury, who told of being in Bulgaria 
and meeting General Skobeloff, who asked him what news 
he had from India. Brackenbury replied that he had none, 
thanks to the Russian postal authorities, whereupon 
Skobeloff replied, "I cannot find out what has become of 
that column of 10,000 men that has been organized by your 
people against us." Brackenbury did not know if there 
was such an idea or not, but he observed that "at any rate 
General Skobeloff believed it, which means that the 
Russian Government had information to that effect."̂ 5
The Home Government's view of the Central Asian 
situation changed suddenly and radically with the signing 
of the Berlin Treaty. Russia was no longer a threat, and 
thus the need for any military action in that region 
became unnecessary. The appearance of a Russian Mission 
at Kabul was not particularly alarming, for it was assumed 
that the mission had started before the conclusion of the
35c.A.W., p. 275.
36The Times, October 5, 1878.
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peace, and therefore, it would be speedily recalled. 
Nevertheless, a formal protest was sent to the Russian 
Government, and Cranbrook stated his opinion that, "It is 
the Russian Cabinet alone which is responsible for the 
acts of its Agent; and it is the Russian Governor-General 
of Turkestan, rather than the Ameer Shere Ali, who, with 
or without authority, is at this moment pursuing a policy 
of which the effect must be to seriously agitate the minds 
of Her Majesty's subjects throughout I n d i a . "3?
The Home Government acquiesced in the Viceroy's 
proposal to send a British Mission to Kabul in answer to 
the Russian Mission. They wished to avoid the possibility 
of a rebuff, and therefore ordered the Mission to go by way 
of Kandahar rather than the Khyber Pass. It was believed 
that the residents of the Kandahar region were much 
friendlier than those of the Khyber region. Furthermore, 
it was decided to wait until a reply to the protest had 
been received from Russia, before advancing the Mission.
The Actors in the Home Government became concerned at 
Lytton's apparent ignorance of the negotiations with 
Russia, when it became evident that the Viceroy was still 
laboring under the assumption of a Russian threat. From 
the viewpoint of the Home Government, the reception of 
the British Mission was desirable to maintain British
37parliamentary Papers, LXXX (Central Asia, 
No. 1), 1878, Cranbrook to Sir L. Mallet, August 8, 
1878, p. 112.
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prestige, in the face of the acceptance of a Russian Mis­
sion, but it was not felt that there was now anything 
sinister or dangerous about the Russian Mission.
The affront to the British at Ali Musjid threw 
the Home Government into consternation. To them the 
issue turned on British prestige, and their quarrel was 
with the Amir over an insult. In their thinking, Russia 
had been removed from the arena by the signing of the 
Treaty of Berlin.
The Situation as Viewed in India
India was far more susceptible to alarmism than 
England. The Sepoy Mutiny of 1856 had shown what could 
happen when the discontented elements saw an opportunity. 
That mutiny, which had begun when the Indian Army voiced 
its grievances, had spread quickly among the conservative 
and feudal elements in Bengal, Bihar, the Northwest 
Provinces, and Central India. The upheaval had been so 
great that it resulted in the assumption of the government 
of India by the Crown. Disraeli, who at the time was the 
opposition j.^ader in the Commons, had placed the blame 
for the revolt on the conduct of the British in India, and 
had declared that British policy "had originally been 
founded on principles of respecting princely states and 
nationalities, on protecting private property, on conserving 
the customs, religion, and institutions of India. In the
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ten previous years, he declared, this traditional policy 
had been altered, a Machiavellian standard of divide and 
rule had followed, and a national revolt against British 
power thus occurred.
Whatever the reasons for the revolt, the British 
residing in India were henceforth uneasy when any dis­
turbances or threats of disturbance, occurred on India's 
Northwest frontier. A writer in Blackwood's Magazine 
expressed it thus:
. . . The Indian empire is ruled by an alien race 
and lacks that internal support which is drawn 
from patriotism or national feeling. Its stability 
very largely depends on its external relations.
The rumoured ascendency of influences hostile to us 
in Kabul or in Beluchistan, would send a thrill 
through the bazaars of India, and excite the 
fanaticism of the dangerous classes in many parts 
of the country. . . .39
Lord Lytton, placed in this environment, came to 
share this view, and thereby became sensitive to any 
activities in Afghanistan which might have been considered 
not in the best interests of British India. As far as 
Russian movements in Central Asia were concerned, he adopted 
Lord Palmerston's view that eventually the borders of 
British India and Russia would be conterminous, and that 
the danger of a Russian force in occupation of Afghanistan,
38ceorge D. Bearce, British Attitudes Towards 
India (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 237.
39"our Indian Frontier Policy: Past and Present,"
Blackwood's Magazine, V. 122 (August, 1877), 220.
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would not be from a direct Russian attack on Calcutta, 
but from the fact that Afghanistan might be converted 
into an advanced post of Russia. This would unleash a 
restlessness in the unincorporated states around India. 
Palmerston described the policy of the Russian Government 
as being, "to push forward its encroachments as fast and 
as far as the apathy or want of firmness of other Govern­
ments would allow it to go, but always to stop and retire 
when it was met with decided resistance, and then to wait 
for the next favourable opportunity to make another spring.
The advance of Russia in Central Asia was viewed 
by Lytton as ominous. Lytton had also been influenced to 
an extent by the opinions of Sir Bartle Frere, but he 
adjusted Frere's ideas to suit his own. Frere's Minute on 
Afghanistan, addressed to Salisbury, contained the following 
paragraph ;
If the Amir showed signs of disinclination to 
improve relations, I would take it as clear proof 
that hostile influences had worked more effectually 
than we now suppose; that it was useless to coax or 
cajole him into a better frame of mind; that we must 
look for alliance and influence elsewhere than at 
Kabul. . . .41
Lytton did interpret Sher Ali's disinclination to receive 
a British Envoy as due to hostile influences. Nevertheless, 
he did attempt to change his mind, though by use of threats
40lbid., p. 233.




Lytton had high hopes of being able to negotiate 
with Sher Ali, but the Amir was reluctant to receive a 
British Envoy. Lytton's resentment of the Amir's attitude 
was increased by his belief that Sher Ali was affording 
courtesies to the Russians that he was refusing the 
British. The Viceroy objected to the correspondence 
between Sher Ali and General Kaufman, and complained that 
the bearers of the letters "are regarded and treated by 
the Amir as agents of the Russian Government, and, on one 
pretext or another some person recognized by the Afghan 
Government as a Russian Agent is now almost constantly 
at Kabul."42 The Viceroy believed that Kaufman's object 
was to impress the Amir, and to make him desire an alliance 
with Russia. The information regarding Russian agents had 
come from dubious sources, but was accepted at face value 
by the Viceroy. (See Chapter VIj
A conference was finally arranged between the 
Amir's representative, Syud Noor Mohammed, and the Com­
missioner of Peshawar, Sir Lewis Felly. While the Amir 
was ready, and even anxious, to negotiate, Lytton believed 
otherwise, and when the Amir's representative suddenly 
died, the Viceroy quickly closed the Conference, although 
a new envoy was on the way. Lytton justified this action
42Lady Balfour, p. 79.
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by stating that the Amir was attempting to raise a jehad 
against the British, "Whilst his representative was carrying 
on friendly negotiations with the British Envoy at Peshawar, 
the Amir himself was publicly and falsely informing his 
subjects that the British Government had broken its 
engagements, and threatened the independence of his kingdom. 
On this mendacious pretext His Highness proclaimed a 
religious war against the British Government. Again, 
his information was erroneous.
Lytton saw Sher Ali as being hostile towards the 
British, and assumed that this hostility was increased 
by Russian activities in Afghanistan. He was extremely 
skeptical of the Amir's good intentions towards the 
British, choosing to disbelieve any reports that the 
Amir was favorably disposed towards them. Instead, he 
adopted the view that any such indications, either direct 
or indirect, were merely for the purpose of deceiving the 
British, and thus buying time for an Afghan military build­
up. He was convinced that Sher Ali was trying to stir 
up the border tribes against India, and that he was 
preparing for a full-scale war at the prodding of the 
Russians.
As the Viceroy had pointed out to Cranbrook on 
April 9, 1878, Russia, herself, was too weak in Central 
Asia to resort to military aggression, and "Diplomacy
43Minute on the Peshawar Conference, March 1877,
quoted in Lady Balfour, p. 246.
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is the natural weapon of weak Powers, and it is the diplo­
macy, rather than the arms of Russia we have to fear in 
Central Asia."̂ 4 Thus the fear created by the presence 
of a Russian Mission in Kabul, was not that of a direct 
Russian Military attack on India, but the ascendency of 
Russian influence which could lead to an attack on India 
by the Afghans, or at least harassment of the frontier 
posts. Such actions would certainly stir-up the dis­
contented elements in Indian society. Moreover, while at 
the moment Russia was not strong enough to pose a military 
threat to India, this did not mean that she would not be 
able to gain that strength later on. Accordingly, it seemed 
a matter of grave consequence that Sher Ali had received a 
Russian mission, and Lytton felt that the situation called 
for a counter-move by the British. His attitude toward 
Russia was greatly affected by his personal bias. (See 
Chapter VIl.)
Lytton had no background in Indian affairs before 
becoming Viceroy. Consequently, he was unable to accurately 
interpret the information he received. His proclivity to 
Russophobia, combined with his national arrogance, con­
tributed a great deal to a personal bias which led him to 
make personal value judgments, rather than to evaluate 
information on the basis of facts and reliability of the
^^Lytton to Cranbrook, April 8, 1879, quoted in
Lady Balfour, p. 246.
298
source. His goals also entered the picture by contributing 
to the crucial nature of the situation. For example, the 
goal of British ascendency in Afghanistan caused the 
reception of a Russian Mission to be viewed as a crucial 
matter, for, if left unchecked, Russia would gain a hold 
over that country. Thus the situation, in the eyes of the 
Viceroy, assumed a crucial nature, calling for action. 
Pressure to act was also exerted by the effects that would 
be produced if the situation were allowed to continue, for 
he was certain there would be undesirable repercussions in 
India.
The situation, which led to the sending of a 
British Mission, was conceived by the Viceroy to be as 
follows. The Afghan Amir had been irretrievably alienated 
from the British, and all attempts to reestablish friendly 
relations with him had failed. He not only distrusted the 
British, but he was openly hostile to them, to the point 
of attempting to stir up wars against them. The Russians, 
in their attempt to extend their territories and influence 
in Central Asia, had begun correspondence with the Amir in 
an effort to bring him under Russian influence, in contradic­
tion of the agreement between England and Russia regarding 
Afghanistan. The appearance of the Russian Mission in 
Kabul meant that Russia was attempting to negotiate an 
alliance with Afghanistan. As Lytton believed that 
Afghanistan could not "stand alone and aloof from the
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influence of the two great European Empires," he concluded 
that she must fall under the influence of one or the 
other. And as he later pointed out to the House of 
Lords, "And now let us suppose, for a moment, that Afghan­
istan falls under the control of Russia. Can any one of 
Your Lordships doubt for a moment that the establishment 
of Russian influence in Afghanistan would be practically 
incompatible with the untroubled maintenance of the 
British Power in I n d i a ? T h u s ,  to the Viceroy, the 
situation demanded action to prevent Afghanistan from 
falling under the domination of Russia, for such an 
occurrence would be a direct threat to British India.
Lytton had little confidence in the success of 
diplomacy in solving the crisis created by the appearance 
of the Russian Mission in Kabul. But the danger of the 
situation was so acute that action was necessary to prevent 
a Russian take-over. The request was sent to Sher Ali for 
the reception of a British Mission, but although the Amir's 
son and heir died at that moment, Lytton was not content 
to wait until the end of the forty-day mourning period for 
a reply to the request. To Lytton it made no difference, 
because he was convinced that Sher Ali was already in 
Russia's hands, and was using delaying tactics. An item 
in the Times expressed the Viceroy's view:
45creat Britain, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 
3rd. series, CCLVII (1881), p. 291.
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The reasons which actuated the Viceroy in pushing 
forward the mission without waiting longer for the 
Ameer's leave to pass were that information had been 
received that the Ameer had no intention of ever 
receiving it, but was merely playing in a derisive 
and insolent manner with the expectation of the 
Government. The tenour of his language was:— "If I 
choose to receive a mission, I will myself invite it; 
but meanwhile it must await my pleasure at Peshawur." 
This tone of course the Viceroy could not brook.46
The affront at Ali Musjid, in Lytton's opinion, 
served to verify his belief of the Amir's hostility. As 
he wrote to Cranbrook, " . . .  ever since the Peshawur 
Conference, I have been convinced that, even long previous 
to that date, the Amir (thanks to the uncorrected prosecu­
tion of the Lawrence-Gladstone policy) was irretrievably 
alienated from us. But no one else shared that conviction, 
nor was I permitted to act on it. . . . The only difference
is that this particular affront is the first of a series 
which it has been impossible to conceal from the British 
public."47
The affront at Ali Musjid united the opinion of 
the British in India that immediate military action 
against Afghanistan was necessary. The Foreign Secretary 
for the Government of India, Alfred Lyall, summarized the 
feelings of the Government of India, when he wrote to 
the Viceroy,
46The Times, September 30, 1878.
47Lytton to Cranbrook, September 23, 1878, quoted
in Lady Balfour, p. 284.
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The strongest motives for immediate action appear 
to be political, and these I think irresistible, 
so irresistible that I can hardly believe any natural 
impediments could possibly justify our deferring 
action until spring. To sit idle on the threshold 
of Afghanistan until next spring would in my opin­
ion be almost too ruinous a policy to be even 
mentioned. . . .48
Public opinion in India also strongly supported
the necessity of action, as allowing such an affront to
go unanswered would seem an admission of weakness to the
native populace, and such an opinion could undermine British
control. Feelings were running high in India, and as the
Darjeeling correspondent wrote,
. . . Unless the public determination of England to 
resent the gross and contemptuous indignity offered 
so conspicuously, with every nation and India as 
spectators, be expressed in a tone of emphatic 
decision, it is felt here that the Indian Government 
will be rendered contemptible and British prestige 
in India will be degraded.49
To the British in India, whether Government 
officials or others, there was no question of Russian 
intentions, nor the effect on the Afghan situation of the 
signing of the Treaty of Berlin. They merely saw an 
incident which appeared as a direct insult to the Indian 
Government by Sher Ali. Such an insult, in their opinion, 
regardless of other extraneous circumstances, had to be 
redressed if serious repercussions were not to be felt in
4^Lyall to Lytton, November, 1878, quoted in
Lady Balfour, p. 291.
49The Times, November 5, 1878.
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India.
It is apparent that the viewpoint of those in 
India was narrower than that of those in England. The 
Russian advance was viewed as it related to a direct 
threat to India. The same was true of the so-called 
Russian intrigues in Kabul. Lytton did not see the 
Russian activities as a counter-move designed to distract 
attention from Constantinople and to act as an irritant 
to the British.
In London, the Actors had a wider view of the 
situation, seeing Afghanistan as it tied in with the 
whole Eastern Question. Thus, to the Home Government, 
the importance of Russian activity in Afghanistan decreased 
tremendously with the signing of the Berlin Treaty. This 
event to their mind, negated the significance of the 
Russian Mission. Their view was much more realistic than 
that of the Viceroy, mainly due to the advantage of 
distance and the larger all-over view which gave them 
greater perspective. On the other hand, they were less 
sensitive to the psychological impact on India of Russian 
activities beyond the Northwest frontier.
Comparing Lytton's view of Sher Ali and of the
Russian intrigues with the facts, shows that he formed a
value judgment of the Amir early in his Indian career,
which prejudiced his thinking in regard to Sher Ali. He
repeatedly chose to disbelieve the Amir's professions of
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good faith, and to think the worst of him. As far as 
the Russians were concerned, his mistrust of them and their 
intentions, which was justified to a point, led him to 
overreact to their movements, so that even after the teeth 
were removed from the Russian Mission, and the Russians 
had drawn back, he refused to believe that the threat 
had diminished.
Despite the differences in the views of London 
and Calcutta, after the affront at Ali Musjid, the situation 
appeared to both circles to call for some sort of face- 
saving action. Actually the insult was blown-up by the 
press to such proportions that it created a situation 
which threatened British prestige, whereas a little 
restraint might have altered matters. As mentioned 
previously, the account of the incident at Ali Musjid does 
not show any direct insult; the insult was inferred from 
the circumstances, namely that the Amir had ordered the 
Mission to be stopped. However, the Commandant had 
maintained that he had not received any instructions from 
the Amir. Furthermore, if the Mission had not been 
ordered so hastily, it is quite possible that a favorable 
reply would have been received from Sher Ali. But since 
Lytton was convinced that no such reply would come, he 
advanced the Mission in expectation of the results which 
occurred.
While the Home Government viewed the situation
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leading up to the incident at Ali Musjid differently, 
they could not allow an affront to the British Government 
to go unanswered. Even many of the Liberals agreed on 
this point as can be seen in a letter from Lord Granville 
to Lord Grey:
I am one of those who agree entirely with you and 
Lord Lawrence. I do not know any political friend of 
any weight who does not do so, condemning the policy 
of Beaconsfield, Salisbury, and Lytton, but many are 
shaky on the point whether being in the mess it is 
possible to avoid war in case the Ameer does not 
give way.
Halifax has never completely retracted his first 
opinion, that notwithstanding the folly of the policy, 
our prestige prevents our withdrawal.
Hartington was when I last saw him of that opinion. 
It was the conclusion to which Argyll and Northbrook 
came a few days ago, notwithstanding their complete 
condemnation of what had been done.50
The distorted viewpoint of the Viceroy had led 
him to take action which resulted in bringing together 
widely divergent points of view in a general consensus of 
opinion. The situation up until the repulsion of the 
Mission was looked at entirely differently from the vantage 
points of London and Calcutta, and was certainly viewed 
differently by the opposition. The situation created by 
the incident at Ali Musjid was unique in being viewed in 
the same way by those whose ideas had varied so greatly 
up until that moment.
SOcranville to Grey, November 10, 1878, quoted in 
Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, The Life of Lord Granville 
(London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1905), II, p. 180.
CHAPTER X
CONCLUSION
The preceding analysis has been a modest attempt 
to bring some order out of a hodge-podge of data and 
information concerning the decision of Britain to embark 
upon the Second Afghan War in November of 1878. The 
ordering of this data has led to many conclusions of 
various types. For convenience, these conclusions have 
been divided into three categories : those concerning the
characteristics of this decision, those giving rise to 
general hypotheses regarding decision-making in general, 
and those concerning the use of the Snyder-Bruck-Sapin 
methodology.
The Decision to Enter the Second Afghan War 
Characteristics
1. This decision was the result of a sequence 
of decisions. While the final decision may be viewed as 
a single decision, various decisions along the way led 
up to it. Each of these decisions tended to be reinforced 
by events occurring between them. Each decision also was
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a response to the actions of other States. The following 
table shows the action-response sequence.
Action
News of Russian Mission to 
Kabul
Khyberi headmen summoned 
back to the Pass
Refusal by Afghans to allow 
British Mission to pass
Receipt of "insolent" letter 
from Sher Ali
Word received that no answer 
had arrived by deadline
Response
Decision to send a British 
Mission. (India and England) 
Decision to send protest to 
Russia. (England)
Decision to send Mission before 
reply received from protest to 
Russia. (India)
Decision to build up troop 
concentrations and detach 
frontier tribes from the 
Amir. (India)
Decision to wait for verifica­
tion that affront ordered by 
Amir before taking any action. 
(England)
Decision to send ultimatum to 
the Amir, and to begin 
hostilities if no reply 
received by deadline. (England)
Troops ordered to cross the 
frontier. (India)
2. The decision was a high-level decision. It was 
made by the British Cabinet. The Viceroy did not participate 
directly in the decision, although he was responsible for 
some of the intermediary decisions, and his opinions 
strongly influenced the Secretary of State for India.
However, he was also a high-ranking official, being the 
chief-executive of the Indian Government.
3. This was an action decision, not a policy 
decision. It was the result of the change in policy
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toward Afghanistan, initiated in March of 1876, and also 
of the Viceroy's personal policy, but the decision itself 
called for action.
4. The decision was not the result of long-range 
planning, involving long-range objectives. The British 
policy towards Afghanistan was the result of long-range 
planning and objectives, but the contingency that arose 
which made the action necessary was not a part of that 
plan. Rather it was the result of a situation created
by the affront at Ali Musjid.
5. The decision was a compromise between two 
points of view. One point of view wanted immediate war, 
the other, only a material guarantee. The latter measure 
was proposed in order to avoid the necessity of summoning 
Parliament. The compromise was to delay aggression and 
issue an ultimatum to the Amir. This compromise provided 
for full-scale war, in place of a limited material guarantee, 
but delayed action to strengthen the case to be presented to 
Parliament.
6. The decision was made necessary by a sudden and 
unexpected development. This characteristic is true as 
far as the Actors in the Home Government were concerned.
The decision was not a result of the Home Government's 
foreign policy, and as it had not been anticipated by the 
Home Government, its members had no definite plan for 
dealing with it.
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7. The development leading to the decision was 
not unexpected by the Viceroy. This characteristic and 
the preceding one are opposite sides of the same coin.
For here the two governments were acting in opposition to 
one another. Thus the situation came as a complete 
surprise to the Home Government, but the Viceroy had not 
only anticipated the development, he had done his best to 
bring it about, and consequently had his own plans and 
ideas of what action to take.
8. This decision was unique in that it involved 
two sets of Actors operating at two different points.
The Actors in London had different motives and information 
from those in Calcutta, and each was unaware of the other's 
intentions. This fact makes it difficult to generalize, 
for what applies to the Home Government's role, does not 
necessarily apply to the Viceroy's role in the decision.
9. This decision could be considered a crisis 
decision. Glenn D. Paige defines a crisis decision as one 
that is a "response to a high threat to values, either 
immediate or long range, where there is little time for 
decision under conditions of surprise.
The Actors in London were certainly surprised by 
the incident at Ali Musjid. It did not become an immediate 
threat to their values (due to distance and lack of 
information) until they were certain that the affront had
Ipaige, p. 276.
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been ordered by the Amir. Lytton's announcement of the 
receipt of the "insolent" letter from Sher Ali, and his 
conclusion that the Amir was responsible for the rejection 
of the Mission, necessitated action. The value at stake 
was British prestige. Word was received from Lytton on 
October 19th, and the Cabinet was summoned on the 25th, at 
which time the decision was made.
The decision might also be considered a crisis 
decision because it was the result of an action outside 
of British territory, and taken by people not under 
British control.
Conclusions
In considering this particular decision, and all 
the factors involved in it, some important conclusions 
may be drawn. This was a particularly complicated decision 
because of the almost parallel circumstances surrounding 
the two locations of the Actors. By parallel, it is not 
meant identical, but two separate systems, acting simul­
taneously. Thus the Actors in London, who had certain 
objectives, motives, and information, were taking actions 
at the same time as the Actors in Calcutta, who possessed 
their own distinctive objectives, motives, and informa­
tion, were involved in carrying out their own action.
But like parallel lines, these two actions did not converge, 
at least not until the crisis arose.
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This decision-making framework has helped to 
unravel some of the confusion surrounding the decision, 
and has helped to reveal certain important points con­
cerning motivation, responsibility, causes, and validity. 
Accordingly, the following conclusions are offered:
1. At the time of the crisis, Russia was in no 
way a threat to British India.
2. The information upon which the Viceroy based 
his beliefs and decisions was unreliable.
3. The Viceroy accepted information which cor­
responded to his belief system, and rejected that which 
did not, regardless of validity.
4. The Viceroy was an extreme Russophobe.
5. The Viceroy, due to an innate sense of 
superiority, was offended by Sher Ali's attitude of 
equality.
6. The Viceroy's feelings towards the Amir 
greatly affected his actions.
7. From the time of the Peshawar Conference, the 
Viceroy was determined to pull down the Amir and plotted 
accordingly.
8. The Home Government had wanted to establish 
closer relations with Afghanistan in order to be able to 
use that country as a base of operation in case of a 
war with Russia in Central Asia.
9. The above motive was removed with the signing
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of the Treaty of Berlin.
10. The Home Government was unaware of the 
Viceroy's intentions.
11. The Viceroy was not kept informed of the 
Home Government's actions or wishes.
12. The Viceroy felt himself more competent to 
make decisions than those in the Home Government.
13. The Viceroy deliberately precipitated the 
incident at Ali Musjid in order to gain public support 
for his proposed action in Afghanistan.
14. The Amir of Afghanistan at no time aggressed
against the British.
15. The Amir wanted neither British nor Russian 
interference in his country.
16. The Amir did not want to accept the Russian
Mission, but was threatened with the loss of his throne
if he refused.
17. Sher Ali did not openly refuse to receive a 
British Mission. The stipulation he made was that it must 
come at his invitation and not by force.
18. The sole motive for the decision was to 
uphold British prestige. Sher Ali was no threat to 
British India, as the country was poor and the Russian 
threat had been removed. But British pride had been hurt.
19. In assessing capability, little attention 
was given as to how the political settlement would be
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handled.
20. The disastrous results of the attempted 
occupation of Afghanistan during the First Afghan War 
were ignored.
21. Because of the principle in British Govern­
ment of Cabinet Responsibility, the Cabinet was responsible 
for the decision, but the circumstances which necessitated 
that decision had been forced upon it by the Viceroy's 
actions.
22. Neither the Viceroy nor the other Actors 
understood the true temperament of the Afghan people, 
and thus they built their policy on unrealities.
It might be well at this point to consider for 
a moment the results of this decision, for in judging its 
validity, the final results are helpful. The British easily 
conquered the country, but they could not hold it without 
pouring a large amount of money and troops into the 
country. The Afghans had not done too well on the battle­
field, against modern weapons, but in a war of attrition 
they were quite skillful. Sher Ali died and his son,
Yakub, concluded a treaty with the British (the Treaty 
of Gandamuk). If the story had ended here, it would have 
been a success. However, after the massacre of Cavagnari, 
Yakub abdicated and fled the country. At this point the 
British accomplishments consisted of destroying Sher 
Ali's kingdom, and plunging the whole country into anarchy.
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At this juncture even Lytton wanted out, and he 
saw clearly, for once, that the best hope for unifying 
the country lay in finding a strong ruler who could win 
the support of the people. The only one around who could 
possibly qualify was Sher Ali's cousin, Abdur Rahman, whom 
the Russians had used to threaten the old Amir. Con­
sequently, Lytton put out feelers to Abdur Rahman.
Before anything could be accomplished, the Conservative 
Government fell, and Lytton resigned. His successor.
Lord Ripen, concluded an agreement with Abdur Rahman who 
took over the country. Abdur Rahman turned out to be a 
very strong ruler. He succeeded in extracting a great 
amount of subsidy from the British Government, but ironi­
cally he did not allow any British European resident to be 
stationed in his country, although he did receive a native 
envoy. Thus the British were right back where they 
started, having gained neither territory, domination, or 
even a European resident, but having spent a great deal 
of money, and having incurred a more fervent dislike of 
themselves by the Afghans.
Another significant result of this decision was 
its contribution to the defeat of the Conservative Govern­
ment in 1880. During the election campaign Gladstone 
denounced the Conservatives on many scores, but the 
disaster in Afghanistan was one of the main issues. He 
denounced "'the policy of denying to others the rights
314
that we claim ourselves,' as untrue, arrogant and dan­
gerous."^ He campaigned on moral issues and recalled 
men to moral forces they had forgotten. Gradually, what 
had been a vague misgiving among the British people about 
Disraeli and the Conservative Government grew into 
certainty. What at first had been only shadows of doubt 
about foreign policy, including that in Afghanistan, 
became substantial condemnation in the election campaign.
The following is a sample of Gladstone's oratory con­
cerning Afghanistan:
Remember that the sanctity of life in the hill 
villages of Afghanistan, among the winter snows, is 
as inviolable in the eyes of Almighty God as can be 
your own. Remember that He who has united you as human 
beings in the same flesh and blood, has bound you by the 
law of mutual love; that that mutual love is not 
limited by the shores of this island, is not limited 
by the boundaries of Christian civilization; that it 
passes over the whole surface of the earth and embraces 
the meanest along with the greatest in its unmeasured 
scope.3
When the election took place, Gladstone had the 
nation behind him, and, as Morley puts it, "the people of 
this realm, who are a people of rather more than their 
share of conscience at bottom, were led to consider 
whether when all is said, there is not still a difference 
between right and wrong, even in the relations of state
2john Morley, Life of William Ewart Gladstone 
(London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1904), II, p. 595.
3lbid.
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and the problems of e m p i r e ."4
General Hypotheses Concerning Decision-iMaking 
Derived from this Study
While the validity of a generalization, based on 
one particular case study, may be questionable, such 
hypotheses may be helpful when compared with similar hypo­
theses drawn from other individual case studies. When a 
sufficient number of studies has been completed, some valid 
assumptions may well be arrived at through the process 
of comparison. These hypotheses are presented in that 
spirit, with the realization that all of them may not be 
applicable to every decision, but that some of them may. 
Also decisions made under similar circumstances may have 
similar characteristics. It is thus hoped that some of 
these hypotheses may be useful to others doing similar 
studies.
The framework for these hypotheses is drawn from 
Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making, 
and from Paige’s The Korean Decision. The hypotheses 
themselves have been derived from the foregoing study of 
the Afghan decision.
Information and Communication
1.1 A faulty system of communicating information
4lbid., p. 594.
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between the branches of government which have authority 
to take independent action, can result in faulty action 
being taken. The Government of India did not keep the 
Home Government properly informed, and conversely, the 
Home Government did not keep the Government of India 
informed. At times the India Office did not inform the 
Foreign Office, and the Foreign Office neglected to 
supply information to the India Office. This resulted in 
no one knowing what anyone else was doing, a dangerous 
situation which helped produce the crisis.
1.2 In a crisis situation the decision-makers 
feel a strong necessity for accurate information before 
formulating a decision. Thus Cranbrook wired Lytton to 
be sure of the facts when he first heard of a Russian 
Mission, and again when the British Mission was stopped, 
he told the Viceroy to find out definitely if the Amir had 
issued the orders. Furthermore, the Cabinet was not 
ready to act until it felt certain it had the facts 
concerning the Amir's intentions.
1.3 Decisions made on the basis of out-dated 
information are very apt to result in miscalculations. 
Lytton's decision to advance the Mission was based on 
information regarding a Russian threat which no longer 
existed. Besides, he had been led to believe that the 
Afghan matter was to be handled as a local affair, and 
had not been informed of the Home Government's change
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of opinion nor of the protest to St. Petersburg. His 
action was based on out-dated information, and on the 
basis of a motive (that of preparing for a war with Russia 
in Central Asia) which no longer existed.
1.4 The greater the motive, the less the importance 
of information. The decision-maker may ignore the facts 
and act the way he sees fit. Lytton's desire to gain 
British ascendency in Afghanistan led him to ignore 
certain information, and to give little weight to that 
information which conflicted with his goals.
1.5 The greater the crisis, the greater the 
inclination for the decision-makers to supplement objective 
information with information or interpretations based on 
their own experiences or proclivities. As the crisis called 
for action, information was interpreted in a way which 
would justify the desired response. Lytton's interpreta­
tion of the Amir's letter, and of the incident at Ali 
Musjid are an example of this, as they were far from 
objective. The Home Government's justification of its 
action also was based on other than objective information, 
and the interpretation of information was motivated by
its goals.
1.6 The greater the crisis, the less information 
pertinent to the decision is made public. The Amir's 
letter was not made public until well after war had been 
declared. Neither was information released concerning
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the tone of the Viceroy's letters to the Amir. These were 
just a few of the instances where information was withheld 
from the public.
1.7 The greater the crisis, the more the tendency 
to release information of a propaganda nature. This is 
done in order to secure public support for the decision­
makers' actions. Much information was released concerning 
the "insult" at Ali Musjid, the Amir's hostility towards 
the British, his cordial reception of the Russians, and 
his "insolent" letter to the Viceroy.
1.8 The greater the crisis, the greater the 
demand for information by those outside the decision-making 
circle. Members of the Opposition demanded information 
which was withheld from them, and maintained that they 
could not accurately judge the situation and vote intel­
ligently in Parliament without more information. They 
strongly criticized Disraeli's government for what they 
considered suppressing information.
Motivation
2.1 In a crisis situation an attempt is usually 
made to limit the scope of the situation, and thus not to 
involve other factions. In this particular situation, the 
Proclamation of War was directed solely against the Amir, 
thus attempting to limit the quarrel. The Actors in London 
were particularly concerned with avoiding any involvement
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with Russia over the situation. Another step taken in 
this direction was the detachment of the frontier tribes 
from the Amir, again narrowing the protagonists.
2.2 A crisis tends to evoke a goal-means value 
complex that is strongly conditioned emotionally.̂  The 
Viceroy was certainly emotionally involved as evidenced 
by his attitude towards the Amir. The Cabinet members' 
emotions became an important factor in the decision for 
war, for it was definitely emotionalism that made them 
feel that any insult must be avenged.
2.3 Crisis tends to evoke the gradual proliferation 
of associated values around a dominant value core.̂  The 
original value that created the crisis, which called for 
action, was that of the Nation's prestige. But when the 
Cabinet members came to make public statements in support
of their actions, they extended it to include the Russian 
threat, need for a scientific frontier, hostility of the 
Amir in waging religious wars against British India, and 
danger to India's internal security from disruptive 
forces.
2.4 The greater the crisis, the greater the 
sensitivity to external response expectations.̂  The Home
Spaige, p. 298. 
Gibid., p. 299. 
^Ibid., p. 310.
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Government wanted to avoid creating any problem which would 
involve Russia. The Actors in London were particularly keen 
on this point due to having just established peace with 
Russia. The Prime Minister, in particular, didn't want 
the fruits of his labor destroyed.
2.5 The man-on-the-spot might be more aware of the 
situation at hand, but he is hampered in seeing it in its 
proper perspective. He is only concerned with the immediate 
issue, not with the long-range, overall outlook. Thus,
as was true with Lytton, the man-on-the-spot is not as 
capable of impartial judgment as someone further removed 
from the scene.
2.6 The stronger the decision-maker's personal 
bias, the more rigid is his motivation. Thus his motivation 
does not readily change with changing circumstances. Lytton 
was so wrapped up in his ideas of Russian intrigues and Sher 
Ali's hostility, that when the Russian threat was removed, 
it still remained in his mind, and the motivation to keep 
Sher Ali from going under Russian dominance remained as 
fixed as ever.
2.7 The likelihood of an actor's personal impact 
affecting a decision varies with the actor's location in
the environment.B For personal impact to have any importance, 
the government must not only be unstable, but the Actor must 
be in a position where he has authority to act. Actors in
Spred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics 
(Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1969), p. 44.
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a position where they are inhibited or restrained by 
others, are unable to accomplish much by themselves. 
Lytton, however, was not sufficiently restrained by 
Cranbrook, so that even though he was ordered to hold the 
Mission, there was no one in India over him to prevent him 
from acting on his own initiative.
2.8 The likelihood of the personal impact of an 
actor is increased to the degree that the environment may 
be restructured.̂  A situation may be considered unstable 
"if modest interventions can produce disproportionately 
large r e s u l t s , and thus subject it to restructuring.
A stable situation does not allow restructuring, and the 
final outcome cannot be changed by eliminating some of the 
contributing factors.
The situation regarding Afghanistan was unstable 
in the above sense. Lytton was able, through his action 
in advancing the Chamberlain Mission, to precipitate a 
crisis, which restructured the environment and made an 
entirely different response necessary from what had been 
anticipated by the Home Government.
2.9 The personal effect of the Actor varies 
proportionately with his strengths and weaknesses. Lytton 




a strong, determined, and willful nature. He did not 
hesitate to take the initiative. On the other hand, 
Cranbrook's weakness tended to increase the Viceroy's 
strength and ability to act single-handed.
2.10 A sure way to win support for an otherwise 
unpopular course of action, is to bring forth the question 
of the necessity of maintaining or restoring the Nation's 
prestige. A great nation, such as England, with its 
principal Actors believing in imperialism, cannot bear to 
lose face, regardless of the consequences. To the imper­
ialist-minded nation, prestige is all important, for if the 
country's prestige suffers, other nations will think less 
of it. Moreover, as in the case of Britain, loss of face 
among subjected peoples was too humiliating, and might 
lead to internal disturbances, if the subjugated people 
somehow got the notion that the "masters" were losing 
their grip.
Capability
3.1 In a crisis situation the leader as a rule 
must accept responsibility for the action taken. Disraeli 
accepted the responsibility for the decision, along with 
his Cabinet, for in Britain Cabinet responsibility was, 
and is, a characteristic of the government. Once the 
situation had been created, the Prime Minister steadfastly 
supported the Viceroy, despite his anger at the letter's
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disobedience. Disraeli, along with the other Cabinet 
members, did not hesitate to assume responsibility for 
their policy, nor to support that policy and their actions 
in Parliament.
3.2 The greater the crisis, the greater the need 
for personal, face-to-face contact among the decision­
makers . When news of the incident at Ali Musjid first 
arrived in England, the main Actors were scattered. The 
Prime Minister felt the need to get together with Salisbury 
and Cranbrook, and finally persuaded Cranbrook to return
to London, as he himself had done earlier. Again, when 
word was received of the Amir's response to the Viceroy's 
letter, it was felt necessary to call the Cabinet together 
for a face-to-face discussion of what action should be 
taken.
3.3 Decision-makers contemplating war are likely 
to be conservative in their estimates of the financial 
costs. Public support is more apt to be gained by under­
estimating cost than by overestimating it. If it were 
known in advance what the actual cost of a war would be, 
in both money and lives, it would be difficult to gain 
public support. In this case the war estimates were 
extremely low, as compared with the actual cost, and even 
though the same had been true in the case of the First 
Afghan War, the Government displayed confidence in the 
estimates.
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3.4 In dealing with underdeveloped countries, 
a major power needs to consider its ability to hold the 
countryside more than its ability to win a conventional- 
type war. A large major power easily has the military 
capability to defeat a small, disorganized power, but this 
is not the main problem. Large, well-equipped armies 
have an advantage on the battlefield, but are ineffective 
in guerrilla warfare.
Britain in this case made the mistake, often made 
by such major powers, of viewing her capability in terms 
of military might. With all her wealth and power, she 
was unable to hold Afghanistan after the initial military 
victory. This was the case in the Second Afghan War just 
as it had been the case in the First Afghan War. Neither 
was this difficulty unknown, for the example of the 
First Afghan War was often held up to the Conservative 
Government by the Opposition as reason for avoiding any 
military intrusion into Afghanistan.
3.5 Faulty perception of the nature of a people 
(or nation) is likely to result in a miscalculation of 
capability. Lytton certainly did not understand the 
psychology of the Afghan people. He took many of his 
notions on policy towards that country from Lord Palmerston, 
who was the Prime Minister during the disastrous First 
Afghan War. The results of Palmerston's policy should 
have been a warning, but they were not. He also relied
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on the opinions of Sir Bartle Frere, but although Frere 
had had vast experience in Asiatic politics and war, and 
had been associated with the Government of India, and was 
a member of the Secretary of State's Council, he had never 
had any connection with Afghanistan, so that his ideas 
were based on his knowledge of other Asiatics. Lytton, 
along with the other Actors, made the mistake of assuming 
the Afghan character to be the same as that of the Asiatic 
peoples with whom they had come in contact, particularly 
the Indians.
3.6 The greater the difference in the cultures
of two countries, the greater the chance for lack of
competence in understanding the other people. Lytton
often made the mistake of judging Sher Ali's actions by
British standards. \Vhat he considered a lack of courtesy 
%by the Amir was actually not discourtesy, but national 
pride. The Amir's letters to the Viceroy were not nearly 
as "insolent" as those of the Viceroy to the Amir. But 
Lytton believed that all such "barbaric" countries should 
recognize the superiority of the British and write in 
humble terms, not as equals. He was used to dealing with 
the Indians who had been subjugated and humbled for a 
number of years, and he did not recognize that this 
attitude did not extend beyond the frontier.
Another example is the Viceroy's (and also 
Salisbury's) belief that it would be very advantageous to
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have a British European agent stationed in Afghanistan.
They could see no good reason for the Amir to refuse this 
request, and thought his protestation on the grounds of 
the envoy's safety, were pretexts. Here again they did 
not understand the Afghan nature nor their hostility towards 
the British as a result of the occupation during the First 
Afghan War. The British were not safe in Afghanistan at 
that time, nor for many, many years after. When Abdur 
Rahman became Amir, he still did not permit a European 
agent in his country, and the British native envoy was 
treated as a virtual prisoner for his own protection.
3.7 The greater the crisis, the greater the 
concern of the decision-makers for the acceptance of their 
response. This includes both public acceptance and 
acceptance by any body that may have authority to check 
that response. Lytton, in meeting the crisis by forwarding 
the Chamberlain Mission against orders, felt certain of 
public support for his policy in the event of an affront, 
and also of the Home Government's support— particularly 
that of Disraeli and Cranbrook.
The Cabinet in making the final decision was very 
much concerned about winning the support of Parliament, 
which was a necessity. For, unless Parliament voted to 
allow the Government of India to use its revenues to 
support the war, it could not be carried on. Thus they 
debated the best way to secure the support of Parliament,
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and accordingly decided on sending an Ultimatum to the 
Amir, in an attempt to shift the responsibility for war 
onto his shoulders.
3.8 The tolerance for faulty decisional execution 
is greater if favorable results are obtained, and decreases 
proportionately with less favorable results. Thus if 
Lytton's decision to forward the Mission ahead of time and 
against orders, had met with a favorable reception, his 
action would have been applauded. Since instead the action 
incurred an "insult" to the nation, the Prime Minister
and other Cabinet members were quite annoyed.
3.9 Public opinion has an ex post facto effect 
on foreign policy. Public opinion does not prevent 
decisions or influence them to any great extent. If 
the policy is successful, public opinion is favorable.
But if the policy fails, then public opinion may become 
sufficiently incensed to cause changes in the government. 
Although public opinion was not altogether in favor of 
embarking upon the Second Afghan War, it was powerless
as a deterrent to that action. Lord Derby expressed the 
general feeling at that time in Parliamentary session on 
December 9, 1878, saying, "We are discussing, an issue 
upon which we have no real or practical influence."H 
However, when the policy resulted in disaster the public
^Thompson, II, p. 502.
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reacted by defeating the Conservatives in the General 
Election of 1880.
Thus conclusions may be drawn concerning the 
various determinant of decision, but it is obvious that 
the determinants are interacting and not isolated. 
Capability may be viewed in light of motivation. Motiva­
tion may be stimulated by information. Information may 
be interpreted according to motivation. These are just a 
few examples of the interactions and complexities. While 
one may attempt to isolate the various determinants, in 
order to better understand them, they do not operate in 
isolation.
Observations concerning Methodology
Historians ascribe various reasons for actions 
taken by decision-makers, but generally without a clear- 
cut basis for their assumptions. In reading many his­
torical sources concerning the advent of the Second Afghan 
War, many questions arise which are not satisfactorily 
answered. Most historians have attributed the blame for 
the Second Afghan War to Lytton, leaving the impression 
that he alone had anything to do with it. This study 
has revealed that while in the final instance he preci­
pitated the necessity for action, the other Actors 
anticipated such action up until the Berlin Congress 
changed the situation. Even at this point had Lytton
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been properly informed and controlled, the necessity for 
hostilities would have been avoided.
Another point which has been clarified, by using 
this approach, is that regarding the Chamberlain Mission. 
Dilip Kumar Ghose, in his work, England and Afghanistan, 
raises the question as to why Lytton disobeyed orders, 
both in sending the Chamberlain Mission before permission 
was received, and why he sent it through the Khyber Pass 
instead of by way of Kandahar. The mystery presented by 
Mr. Ghose is no great mystery when the question is analyzed 
using the decision-making framework.
This framework is extremely valuable in dissecting 
the various components which lead to a decision, thus 
enabling the researcher to more clearly identify the 
contributing factors, and thereby better understand the 
nature of the decision in question. This also leads to 
discovery of important points which would otherwise be 
overlooked. The basic understanding of a decision, which 
this process affords the researcher, is much greater than 
that afforded by the historical approach alone.
This method is also helpful in affording a better 
understanding of the organizational framework and channels 
involved in decision-making, for no decision-maker operates 
in isolation from the governmental structure. This 
structure may either hamper or aid the actors in making 
decisions, and it is important to understand the
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organizational setting in which decision-makers function.
The main drawback which has been encountered in 
the use of this method is the necessary repetition, for 
in viewing the same events, even though from different 
angles, repetition is unavoidable. However, this may not 
bother the investigator as much as the reader.
While the conclusions drawn regarding this 
particular decision are felt to be valid, the validity 
of the general conclusions must await comparison with 
many more studies of this type. It is hoped that the 
future studies of such conclusions, en masse, may contribute 
some helpful suggestions for future decision-makers.
GLOSSARY
GLOSSARY
Bala Hissar. The citadel or fort of Kabul, located in 
the southeastern section of old Kabul. It served as the 
residence of the kings in the days of Shah Shuja. It is 
a strategic military position, being located on high 
ground which overlooks the city. It is used as a munitions 
depot even today.
durbar. (Also written darbar). An audience, levy, or 
state reception held by the governor or sovereign.
Bed. A Moslem religious holy day which occurs at the 
end of the thirty day fast period known as Ramadan. A 
second Bed (Bed Al-adha) occurs seventy days after the 
first Bed (Bed Al-fiter).
firman. A Persian term meaning a mandate, order, or 
decree of an oriental sovereign. Also a grant, a passport, 
license, grant of privileges. Issued for various special 
purposes, such as to insure protection and assistance to 
a traveler.
Ghilzai. One of the major Afghan tribes. They were 
located principally in the northeastern part of Afghanistan. 
They are engaged for the most part in commerce and the 
militairy.
Nawab. An Indian title for a nobleman. Also called 
nabob. The title came originally from the Arabic naib 
which meant governor.
Sirdar. A Persian title for a headman or chieftain. The 
term is also used in India.
Vakeel. An Arabic term widely used in India meaning an 
ambassador or agent sent on a special commission, or 
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